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Abstract
Inspired by the history of the development of instruments in the physical sciences, and by
past psychology giants, the following dissertation aimed to advance basic psychological
science by investigating the metric calibration of psychological instruments. The overarching goal of the dissertation was to demonstrate that it is both useful and feasible to
calibrate the metric of psychological instruments so as to render their metrics non-arbitrary.
Concerning utility, a conceptual analysis was executed delineating four categories of
proposed benefits of non-arbitrary metrics including (a) help in the interpretation of data, (b)
facilitation of construct validity research, (c) contribution to theory development, and (d)
facilitation of general accumulation of knowledge. With respect to feasibility, the metric
calibration approach was successfully applied to instruments of seven distinct constructs
commonly studied in psychology, across three empirical demonstration studies and reanalyses of other researchers’ data. Extending past research, metric calibration was achieved
in these empirical demonstration studies by finding empirical linkages between scores of the
measures and specifically configured theoretically-relevant behaviors argued to reflect
particular locations (i.e., ranges) of the relevant underlying psychological dimension. More
generally, such configured behaviors can serve as common reference points to calibrate the
scores of different instruments, rendering the metric of those instruments non-arbitrary.
Study 1 showed a meaningful metric mapping between scores of a frequently used
instrument to measure need for cognition and probability of choosing to complete a
cognitively effortful over a cognitively simpler task. Study 1 also found an interesting metric
linkage between scores of a practically useful self-report measure of task persistence and
actual persistence in an anagram persistence task. Study 2, set in the context of the debate of
pan-cultural self-enhancement, found theoretically interesting metric mappings between a
trait rating measure of self-enhancement often used in the debate and a specifically
configured behavioral measure of self-enhancement (i.e., over-claiming of knowledge).
Study 3 demonstrated the metric calibration approach for popular behavioral measures of
risk-taking often used in experimental studies and found meaningful metric linkages to risky
gambles in binary lottery choices involving the possibility of winning real money. Reanalyses of relevant datasets shared by other researchers also revealed meaningful metric
iii

mappings for instruments assessing extraversion, conscientiousness, and self-control.
Gregariousness facet scores were empirically linked to number of social parties attended per
month, Dutifulness facet scores (conscientiousness) were connected to maximum driving
speed, and trait self-control scores were calibrated to GPA. In addition, to further
demonstrate the utility of non-arbitrary metrics for basic psychological research, some of my
preliminary metric calibration findings were applied to actual research findings from the
literature. Limitations and obstacles of metric calibration and promising future directions are
also discussed.

Keywords
Metric calibration, arbitrary metrics, psychological units of measurement, psychological
measurement, psychometrics.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

It is undeniable that measurement is a cornerstone of psychology as an empirical science.
Any field of scientific enquiry takes it as a given that empirical observation – rather than
judgments of faith – is the primary evidentiary entity used to make claims regarding
reality. The significance of measurement cannot be over-stated. The importance of
measurement, however, can be further illuminated by considering the definition of the
word cornerstone. The Oxford English dictionary defines cornerstone as “the first stone
set in the construction of a masonry foundation, important since all other stones will be
set in reference to this stone, thus determining the position of the entire structure.” This
analogy visually reveals that measurement is critical because all empirical findings and
theoretical claims are fundamentally tied or emerge in reference to measurement.
Furthermore, measurement as a first stone ultimately determines the structure and
sturdiness of an entire body of scientific knowledge.
The vast majority of researchers in psychology generally agree with the importance of
measurement. Indeed, within the last few decades, great advances in psychological
measurement techniques have been achieved, which have led to important theoretical
insights (e.g., the development of implicit measures; see Fazio & Olson, 2003). At the
same time, however, some psychologists have pleaded for an increased focus on
measurement in psychological research (e.g., Borsboom, 2006; Embretson, 2006;
Merenda, 2007; Murphy & Deshon, 2000). In particular, Borsboom (2006), based on an
analysis of the factors that have hindered the integration of psychometrics and
psychology, argued that the incorporation of more advanced psychometric practices into
psychological research is necessary for the true potential of psychological science to be
realized. Notwithstanding these critiques, psychology researchers are often diligent in
satisfying basic measurement requirements, for example, by providing evidence for the
reliability and validity of their measures. However, an aspect of measurement that is
distinct from reliability and validity that has received virtually no attention in basic
research and scant attention in applied research, concerns the numbering system used to
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quantify observed scores on psychological measures: that is, the metric of psychological
instruments.
The term metric refers to the numbering system used to quantify observed measurement
scores when describing an individuals’ standing on a psychological construct (Blanton &
Jaccard, 2006a). For instance, Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck & Steer, 1987)
has a metric that can range from 0 to 63. An interesting fact that is rarely discussed,
however, is that virtually all measures in psychology have a metric that is arbitrary in
nature. This means that any particular value produced by a measurement instrument does
not necessarily have any precise meaning except when considered in relation to other
values. That is, a score of “35” on the BDI does not – in and of itself – tell us much;
however, relative to a score of “45”, we can – all else being equal – infer that a person
with a score of “35” has a depression of lesser severity than a person with a score of
“45”. In a formal sense, a metric is arbitrary when it is not empirically known where a
given score locates an individual on the underlying psychological dimension or when it is
not known how a 1-unit change in the observed scores reflects the magnitude of change
on the underlying dimension (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b).
The focus of the current research is on the nature of arbitrary metrics in the context of
basic psychological research. The over-arching goal of the dissertation is to argue that it
is both useful and feasible to calibrate the metric of psychological instruments used in
basic psychological research so as to render their metrics non-arbitrary. To achieve this
goal, I will present a conceptual analysis of the utility of non-arbitrary metrics for basic
psychological research by elaborating on four categories of proposed benefits of nonarbitrary metrics. Then, I will illustrate empirically that it is feasible to calibrate the
metric of psychological instruments, by applying the metric calibration approach to seven
distinct constructs commonly studied in psychological research, across three studies and
re-analyses of other researchers’ data. Finally, connecting the conceptual and empirical
components of the dissertation, in the General Discussion, I will attempt to strengthen my
case regarding the proposed benefits of non-arbitrary metrics by applying some of my
preliminary metric calibration findings to actual published research findings in the
literature.

3

1.1

The Nature of Metrics and Metric Arbitrariness

In this section, I will expand on what is meant by metric arbitrariness and elaborate on
important issues that are relevant when considering the metrics of psychological
measures. First, however, a clarification concerning terminology is in order. Following
De Houwer (2006), I will define a measurement procedure (or measurement instrument)
as the actual apparatus used to measure a psychological variable (e.g., the questionnaire,
task instructions, etc.). For the term, measure, it is important to realize that this term can
refer either to the measurement instrument or to the outcome of a measurement procedure
(e.g., a particular score on a questionnaire). To avoid this ambiguity, I will use the term
measure exclusively to refer to the measurement instrument. To refer to the outcome of
measurement, I will use the term measurement scores (or observed scores), which can be
viewed as the end product of applying a measurement procedure to a person to assess a
psychological construct. The term measurement is defined using Stevens’ (1946) widely
adopted characterization as “the assignment of numerals to objects or events according to
some rule” (p. 677; but see Luce, 1997). Hence, metric arbitrariness is a feature of the
scores produced by a measurement procedure.
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, Blanton and Jaccard (2006a) consider a
metric as arbitrary when it is not known where a given score locates an individual on the
underlying psychological dimension or when it is not known how a 1-unit change in the
observed scores reflects the magnitude of change on the underlying dimension. In other
words, a metric is arbitrary when the mapping between observed scores and the
underlying dimension is unknown. In psychology, it is generally assumed that observed
scores provide a proxy to an individual’s actual standing on the latent construct of interest
and that some response function relates the individual’s actual standing on the construct
to his or her observed score on the response metric (Lord & Novick, 1968). Hence, when
a metric is arbitrary, the function describing the relation between observed scores on a
measure and the underlying dimension is unknown (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a). Of
course, we never have direct access to the underlying dimension (as is also the case in the
physical sciences). What we can do, however, is to observe theoretically-relevant
behaviors, which can be argued to reflect different levels of the underlying dimension.
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The general task then becomes to discover how scores from the to-be-calibrated measure
link up to these theoretically-relevant behaviors, which researchers consensually agree
reflect particular locations on the underlying dimension of the construct (I will elaborate
below on the characteristics such behaviors should ideally possess to serve as useful
reference points). These fundamental concepts of metric calibration can be clarified by
turning to the panel A of Figure 1, which depicts three depression instruments having
arbitrary but distinct metrics (Instrument A = Self-report Depression Scale [SDS; Zung,
1965], Instrument B = Major Depression Inventory [MDI; Bech et al., 2001], and
Instrument C = Beck’s Depression Inventory [BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987]).

Figure 1: The nature of arbitrary metrics visually depicted.
The metric arbitrariness of these instruments becomes apparent in the figure given that
the instruments have not been linked in any way to relevant behavioral reference points

5

of depression. Hence, it is unclear what a high score on any of the depression instruments
means with respect to the different ranges of the underlying dimension. For instance, it is
possible that a high score on one instrument (e.g., instrument A) reflects a lower level of
depression than a low score on another instrument (e.g., instrument C).
These issues can be further clarified by considering the metric calibration of different
thermometer instruments, depicted in panel B of Figure 1. Here, the non-arbitrary metric
of the different thermometers becomes apparent given they have all been empirically
linked to the boiling and freezing point of water, which are reference points indicative of
particular locations on the underlying dimension of temperature. As should be apparent, it
is clear that the only way to know that these different thermometers are tapping into
different ranges of the underlying dimension of temperature is through their empirical
linkages to the relevant reference points. For instance, the cooking thermometer
(thermometer A) taps into a higher and much wider range of the underlying dimension
whereas the more general purpose thermometers (thermometers B and C) cover a
narrower and lower range.
Returning to the depression instruments, these considerations make apparent that to get a
sense of what range of the underlying dimension the different depression instruments are
tapping into, it is necessary to empirically link scores from those instruments to specific
depression behaviors which could be argued to reflect different locations on the
underlying dimension of depression (for e.g., suicide attempt in the last six months).
Then, the metric of those instruments would gain meaning and become non-arbitrary.
More generally, achieving non-arbitrary metrics for psychological instruments requires
that observed scores are linked to particular behaviors argued to reflect different locations
on the underlying psychological dimension. Then, and only then, will the metric of
psychological instruments start to gain meaning and hence shed light on what location of
the underlying dimension one’s instrument is tapping into. Below, I will elaborate on the
specific details of this kind of metric calibration approach and outline the critical features
ideal behavioral reference points should possess.
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Arbitrary metrics may not be a problem per se for basic researchers who typically seek to
test general theories rather than make absolute judgments about a person’s standing on a
construct (however, we will see later how this can be a problem for certain types of
claims made even in basic psychology). Arbitrary metrics do, however, become an issue
when researchers attempt to make individual-level diagnoses based solely on the scores
produced by an instrument with an arbitrary metric. This is the case when a researcher
attempts to characterize an individual (or a group of individuals) as “high” or “low” on
the underlying dimension: that is, making a statement regarding a person’s absolute level
on the underlying dimension.
Blanton and Jaccard described (2006a) two inappropriate strategies researchers
sometimes use to make absolute judgments from scores produced by measures with
arbitrary metrics: meter reading and norming. Meter reading refers to the act of simply
using the score on the observed metric to infer the standing of the person on the
underlying dimension. Hence, someone with a score at the high end of the metric would
be considered as being “high” on the underlying dimension whereas someone with a
score at the low end of the metric would be considered as being “low” on the underlying
dimension (see below for an example). Norming refers to the process of transforming raw
scores into standardized scores (e.g., z-scores or percentiles) based on the distribution of
data from a target population and then making inferences of location on the underlying
dimension based on this new metric. Blanton and Jaccard argue that both of these
strategies are unfounded and that systematic metric research linking measurement scores
to meaningful psychological events is the only sufficient strategy to permit inferences
regarding someone’s standing on the underlying dimension.
Meter reading, the first inappropriate strategy reviewed by Blanton and Jaccard (2006a),
involves inferring the standing of a person on the underlying dimension by simply
examining where, on the metric range, that person’s observed score lies. For example,
inferring that someone with a score of “6” on a self-esteem inventory with a metric
ranging from 1 to 7 is “high” on the underlying dimension of self-esteem would be an
example of meter reading. Although meter reading may not be that common for situations
similar to this simple example, researchers often engage in meter reading in the context
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of bipolar constructs, which are quite common in psychology. For bipolar constructs, the
two ends of the dimension are assumed to be polar opposites, with the midpoint of the
scale sometimes labeled as “neutral” or “unsure” or “neither agree nor disagree”. In this
context, researchers may simply assume (based on faith) that the scale midpoint maps
onto the midpoint of the underlying dimension.
The assumption that the scale midpoint maps onto the midpoint of the underlying
dimension is pervasive, for example, in research on egocentric preferences for the self
relative to others (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Weinstein,
1980) and in research on knowledge overconfidence (Erev, Wallsten, & Bedescu, 1994).
In the research on egocentric preferences, for example, researchers infer “better-thanaverage” effects by testing whether individuals’ mean ratings of how they view
themselves in comparison to others on certain traits (e.g., “intelligent”, “friendly”) are
statistically greater than the scale midpoint (5 on a 9-point scale, where 1 = much less
than the average college student; 5 = about the same as the average college student; 9 =
much more than the average college student). There are numerous logical and empirical
reasons why assuming that the scale midpoint reflects the midpoint on the underlying
dimension is not warranted. Logically, and returning to my earlier analogy to
thermometers (see Figure 1, panel B), it should be clear that if one was working with
thermometers that have not been calibrated to relevant fixed points, it follows that one
should not simply conclude that the numerical midpoint on one’s thermometer reflects
“neutral” temperature. Similarly, it is clear from Figure 1 (panel B) that a thermometer
reading near the maximum (or minimum) of the range of the instrument should not be
used to infer the temperature in an absolute sense (i.e., meter reading) if the thermometer
has not been empirically calibrated to relevant fixed points. Transporting these
considerations into the psychological arena clearly implies that one should not engage in
this type of meter reading if the psychological instruments have not been empirically
linked to relevant reference points.
Above and beyond logical considerations against meter reading, there are also various
empirical findings that indicate we should not engage in meter reading with
psychological instruments. For example, ratings given to questionnaire items have been
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shown to be influenced by all of the following: the number of categories on the rating
scale (e.g., 6- vs. 9-point scales; Parducci & Wedell, 1986), the extremity of previously
judged items (Rotter & Tinkleman, 1970), the adjective labels or format of the scale
anchors (French-Lazovik & Gibson, 1984; Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985),
whether the intermediate categories are labeled with adverbs or not (e.g., slightly,
moderately; Lam & Klockars, 1982), sheer frequency with which stimuli occur in the real
world (Wedell & Parducci, 1988), and category activation processes related to the scale
anchors (“very honest” vs. “not at all dishonest” activates conceptually distinct
knowledge structures; Gannon & Ostrom, 1996).
Yet another empirical reason that supports the inappropriateness of meter reading is the
issue that individuals sometimes use different standards of reference when making
judgments about different targets (Biernat & Manis, 1994). For example, it has been
found that for judgments of competence, individuals use different standards of
comparison when judging men versus women, such that individuals – based on gender
stereotypes – give higher ratings of competence to women than to men for exhibiting the
same level of competence (Biernat & Manis, 1994). Hence, equal ratings of perceived
competence across gender targets do not reflect equal amounts of perceived competence.
In other words, a difference score of “0” on observed ratings of competence for men
minus women would not indicate equal perceived competence but in actuality reflect
higher perceived competence in women than in men. In a broader sense, however, one
can argue that individuals’ reliance on different judgment standards poses psychometric
problems even for judgments made about the same target (e.g., personal attitude
judgments: Olson, Goffin, & Haynes, 2007; employee performance judgments: Goffin,
Gellatly, Paunonen, Jackson, & Meyer, 1996; see also Goffin & Olson, 2011). Taken
together, all of these empirical findings imply that it is questionable to engage in meter
reading and hence assume based on faith alone that the neutral point of a numerical scale
maps onto the neutral point of the underlying dimension for bipolar constructs.
Ultimately, however, these empirical reasons are not strictly required to make the case
that meter reading is unwarranted given the aforementioned logic regarding the more
obvious flaw of meter reading when considering, for instance, thermometers which have
not been empirically calibrated to relevant fixed points (see Figure 1, panel B).
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Another example of this issue – worth mentioning due to its notoriety – is the race
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), for which
some researchers interpret scores of “0” as lack of implicit bias, when in fact certain
features of the IAT stimuli could render a difference score of “0” ambiguous in meaning
at best (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b; Blanton et al., 2009). This could be the case if
positive words used in the IAT are more positive in character than the negative words are
negative and/or if the Black faces are more prototypically Black than the White faces are
prototypically White (Bluemke & Friese, 2006; hence, again shifting scores in either
direction away from the theoretical midpoint). To interpret the numerical midpoint of “0”
in the IAT as the neutral midpoint on the underlying dimension, one has to move beyond
meter reading and actually gather evidence of empirical linkages between particular
measurement scores and “meaningful and conceptually relevant behaviors” (p. 63)
argued to reflect particular locations on the underlying dimension (Blanton & Jaccard,
2006b). It is important to note that the metric of any measure, regardless of the measure
type (i.e., self-report, indirect, unobtrusive, behavioral task), is initially inherently
arbitrary. Only after scores of a measure are linked to specifically chosen theoreticallyrelevant behaviors consensually agreed-upon to reflect particular locations on the
underlying psychological dimension, do measurement scores start to gain meaning.
A second strategy identified by Blanton and Jaccard (2006a) sometimes used to
inappropriately infer metric meaning, is when a researcher “norms” a distribution of
scores such that it conforms to the properties of a standardized population of individuals
(e.g., a population of healthy individuals). Norming typically involves the transformation
of raw measure scores into standardized scores, such as z-scores, and then these scores
are interpreted relative to the mean of the standardized population. For example, a raw
score of “6” could be transformed to a z-score of “1.5”, which would mean that a
person’s score is 1.5 standard deviations higher than the mean in the normative target
population. Although it is true that standardizing scores may give important information
about the relative standing of individuals within a particular target population,
standardization alone in no way conveys information about a person’s standing on the
underlying dimension in an absolute sense or in terms of the behavioral implications of a
particular score. Consequently, standardizing scores from an arbitrary metric does not
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render the metric non-arbitrary. The only way to convey information about a person’s
standing on the underlying dimension in an absolute sense is to link observed scores to
behavioral implications of the relevant construct, which can serve as reference points
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b; Sechrest, McKnight, & McKnight, 1996).

1.2

1

Reducing Metric Arbitrariness: Background

To glean information about a person’s standing on an underlying dimension, one has to
go beyond meter reading and norming and acquire empirical evidence for making more
nuanced interpretations of measurement scores. Empirical research must therefore be
executed providing behavioral evidence for score interpretation rather than deciding
metric meaning based on faith, by fiat, or as a measurement assumption. Although sparse,
the literature contains some theorizing about different research strategies that can be used
to reduce metric arbitrariness. A valuable starting point is a framework provided by
Sechrest et al. (1996) who stated that metric meaning can be increased in one of three
ways: (1) by estimating the degree of internal coherence of a measure, (2) by calibrating a
measure with another measure, and (3) by calibrating a measure against external criteria
or behavioral implications. Sechrest et al. emphasized that the third strategy is likely the
most fruitful strategy and hence focus their discussion almost exclusively on this strategy.
This resonates well with Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006a, 2006b) position who also
emphasized a strategy involving the calibration of measures by finding empirical linkages
between measurement scores and meaningful behavioral referents external to the to-becalibrated measure.
Sechrest et al. (1996) elaborated on five strategies to increase the meaning of score
metrics via calibration of a measure against external criteria: direct personal experience,
empirically established behavioral implications, cross-experiential equivalence

1

Some may find Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006a) position that normative data cannot speak to the metric
issue too strong, given that normative IQ data have led to an intuitive metric of IQ scores. Though it is true
that the IQ metric in some sense has gained an intuitive metric via normative data, strictly speaking metric
calibration requires systematic empirical research linking test scores to behavioral reference points rather
than metric meaning based on informal data regarding the kind of behaviors one can expect from
individuals with particular IQ scores.
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(formulating unfamiliar phenomena in more familiar terms), cross-modal representation
(representing psychological states in terms of experiences in other modalities; e.g.,
loudness), and the method of just noticeable differences (minimum difference in scores
required to observe a difference in theoretically-relevant behavior). I will focus my
attention on the first two strategies as they reflect most closely the conceptualization of
metric arbitrariness taken in this dissertation. In terms of direct personal experience,
clinicians working with patients may sometimes have extensive experience in the use of
psychological instruments and hence have an intuitive sense of the kinds of behaviors
that correspond to particular scores on a measure. For example, a clinician who regularly
uses the BDI potentially could have an intuitive understanding of how certain BDI scores
map onto different types of depression-related behaviors (i.e., frequency of crying,
suicide ideation) exhibited by his or her patients. It can be argued, however, that these
types of mappings need to be established more systematically and precisely. Indeed, as
Sechrest et al. mention, these kinds of personal experiences may not be of much help to
the majority of the researchers in the field, who lack dual contact with clients and a
psychological measure, unless this information can be captured and organized in some
systematic fashion. The second strategy proposed by Sechrest et al. involves using
empirically established behavioral implications to calibrate a measure’s scores. For
example, given that a sad demeanor is one of the most salient features of depression, one
could examine the specific mapping between a 1-point increase in BDI score and
reduction in probability of being found smiling. More generally, Sechrest et al. argue that
using behavioral implications of any particular measure (not just clinical measures) can
be a fairly direct method of imbuing measurement scores with more meaning.
In a similar vein, Blanton and Jaccard (2006a, 2006b) provided valuable information on
strategies to reduce the metric arbitrariness of psychological measures. Indeed, they went
beyond Sechrest et al. (1996) by providing a more nuanced conceptual analysis of the
tricky issues surrounding the metric calibration of psychological measures and also by
elaborating more concretely on the actual steps required to carry out empirical research
aimed at reducing metric arbitrariness. According to Blanton and Jaccard’s conceptual
analysis, an important preliminary step, which can be seen as a pre-condition to the
metric calibration of a measure, is to develop consensus among researchers as to which
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particular behaviors (or symptoms, or manifestations of a certain state) likely places an
individual at the high or low end of the underlying psychological dimension. If this
particular behavior empirically corresponds to a certain observed score on the measure,
then the approximate location of the score on the underlying dimension can be inferred.
Granted, this inference nonetheless caries some degree of uncertainty given the number
of complexities inherent in the metric calibration process (e.g., reaching consensus
among experts on the most appropriate behavioral reference points, assessing the
particular behavior, modeling the metric mapping). Indeed, Sechrest et al. mention that
the calibration of measures in psychology may never be as “tight” as in the physical
sciences, but that this should not detract psychologists from engaging in metric
calibration research. Moreover, the fact that the constructs of interest in psychology are
unobservable should also not detract psychologists from calibrating their measures.
Although this fact undoubtedly renders the calibration task quite challenging, it is
important to keep in mind that most constructs in the physical sciences are also
unobservable (e.g., temperature, electricity, magnetism), but that this did not prevent
natural scientists from calibrating measures of unobservable constructs.

1.3

Main Empirical Strategies of Metric Calibration

Three primary strategies can be followed to reduce metric arbitrariness, two roughly
following from Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006a, 2006b) and Sechrest et al.’s (1996)
analyses and one stemming from my own ideas derived from an analysis of how
thermometers and hygrometers are experimentally calibrated to theoretically-relevant
reference points. The main empirical strategies are: (1) mapping observed scores to
noteworthy differences in behavior tied to the phenomenon in question, (2) mapping
observed scores to the gradation of theoretically-relevant behaviors, and (3) using an
experimental approach to experimentally manipulate the construct to increasingly
extreme levels. I will elaborate on each one of these strategies in turn.

1.3.1

Strategy 1: Noteworthy Differences in Behavior

In a first sense, a metric can be made more meaningful by finding an empirical mapping
between observed scores and noteworthy differences in behavior tied to the construct of
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interest. This can be implemented, for example, by finding an empirical mapping
between observed scores and the probability of performing a theoretically-relevant
behavior. In this context, the presence or absence of a behavior can be seen as a clear
noteworthy difference in behavior. Hence, one seeks to document how changes in the
observed scores of the to-be-calibrated measure map onto the probability of performing a
certain behavior. As a concrete example, one could examine how depression scores map
onto whether an individual has or has not made a suicide attempt in the last six months.
As Blanton and Jaccard (2006b) mention, one response function that could be found in
this case is an exponential function, fitted using logistic regression (see Figure 2). As is
seen in the figure, the probability of a suicide attempt is small and constant for depression
scores below “10”, but then start increasing around “15” and may reach unacceptable and
dangerous levels around “25” and “30”, respectively.
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Attempt
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Figure 2: Hypothetical probability of suicide attempt as a function of depression
scores.
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It is important to note that, if this empirical mapping was found (and replicated), it would
be clear that improving someone’s depression score from a value of “30” to “25” would
mean something quite different than improving someone’s depression score from a value
of “20” to “15”. These sorts of meaningful inferences could not be made without this type
of metric calibration information. Hence, as Blanton and Jaccard state more broadly, “as
individual test scores are linked to meaningful external events [behaviors], the meaning
and implications of a given test score become more apparent and the metric becomes less
arbitrary” (p. 63).
Another example may help clarify the important concept involved in the notion of
noteworthy difference in behavior. Consider a researcher interested in shedding light on
the meaning of neuroticism scores by assessing individuals’ emotional reactions to
construct-relevant environmental stressors as a theoretically-relevant behavioral criterion
to calibrate those scores. In particular, one would be interested in finding the mapping
between neuroticism scores and qualitatively distinct emotional reactions to the relevant
environmental stressor. In this context, the qualitatively distinct emotional reactions
could be seen as the noteworthy difference in behavior. Trained independent judges could
code the emotional reactions of participants to the environmental stressor as “calm, even
tempered” or “irritated/angry.” Assuming adequate inter-judge reliability, one could then
find the approximate threshold neuroticism score that separates those who respond to the
stressor with annoyance and irritation versus those who remain calm. Using a logistic
regression, a graph could then be generated as depicted in Figure 3. As is evident in the
non-linear mapping in Figure 3, a neuroticism score of approximately “18” could be
viewed as representing a threshold value that distinguishes between individuals who
respond to the environmental stressor with anger rather than calmness (given that a score
of “18” maps onto a .5 probability of reacting with anger vs. calmness).
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Figure 3: Hypothetical mapping between neuroticism scores and probability of
reacting to an environmental stressor with anger rather than calmness.
That being said, it is also possible that a more nuanced three-category model of
qualitatively distinct emotional reactions could be posited and found (using, for e.g.,
probit or logit regression). That is, strong construct theory and other considerations may
predict three qualitatively distinct ways to respond to the environmental stressor (e.g., [1]
calmness, [2] mild irritation, and [3] extreme anger). The example in this approach fits
well with Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006a) own recommendations, stating that meaningful
metrics are “developed through the discovery of empirical thresholds that indicate
noteworthy changes in the occurrence of observable events tied to the phenomenon in
question” (p. 34).
Finally, it is also interesting to briefly note how this noteworthy difference in behavior
approach parallels in a broad sense the general strategy of calibrating the metric of
thermometers by using the qualitatively distinct changes in relevant external events as
reference points (i.e., noteworthy change of states between non-boiling and boiling water
or between non-frozen and frozen water). Although this parallel was not mentioned by
Blanton and Jaccard (2006a, 2006b), I think it is informative to bear this in mind when
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considering the complex and abstract issues surrounding the metric calibration of
psychological instruments. I will soon return to this issue in my section on inspirations
from the history of the development of instruments in the natural sciences.

1.3.2

Strategy 2: Gradation in Behavior

The second general strategy to reduce metric arbitrariness involves finding empirical
linkages between test scores and gradation of theoretically-relevant manifest behaviors.
Using this strategy, particular scores on a measure can be mapped onto particular
behavioral manifestations of the relevant construct, imbuing those particular scores with
meaning. Gradation of such behaviors could take the form of an individual’s performance
on a behavioral task or a frequency count of the number of times a relevant behavior is
performed. For example, one could examine the mapping between extraversion scores
(e.g., using Eysenck’s Introversion-Extraversion Scale [IES]; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975)
and number of hours spent socializing.

Average Number of Hours Spent
Socializing (per day)

11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Eysenck's Introversion-Extraversion Scale Scores

Figure 4: Hypothetical linear (solid line) and non-linear (dotted line) mappings
between extraversion scores and average hours spent socializing.
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As depicted in Figure 4, extraversion scores could gain meaning by way of their mapping
to the behavioral manifestation of extraversion; that is, the average hours spent in the
presence of others per day (as assessed, for e.g., using Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow, Dabbs,
& Price’s, 2001, electronically activated recorder [EAR]). As reflected by the linear
mapping (solid line), an extraversion score of “9” would correspond to approximately 8
hours per day spent socializing whereas an extraversion score of “1” would correspond to
approximately 2 hours of socializing per day. Hence, although in this approach no
specific qualitatively distinct difference in behavior is available as a particular reference
point, the scores nonetheless acquire meaning via the discovery of empirical mappings to
relevant theoretically-relevant behaviors.
With systematic collaborative discussions among experts in the field, it is also possible
that consensus eventually emerges as to what changes in values in the manifest behavior
represent noteworthy differences. For instance, in the extraversion example, even though
number of hours spent socializing per day is linear, it seems clear that spending an
average of 2 hours socializing – versus spending an average of 9 hours – represents a
qualitatively distinct state of affairs. Over time, as more is understood about extraversion,
perhaps experts in the area could agree to even more nuanced “noteworthy”
differentiations. Furthermore, even though average hours is a continuous variable, it is
also entirely possible that the function relating extraversion scores to average hours spent
socializing could be non-linear (e.g., cubic or exponential), in which case meaningful
threshold values for the behavioral referent could be gleaned. Indeed, as reflected by a
non-linear function (dotted line) in Figure 4, a closer inspection reveals some kind of
discontinuity near the inflection point of the fitted non-linear curve, suggesting
extraversion scores greater than approximately “6.5” may correspond to a qualitatively
distinct manifestation of extraversion.

1.3.3

Strategy 3: Experimental Approach

A third strategy for calibrating the metric of psychological measures, which to my
knowledge is a completely novel conceptual idea, involves adopting an experimental
approach whereby the relevant construct is manipulated to extreme levels. I will propose
two variants of the experimental approach to account for the fact that constructs in
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psychology are generally theorized to be either predominantly trait-like (e.g., personality
constructs) or predominantly state-like. Hence, I will propose (1) an experimental
strategy aimed to calibrate instruments that assess predominantly state-like constructs
(i.e., a “strong” experimental strategy) and (2) an experimental approach aimed to
calibrate instruments that assess predominantly trait-like constructs (i.e., a “weak”
experimental strategy).
The strong experimental approach involves manipulating a certain construct to
increasingly extreme levels and then simultaneously assessing the to-be-calibrated scores
and manifest behavioral referents. Empirical mappings between scores and behaviors are
then established by way of the manipulation levels (as depicted in Figure 5, panel A).
This idea broadly derives from the history of the calibration of the thermometer and
hygrometer (details covered below). In the physical sciences, it is common practice for
scientists to calibrate their instruments by linking the instrument readings to reference
points that involve extreme levels of the phenomenon. For example, in the case of the
early hair hygrometer (i.e., a human hair used to index ambient humidity), scientists
experimentally manipulated extreme degrees of humidity by creating conditions under
which the ambient air was either extremely moist or extremely dry. Consequently, the
arbitrary values of the early hair hygrometer (i.e., length of human hair expanding or
contracting as the moisture in the air increased or decreased) gained meaning as they
were linked to these extreme manifestations of humidity. Transporting this approach into
the psychological arena implies that we can potentially increase the meaning of our
metrics by experimentally manipulating a certain construct to levels as extreme as
possible (both low and high) and then simultaneously assess changes in the to-becalibrated measurement scores and the relevant behavioral manifestation of the construct.
The empirical linkage between the to-be-calibrated measure scores and the behavioral
manifestations would then be achieved by virtue of the experimentally manipulated
levels. That is, the mean scores of the to-be-calibrated measure can be connected to the
mean scores of the behavioral measure within each of the conditions (as depicted in
Figure 5, panel A).
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Figure 5: Schematic diagrams of the key concepts of the strong (panel A) and weak
(panel B) variants of the proposed experimental metric approach.
For instance, strongly anxiety-provoking situations (vs. intermediate vs. control
conditions) could be used to experimentally calibrate a state-measure of anxiety
(Spielberger, 1983) to the probability of exhibiting a nervous tick, by examining the
mapping between the mean state-anxiety scores and the mean behavioral reference point
scores at each level of the anxiety manipulation (e.g., mean score of “6.5” on stateanxiety measure linked to a .5 probability of exhibiting a nervous tick). This strategy
would roughly map onto the calibration of instruments in the physical sciences where the
manipulation of the construct (e.g., increasing temperature of water via a flame)
simultaneously impacts the to-be-calibrated measure (e.g., the glass-tube thermometer
readings) and the reference point (e.g., presence or absence of boiling water).
The second “weak” variant of the experimental metric approach is proposed as a way to
imbue further meaning into scores from measures posited to be predominantly trait-like,
above and beyond the scores’ linkages to naturally occurring levels of theoreticallyrelevant behavioral referents covered in the first two strategies. Given that it may not be
possible, or make theoretical sense, to attempt to manipulate trait-like measures to
extreme levels (e.g., a self-report measure of extraversion), the strong form of the
experimental approach is not appropriate. However, I propose that a “weaker” variant of
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the strong experimental strategy could nonetheless imbue additional meaning into the
measurement scores of constructs theorized to be predominantly trait-like. This can be
achieved by manipulating the behavioral expression of the construct to as extreme as
possible levels and then assessing these behavioral manifestations (scores from selfreport measure of the construct would be assessed before any manipulations given traitlike construct). Even though a construct may be posited to reflect a primarily trait-like
component (e.g., extraversion), it may nonetheless be possible to increase the behavioral
expression of the construct by manipulating theoretically-relevant situational factors. For
instance, one could manipulate extraverted behavior with an alcohol manipulation (e.g., 0
vs. 2 vs. 4 units of alcohol per kg of body weight). Although personality psychologists
may not see the expression of extraverted behavior due to alcohol as “true change” in the
underlying construct, I contend that experimentally manipulating extraverted behavior to
extreme levels can nonetheless provide valuable reference points that further increase the
meaning of extraversion trait scores. This would be achieved by the fact that the
experimentally manipulated extreme levels of the behavioral reference points would
supplement the naturally occurring observed levels of the behavioral reference points.
The “weak” variant of the experimental approach is depicted in Figure 5 (panel B).
Continuing with the extraversion example, we can see on the left-hand side of the
diagram, the mapping between the naturally occurring levels of trait extraversion scores
and a relevant extraverted behavioral reference point (e.g., probability of talking to a
stranger). Hence, manipulating extraverted behaviors via alcohol could increase (on
average) the probability of spontaneously talking to a stranger (values in boxes on the
right-hand side). These manipulated behavioral reference points can then serve to add
additional meaning to the naturally occurring levels of the behavioral reference point,
which would lend further meaning to the interpretation of the trait scores. For example,
the interpretation of the meaning of an extraversion trait score of “7” would be increased
by virtue of the fact that the natural mapping to its behavioral reference point (i.e., .25
probability of talking to a stranger) can be interpreted with reference to the
experimentally manipulated reference point (i.e., .50 probability).
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In summary, following broadly the experimental logic of the calibration of instruments in
the physical sciences, the experimental approach proposed (either in its strong or weak
form) holds the potential to increase the meaning of psychological score metrics over and
2

above the meaning gained from the first two non-experimental strategies. The two
primary strategies that will be used to reduce metric arbitrariness in the current research,
however, will be the two non-experimental strategies first reviewed. Future studies
should nevertheless explore the potential utility of my newly proposed experimental
approach to metric calibration.
No matter what metric calibration strategy is used, it is important that the most
appropriate statistical technique is used to model the response function that best connects
the observed scores to the manifest behaviors. For instance, if a binary behavioral
outcome is assessed, a logistic regression could be used to determine the logistic
coefficient and intercept of the best fitting line; then predicted probability of performing
the behavior can be determined for given test scores. If multiple category behavioral
reference points are assessed, then a probit or logit regression could be used. For countlike data, for example the frequency of crying, poisson (or negative binomial) regression
could be used. Regardless of the statistical strategy employed, the important issue is that
a particular metric mapping is established and that the parameters of this function are
then used to map the observed test scores to the criterion behaviors. It may also be
informative to form prediction intervals (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman,
1996) for each given test score, to gauge the amount of uncertainty inherent in the
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The known-groups approach sometimes used in construct validity research might come to mind to some
readers in this section. Indeed, the known-groups approach could be seen as providing very preliminary
information about the possible meaning of a measure’s metric. For example, the finding that university
professors score on average “6.5” on the need for cognition (NFC) scale (scale metric ranging from 1-7, for
e.g.) whereas fashion designers score on average “3.5” could provide preliminary information to investigate
what type of qualitatively distinct NFC-related behaviors distinguish university professors from fashion
designers. Subsequent metric research could then systematically examine the empirical linkages between
NFC scores and the relevant NFC-related behaviors identified in the known-groups stage.
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empirical mapping for the individual-level scores. Prediction intervals estimate a range in
which future observations will fall, given what has already been observed.

1.4

3

Ideal Characteristics of Behavioral Reference Points

Regardless of the metric calibration strategy employed, it is important that behaviors
chosen to act as reference points possess specific characteristics. In this section, I will
elaborate on such particular characteristics, which behaviors serving as reference points
should ideally possess. These characteristics are based on considerations that build upon
past theorizing on the metric calibration process in the psychological arena. For instance,
Sechrest et al. (1996), from an applied perspective, conceived criterion behaviors to be
used in metric calibration as reflecting “external behavioral implications” (p. 1068) in
relation to real-life events. More generally, Blanton and Jaccard (2006b) construed
criterion behaviors as “meaningful and conceptually relevant behaviors or symptoms” (p.
63) or as “meaningful events that have gained consensus as being of relevance” (p. 68)
with respect to certain locations on the underlying psychological dimension. But what
particular characteristics render certain behaviors or psychological events “meaningful”?
Going beyond considerations by Blanton and Jaccard and Sechrest et al., I contend that
criterion behaviors to serve as behavioral reference points should ideally possess the
following specific characteristics: theoretically-relevant, objective, unambiguous
construct-wise, and interpretationally clear.
First, criterion behaviors should be theoretically-relevant in the sense that there is an
expectation based on construct theory that a certain behavior reflects a relevant
behavioral manifestation of the construct at hand. That is, the accepted working definition
of the construct (itself ideally stemming from theoretical considerations surrounding the
construct) should guide the decision of which particular behaviors one would
theoretically expect to be connected to scores of the to-be-calibrated measure. Second,

3

In a related vein, the role of random measurement error contaminating the scores of both the to-becalibrated measure and criterion behavior should be considered and accounted for in the metric calibration
process. Given that this issue has not yet been discussed in the metric calibration literature, future research
should investigate how best to account for random measurement error in the metric calibration process.
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behaviors to serve as reference points should be objective in the sense that independent
observers can agree that a particular behavior was exhibited. Third, criterion behaviors
should be chosen (and assessment situations configured) such that the observed behaviors
are the most unambiguous as possible construct-wise. That is, the chosen behaviors
should be assessed in such a manner whereby it can be argued that the observed behavior
reflects primarily the construct of interest rather than also reflecting other constructs
which are not of interest. Finally, criterion behaviors should be chosen and assessed such
that they have a clear and intuitive interpretation, meaning that the scoring of the relevant
behavior has a clear connection to the observed behavior in question (e.g., 1 = presence
of a behavior and 0 = absence of a behavior; or number of times [or proportion of time]
engaging in some behavior). For instance, if assessing time spent socializing with others
(using e.g. Mehl et al.’s [2001] EAR), one would want to express the behavior in terms of
hours spent socializing per day (for instance), rather than the number of seconds spent
socializing per month. Also, another important consideration, as already mentioned, is
that criterion behaviors to serve as behavioral reference points should be specifically
chosen with the goal that the behaviors in question can be argued to reflect a particular
location on the underlying dimension in an absolute sense. Taken together, I contend that
it is the confluence of all of these characteristics that render certain behaviors strong
candidates to be considered meaningful behavioral reference points.
Furthermore, it is also important to consider the features of the context in which criterion
behaviors are assessed (the “interpretational context”). When searching for empirical
mappings, it is critical that a researcher uses theory to guide his or her thinking about the
particular contextual conditions that need to be in place to elicit the behavioral
manifestation of the construct in question. Consequently, rather than modeling
moderation, one must include the contextual moderators of a psychological phenomenon
into the design of a metric research investigation. For example, in the abovementioned
neuroticism example, it is crucial to configure the experimental situation to match the
particular conditions under which neurotic individuals have been found to respond with
negative emotions. Hence, any mapping found between neuroticism scores and manifest
behavior can be viewed as being conditional with respect to the parameters of the
experimental situation (i.e., the type and severity of the environmental stressor). Also, it
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is important to ensure that the measure being calibrated is tapping into the construct at the
same level of generality and temporality as the manifest behaviors. Consistent with the
specificity matching principle (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Swann, Chang-Schneider, &
McClarty, 2007), if the measure-to-be-calibrated taps into a relatively specific construct
(e.g., attitudes toward potato chips), then the manifest behavior should be equally specific
(e.g., how many grams of potato chips eaten in a year) whereas if the measure-to-becalibrated taps into a relatively general construct, then the manifest behavior should be
equally broad (e.g., number of social events attended per month). Similarly with
temporality, if the measure-to-be-calibrated taps into behaviors or mental states over a
long period of time, the manifest behaviors also need to be observed over an equally long
temporal period whereas if the measure-to-be-calibrated taps into a transient mental state,
then the manifest behavior used as reference point should reflect an equally transient
manifest behavior (e.g., behavioral markers of transient anxiety). In addition, construct
theory should be used to determine which particular facet of a construct is best suited to
be calibrated to certain behavioral manifestations of the construct. For example, if
number of mistakes in a detail-oriented task is to be used as a behavioral reference point
to calibrate a conscientiousness measure, great care should be used to select the most
appropriate lower-order facet of conscientiousness (e.g., Deliberation facet of the NEOFFI; Costa & McRae, 1992).

1.5

Inspirations from the History of the Development of
Instruments in the Natural Sciences

A brief glimpse into the history of the development of two important instruments in the
natural sciences provides a useful context for discussing pertinent issues surrounding
arbitrary metrics and the potential value of metric calibration in psychology. I will
discuss, in turn, the history of the development of the thermometer and hygrometer.
The development of the thermometer was based on a basic principle – discovered in
antiquity by Philo of Byzantium and Hero of Alexandria at about the end of the second
century B.C. – that certain substances expand and contract under varying conditions
(McGee, 1988). Many centuries later, the idea of developing an instrument to quantify
this effect emerged. Although still contested, historians of science usually consider
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Galileo Galilei, Santorio Santorio, Cornelius Drebbel and Robert Fludd as serious
candidates for the honor of having “invented the thermometer” sometime in the 1500s
(Middleton, 1966). These early thermometers or thermoscopes as they were properly
called, used as their thermometric substance the expansion and contraction of air, which
would displace water in an elongated tube. Of relevance to my dissertation, these early
thermoscopes did not have a scale and hence lacked any systematic metric or numbering
system (Middleton, 1966). Furthermore, when Francesco Sagredo and Santorio Santorio,
around 1612, first put some kind of scale on their respective thermoscopes, these scales
did not involve any meaningful metric. These primitive scales involved the gradation of
lines drawn on the tube, sometimes with two moveable threads tied to the stem,
presumably to detect a change in temperature (see Figure 6, left). The first systematic
scale used with an air thermometer was developed by Jean Leurechon around 1625,
which had a scale ranging from 1 to 9 “degrees” (see Figure 6, right) and an air
thermometer reported by Telioux around 1613 which had a scale ranging from 1 to 8
(Middleton, 1969).

Figure 6: Early thermometers having no metric (left) or arbitrary metric (right).
Reprinted with permission of The John Hopkins University Press (© 1969) from
Middleton (1969, p. 87, Figure 3.1).

26

It is historically interesting to note that the scales of early air thermometers can be viewed
as having had an arbitrary metric. That is, even though temperature measurements with
these air thermometers may have been mostly valid (although see next paragraph) and
reliable, without reference to other observable phenomena, the readings produced by
these thermometers were devoid of much meaning. It is also very interesting to note that
these early scales seemed strikingly similar to the Likert-type scales so pervasively used
in modern day psychology.
Soon, however, a defect was discovered in the commonly used non-sealed air
thermometers, such that they would respond to changes in air pressure as well as changes
in temperature (i.e., early air thermometers were also barometers). To remedy this
situation, Ferdinando II de Medici created a sealed liquid-in-glass thermometer in about
1654 that was immune to atmospheric air pressure. Subsequently, many different types of
sealed thermometers were developed using different thermometric substances (e.g.,
water, wines and other alcoholic spirits, mercury) and using different scales. It soon
became apparent, however, that it would be much more useful, both in terms of the
interpretation of thermometer readings and for comparing thermometer readings across
laboratories using differently constructed instruments, if thermometers could somehow be
standardized. Hence, some time in the middle of the 1600s, scientists started proposing
that thermometers should be standardized in their construction and in their calibration to
certain fixed points (and hence the scale used). Robert Hooke was one of the first, around
1665, to propose that thermometers should be calibrated using one fixed point, namely
the freezing point of distilled water; around the same time, Christiaan Huygens proposed
to use as a reference point either the degree of cold at which water begins to freeze or the
degree of heat of boiling water as a universal standard, so that degrees of heat and cold
could be compared across laboratories without having to use the same instrument. A long
debate, spanning almost a full century, thereafter ensued concerning which fixed points
(and how many) should be used to calibrate thermometers. For example, fixed points
proposed included (to name a few): constant temperature of deep cellars under the Paris
Observatory (Mariotte, circa 1679), snow and boiling water (Bartolo, circa 1679),
freezing point of water and melting point of butter (circa 1688), melting point of ice and
salt and the temperature of very deep cellars (circa 1688), and melting point of ice and
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body temperature (Isaac Newton, circa 1701). Eventually, Daniel Fahrenheit (circa 1724),
René-Antoine Réaumur (circa 1730), and Anders Celsius (circa 1742) proposed to use
the freezing point of water and boiling point of water as universal reference points,
although they each proposed their own scales (32 °F and 212 °F; 0 °R and 80 °R; 0 °C
and 100 °C, respectively were proposed as values for the freezing and boiling points).
A similar story emerges from reading the history of the development of the early
hygrometers (instruments to measure humidity). For instance, one of the first documented
hygrometers, Santorio’s string hygrometer (circa 1612) (see Figure 7), was a simple
device composed of a stretched out cord attached on both ends to a wall, with a lead ball
fixed in the middle with a scale drawn nearby (Middleton, 1966). The logic underlying
this measurement instrument was that as the moisture in the air increased, the length of
the cord expanded whereas as moisture decreased (or dryness increased) the length of the
cord contracted, moving the lead ball up or down, which could be quantified by the scale
drawn on the wall.

Figure 7: Santorio’s early string hygrometer having a scale with arbitrary metric.
Reprinted with permission of The John Hopkins University Press (© 1966) from
Middleton (1966, p. 21, Figure 1.9).
As should be apparent, it is clear that the metric of this early string-hygrometer was
arbitrary in nature, given that the scale values were not linked to any external reference
points. Later hygrometers (e.g., de Saussure’s hair-hygrometer and Deluc’s whalebonehygrometer), however, did include a meaningful metric by calibrating the devices to
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external reference points. For de Saussure’s (circa 1778) hair hygrometer, for example,
the reference points were an extreme condition of moisture (achieved by putting the hair
apparatus under a bell-jar of which the sides and bottom were wet) and an extreme
condition of dryness (achieved by enclosing a piece of sheet iron – previously made redhot, cooled, and sprinkled with a mixture of powdered niter and cream of tartar – in a dry
jar along with the hygrometer). Hence, the arbitrary values of de Saussure’s early hair
hygrometer (i.e., length of human hair) gained meaning as they were linked to these
extreme manifestations of humidity.
Taken together, these historical sketches make clear that voluminous amounts of research
was undertaken to calibrate thermometers and hygrometers to theoretically-relevant
reference points (and many other instrument in the natural sciences). Such metric
calibration research not only imbued temperature and humidity readings with more
meaning, but also contributed in important ways to the cumulative knowledge base in
these fields and correspondingly to theory development (e.g., theory of heat developing
in step with the calibration of the thermometer, McCormmach, 2004). As it concerns my
dissertation, the take-home message of these historical excerpts is: (a) that natural
scientists agreed that the metric calibration of their measurement instruments was very
important for the advancement of knowledge and (b) that this type of research involved
the unique challenge of researchers reaching consensus as to the most theoreticallyrelevant and meaningful reference points to use in the calibration process. Consequently,
a possible implication of these historical excerpts for my research is that perhaps it is
time for psychological instruments to be improved in ways that are in a broad sense
4

similar to the calibration of instruments in the natural sciences. In particular, perhaps it
is time for basic researchers in psychology to start considering the potential utility and
feasibility of calibrating the metric of psychological instruments.

4

It is important to keep in mind that I am not suggesting that psychologists follow strict parallelism to
measurement and methodology used in the natural sciences. My goal is to use measurement examples from
the natural sciences as metaphors (see Dooremalen & Borsboom, 2010) to help inspire novel ideas with
respect to psychological measurement. Psychological measurement clearly involves unique methodological
challenges that transcend measurement challenges in the physical sciences; hence, metric calibration in
psychology needs to be tailored to these unique specific challenges.
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1.6

Relevant Theorizing by Past Psychologists

If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. - Isaac Newton
Considering the scarcity of metric research in psychology, it may seem surprising that
prominent psychology scholars have proposed theoretical ideas that are broadly
consistent with my argument that reducing metric arbitrariness could potentially benefit
basic psychological research. This observation seems even more remarkable given that
specific research on metrics in psychology only emerged much later in the late 1990s. For
instance, in a 1969 American Psychologist article, John Tukey propounded repeatedly
that “amount, as well as direction, is vital” (p. 86). By this he meant that it is not just the
direction of an experimental effect that is important, but by how much. In his own words:
The physical sciences have learned much by storing up amounts, not just
directions. If, for example, elasticity had been confined to “When you pull on it, it
gets longer!” Hooke’s law, the elastic limit, plasticity, and many other important
topics could not have appeared (emphasis added) (p. 86).
It is important to keep in mind that Tukey is not simply arguing that we should be
cognizant of the effect size of experimental findings. He is specifically making a plea that
researchers should “store up amounts,” which implies that simply reporting amounts is
insufficient, and hence that researchers should actually keep track and become familiar
with particular amounts (see also Tukey, 1991). Another quotation from the same article
makes this point even more clearly:
Measuring the right things on a communicable scale lets us stockpile information
about amounts. Such information can be useful, whether or not the chosen scale is
an interval scale. Before the second law of thermodynamics – and there were
many decades of progress in physics and chemistry before it appeared – the scale
of temperature was not, in any nontrivial sense, an interval scale. Yet these
decades of progress would have been impossible had physicists and chemists
refused either to record temperatures or to calculate with them (p. 87, emphasis
added).
It seems clear from this passage that Tukey is espousing that we should keep track of the
particular magnitude of an experimental effect in terms of scores that have a
meaningfully interpretable metric. According to Tukey, it is valuable and important to
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keep track of the particular amount of an effect as expressed in the units of measurement
of the instrument used. Of course, this “stockpiling” of information is only valuable if the
units of measurement are indeed meaningful. If, on the other hand, the metrics of
measures in a research domain are arbitrary and hence lacking in meaning, then it would
not be surprising that researchers fail to stockpile this kind of information. In general,
psychologists doing basic research fall into this category. Indeed, Tukey (1969) spoke on
this matter and explicitly lamented that “being so disinterested in our variables that we do
not care about their units can hardly be desirable” (p. 89). One way of explaining why
psychology researchers have not heeded Tukey’s ideas is indeed because virtually all
psychological metrics used today are arbitrary (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a). An important
aspect of the current research, therefore, is to argue that given we now have a preliminary
psychometric understanding of the steps required to make metrics of psychological
instruments more meaningful (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b; Embretson, 2006), it is
now time to tap into the great potential of Tukey’s words of wisdom at a practical level.
Much inspired by Tukey’s ideas, Jacob Cohen also had important things to say regarding
arbitrary metrics in psychology. Resonating particularly well with Tukey’s theorizing,
Cohen (1994) emphasized that if all psychologists learn from a study is the direction of
an effect, then we have not really learned much at all. In his own words: “But if all we, as
psychologists, learn from a research is that A is larger than B (p < .01), we have not
learned very much. And this is typically all we learn” (p. 1001). In a broad sense, this
quote implies that we should be learning a lot more from a study than whether the groups
differed in one direction or the other. That is, we should learn by how much the groups
differed with respect to particular values of the dependent variable (DV) and also
consider the departing value of the effect (e.g., manipulation increased DV scores by 2
units from a departing value of 4 units). In a strikingly similar style, Kirk (1996) made
almost exactly the same remark while speaking about the severe limitations of the typical
use of null hypothesis statistical significance testing (NHST), one of which is that it
evaluates only ordinal relationships:
…a rejection [of the null] means that the researcher is pretty sure of the direction
of the difference. Is this any way to develop psychological theory? I think not.
How far would physics have progressed if their researchers had focused on
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discovering only ordinal relationships [such as those tested by conventional
NHST]? … knowing A is greater than B is not enough (p. 754).
Hence, in a broad sense, these poignant prods imply that we need to go beyond direction
and start being cognizant of the units we work with. Indeed, Kirk specifically mentioned
that the use of confidence intervals (CI) can help precisely because CIs use the same unit
of measurement as the data, which “facilitates the interpretation of results and makes
trivial effects harder to ignore” (p. 754). This kind of theorizing directly implies that
researchers should be more acquainted with the metrics they work with. In fact, Cohen
explicitly stated that psychologists need to “respect” the units they work with:
To work constructively with “raw" regression coefficients and confidence
intervals, psychologists have to start respecting the units they work with, or
develop measurement units they can respect enough so that researchers in a given
field or subfield can agree to use them. In this way, there can be hope that
researchers' knowledge can be cumulative. There are few such in soft psychology.
A beginning in this direction comes from meta-analysis, which, whatever else it
may accomplish, has at least focused attention on effect sizes. But imagine how
much more fruitful the typical meta-analysis would be if the research covered
used the same measures for the constructs they studied. Researchers could get
beyond using a mass of studies to demonstrate convincingly that "if you pull on it,
it gets longer. (emphasis added, p. 1001)
“Respecting” the units one works with implies that one should become intimately
acquainted with those units by first of all keeping track of them. Second, it also means
that one should try to make sense of those units which requires that they actually be
meaningfully interpretable. Indeed, the specific part of this last quote about developing
measurement units that can be respected enough that different researchers can agree to
use them specifically implies that researchers should develop non-arbitrary metrics that
are respectable enough that different researchers can agree to use them (as occurred in the
case of the development of thermometer and hygrometer scale metrics).
From a slightly different perspective, Paul Meehl indirectly argued for the importance of
score metrics in the context of the nature of theory testing in psychology. Meehl (1978)
mentions that for science in general, a theory is corroborated to the extent that it has been
subjected to potentially risky tests. That is, “the more dangerous tests [a theory] has
survived, the better corroborated it is” (p. 817). In other words, the higher the specificity
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of the predictions a theory confirms the more strength the theory acquires (see also
Popper, 1968/1959). Hence, specific point predictions that involve estimating numerical
point values are inherently more valuable for theory testing purposes than general
directional predictions (see also Meehl, 1990a, 1990b). Indeed, Meehl specifically
mentioned that “a theory that makes precise predictions and correctly picks out narrow
intervals or point values out of the range of experimental possibilities is a pretty strong
theory” (p. 818, emphasis in original). For psychology, this would translate into making
specific theoretical predictions about how an experimental manipulation would pattern
itself on specific locations of the metric of a DV. Meehl (1990a, 1990b) lambasted
psychologists for invoking NHST in its weak form and laments that directional theory
testing is highly sub-optimal because it subjects psychological theory to very weak or
lenient tests.
Relatedly, Meehl (1967) has argued that the hurdle which physical sciences theory must
surmount generally increases with improvement in experimental design and measurement
whereas in the psychological sciences improvement in experimental design generally
leads to easier hurdles for a theory to surmount (a situation Meehl calls a
“methodological paradox”). This is the case because in the physical sciences, with
increased knowledge, increasingly precise point-value predictions are made whereas in
psychology only directional tests are ever made. Of course, Meehl mentions that most
psychological theories (and the knowledge base from which theories are derived) may not
be sufficiently quantitatively developed to be able to generate point-predictions (but see
Granaas, 2002). Hence, he admits that although this state of affairs is surely
unsatisfactory, it is “nobody’s fault” given it is unclear how behavioral scientists would
attempt to develop strong enough theory to be able to generate point-predictions that
stand a larger risk of refutation (and hence would corroborate the theory in a much
stronger way). That being said, Granaas (2002) questions whether psychologists’
reluctance to make point predictions stems from (a) their theories not being sufficiently
developed quantitatively or (b) from psychologists not being trained to think this way.
From a metric perspective, however, I would argue that increased attention to the metric
of our measures and research specifically aimed at calibrating our metrics to behavioral
fixed points could represent the preliminary steps required to move our field into a
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direction that could make it eventually possible to adopt Meehl’s recommendations of
making more specific point-value estimate predictions (see also Mulaik, Raju, &
Harshman, 1997). In fact, one could argue that metric research is a required and
necessary first step to even consider the possibility of such kinds of point-prediction
theory testing.
In summary, a fair bit of theoretical discourse exists that generally supports the idea that
making metrics more meaningful could benefit the progress of basic psychological
science. Ranging from theoretical ideas on more quantitatively-oriented theory testing, to
pleas on developing units of psychological measures that researchers are willing to
respect, to the stockpiling of information about particular amounts of experimental
effects, taken together, these theoretical ideas provide the context from which my main
thesis is derived. Ultimately, these broad-minded theorists had the foresight to discuss
ideas that are broadly consistent with my argument that making metrics of psychological
instruments more meaningful can move our field forward and benefit basic psychological
research.

1.7

Past Research on Arbitrary Metrics

Past research that speaks more directly to the issue of metrics in the psychology arena is
surprisingly limited. Based on my review of the literature, the only existing research on
the issue of metrics is the relatively small amount of research done from an applied
perspective in the area of clinical psychology (Kazdin, 1999; Kazdin, 2006; Sechrest et
al., 1996), forensic psychology (Hanson, 2009; Pirelli, Gottdiener, & Zapf, 2011), sport
psychology (Andersen, McCullagh, & Wilson, 2007), and individual-level diagnoses
5

(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b; Blanton et al., 2009). I discuss these in turn.

5

Research approaches within the domain of industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology have also examined
topics that could be viewed as related to metric calibration issues broadly construed (e.g., expectancy
charts, utility analysis). However, given that this research does not directly tackle the issue of empirically
developing meaningful units of measurement for one’s measures, I will defer my discussion of these
approaches until the General Discussion.
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1.7.1

Clinical Psychology

Most of the research concerning arbitrary metrics from a clinical perspective involves
papers that discuss the challenging task of evaluating the true effectiveness of clinical
interventions on treating psychopathologies. Known under the rubric of clinical
significance, this research aims at determining what constitutes proper evidence for
showing clinical significance rather than merely showing statistical or practical
significance (Chambless & Hollon, 1998; Kendall, 1999). For example, in a review of
literature, Kazdin (1999) conceptualized the notion of clinical significance as the
practical or applied value or importance of the effect of an intervention – that is,
whether the intervention makes a real (e.g., genuine, palpable, practical,
noticeable) difference in everyday life to the clients or to others with whom the
clients interact (p. 332).
Kazdin conceptually analyzed the various ways that different researchers have
operationalized clinical significance and concluded that all of these different meanings
involve ambiguities that need to be clarified. Kazdin recommended that much more
research effort should be focused on determining cut-off scores for outcome measures
that can identify individuals who have changed in marked ways in everyday functioning
by calibrating the metric of outcome measures commonly used in psychotherapeutic
intervention studies.
Indeed, in his 2006 commentary on Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006a) target article, Kazdin
specifically delineated the numerous problems of using measures with arbitrary metrics
for research on evidence-based psychotherapy. His main point was that the thorny issue
of determining the clinical significance of intervention studies would be greatly improved
if outcome measures used in intervention studies were calibrated against real-world
referents as to reduce the metric arbitrariness of these outcomes measures (see also
Kazdin, 1999, 2001). Kazdin argued that using outcome measures with non-arbitrary
metrics would allow one to better gauge the actual impact of an intervention on a client’s
everyday functioning. For example, a depression inventory whose scores were linked to
frequency of actual crying episodes would allow a better assessment of the actual impact
of an intervention on client functioning.
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Similarly, but said much more piercingly, Sechrest et al. (1996) delineated the
interpretational problems in judging the effectiveness of clinical intervention studies
when outcome measures have an arbitrary metric. For instance, Sechrest et al. reviewed a
major national study of the treatment of depression, showing that BDI (Beck & Steer,
1987) scores decreased from about 26 points to about 17 points post-treatment (Watkins
et al., 1993). What do these findings mean other than that depression decreased to some
extent over the course of the study? Sechrest et al. stated bluntly: “nothing much we
think, unless one has good understanding of just what is entailed by that to some extent”
(p. 1065). They further stated that it is impossible to gauge the degree of effectiveness of
most psychotherapy intervention studies (even psychotherapy meta-analyses, e.g., Lipsey
& Wilson, 1993), because at best these studies express treatment effects in standard
deviation units on whatever outcome measures were used. Sechrest et al. argued that for
psychotherapy findings to be interpretable, findings must be expressed in terms of actual
change in behavior or functioning rather than simply assuming change from a metric of
uncertain meaning. Hence, they strongly recommended that the outcome measures used
in intervention studies be calibrated against “external implications” reflected in actual
behavior theoretically related to the construct at hand, as to imbue the metric of outcome
measures with some inherent meaning and interpretability.
Although Sechrest et al. (1996) discussed issues pertaining to arbitrary metrics mostly
from the applied context of clinical psychology, they also made statements about metrics
directed to psychology more generally. For example, in their own words they stated that
“science, [and] understanding of behavior, […] would be advanced by a better
understanding of the measures by which the phenomena we concern ourselves are
gauged” (p. 1068). In other words, it seems in the eyes of Sechrest et al. that
understanding of human behavior more generally could be advanced by increasing our
attention to the meaning of the metrics of the measures we use to assess psychological
phenomena. This idea is stated more clearly and convincingly in their concluding
paragraph, which will be included in its entirety due to its relevance and vigor:
Our belief is that progress in psychology, [including the understanding of
psychotherapy], like progress in all science, depends strongly on the quality of
psychological measures. Psychologists cannot claim to have high-quality
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measures if they do not have full knowledge of their implications. Currently, that
knowledge cannot be claimed for most measures used in psychology. We believe
that knowledge, understanding, and progress in the science of psychology would
be furthered greatly by concerted efforts to calibrate psychological measures in a
variety of ways that are now available and that are sadly neglected. These
methods include calibration of measures against each other so that it is possible to
make accurate comparison across studies, but behavioral and other real-life
implications should be accorded highest priority (p. 1071).
This concluding paragraph is most unambiguously consistent with the main thesis of my
dissertation. Precisely how the calibration of measures could benefit basic psychological
research, however, still remains unclear and unspecified. As mentioned, one of the goals
of this dissertation is to specify precisely how metric research can potentially benefit
basic psychology.
In a praiseworthy demonstration of Sechrest et al.’s (1996) general recommendations,
Harman, Manning, Lurie and Liu (2001) published a large scale study that specifically
linked mental health status measure scores (at time 1) to the probability of occurrence of
subsequent major life events (at time 2). They framed the goal of their research as helping
clinicians, researchers, and policy makers more easily interpret and gauge the actual
significance of intervention outcomes. Harman et al. examined three mental health status
scales including the Global Assessment Scale (GAS; individual life functioning), the
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS; mood, anxiety, and
delusions) subscale, and the Schizophrenia Subscale of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
(BPRS; emotional withdrawal, guilt, hostility, and disorientation). The major life events
used in the study were psychiatric hospitalizations, victimizations, arrests, and suicide
attempts, all assessed by patient self-report during face-to-face interviews.
Using a logistic robust regression, Harman et al. (2001) found, to list a few examples:
that an 8 point increase on the GAS (metric range = 0 to 100) corresponded to a 24%
decrease in probability of a suicide attempt; that a 5 point increase on the SADS
depression subscale (metric range = 0 to 73) corresponded to a 19% increase in
probability of psychiatric hospitalization and a 36% increase of a suicide attempt. It was
argued that these kinds of linkages can help clinicians and policy makers interpret results
of clinical interventions because rather than simply reporting that an intervention
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increased GAS scores by 8 points, one could report that the effect of the intervention was
equivalent to a 24% reduction in probability of suicide attempt.
Another interesting implication of Harman et al.’s study is that it can be used (taking into
account sampling differences) to interpret the clinical significance of past studies. For
example, a study on the effect of risperidone versus haloperidol in treating refractory
schizophrenia, showed that patients taking risperidone had post-treatment BPRS scores
that were 2.3 points lower than patients taking haloperidol (p < .05, d = .15; Wirshing et
al., 1999). According to Harman et al.’s calibration results, this effect translates into an
approximate decrease of 5% in the probability of a psychiatric hospitalization, which is
clearly more meaningfully interpretable than knowing the results of the study based
solely on scores having an arbitrary metric, arbitrary effect sizes, and arbitrary p-values.

1.7.2

Forensic Psychology

Although still in its early stages, preliminary conceptual work has been done by Pirelli,
Gottdiener, and Zapf (2011) with respect to the use of non-arbitrary metrics for
competency to stand trial assessment instruments. In their review of the literature, it is
concluded that each of the eleven competency to stand trial assessment instruments used
in the forensic literature has an arbitrary metric and that this is problematic for both
researchers and practitioners. Competency to stand trial instruments are especially
important due to the costs associated with poor or flawed competency to stand trial
evaluations should an incompetent defendant incorrectly be forced to stand trial or should
a competent defendant be incorrectly committed to a forensic psychiatric facility. For
example, the Competency Screening Test (CST; Lipsitt, Lelos & McGarry, 1971) is a
self-administered measure containing 22 sentence completion items which are coded by
independent judges as “0” (incompetent), “1” (marginally competent), and “2”
(competent). Example items include “When I go to court the lawyer will…” and “When
they say a man is innocent until proven guilty…” Composite score can range from 0 to
44, with a total score of 20 or below demarcating incompetent from competent
defendants. Pirelli et al. argued that this measure (as all other competency to stand trial
instruments) is seriously flawed given that the metric of the measure is arbitrary and thus
it is quite unclear what the total scores really mean with respect to competency to stand
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trial. Without linking CST scores to specific competency to stand trial behaviors that are
theoretically-relevant and meaningfully interpretable, CST scores remain ambiguous at
best. As Pirelli et al. pointed out, it is axiomatic that the number “1” should always be
located between “0” and “2” on any scale and that assuming a score of “1” on an
instrument corresponds to a neutral point on the underlying construct of competency is
completely unfounded.
Another important problem related to arbitrary metrics of instruments with composite
scores like the CST is that, because the issue of arbitrary metrics applies both at the item
and composite score level, two persons may arrive at the same total score via two
completely different routes and this may mean quite different things in terms of actual
behavior. For example, for the CST, a defendant could have a total score of 20 by
receiving twenty “1”s and two “0”s or by receiving ten “2”s and twelve “0”s, which may
translate into quite distinct competency to stand trial behaviors. Pirelli et al. concluded by
recommending that it is imperative that researchers reduce the metric arbitrariness of
competency to stand trial for the good of science and society, by empirically linking test
scores to real-world competency to stand trial behavioral referents that are deemed by
experts in that area to be theoretically-relevant and interpretable.
Paralleling Pirelli et al.’s (2011) general ideas, recent work by Hanson (2009) followed
the same logic but was applied in the context of risk assessment measures used to predict
crime and violence. Reviewing the literature on risk assessment tools for crime and
violence (e.g., sexual deviancy, aggression measures), Hanson concluded that crime and
violence risk assessment tools used to predict subsequent criminal and violent behaviors
(sexual and violent recidivism, respectively) need stronger psychometric properties and
would greatly benefit from having non-arbitrary metrics. Indeed, Hanson, Helmus, and
Thornton (in press) reported research examining the empirical linkages between the
scores from the most commonly used sexual recidivism risk tool in Canada and the U.S.
(i.e., the Static-2002; McGrath, Cumming, & Burchard, 2003) and probability of recommitting a sexual offence. The Static-2002 tool combines objective (e.g.,
demographic, previous sexual offences) and self-report (e.g., deviant sexually interests)
information for five content dimensions within a professional structured interview
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context (age, persistence of sex offending, deviant sexual interests, relationship to
victims, and general criminality). For instance, an individual with 4 prior sexual
convictions would receive a subscore of “3” for the “persistence of sex offending”
dimension; an individual with any non-sexual convictions would receive a score of “1”
for the “general criminality” dimension. These scores are then summed and recoded in a
weighted fashion to produce the final total composite scores ranging from 0 to 14, with
higher numbers representing higher levels of sexual crime risk.
In a large sample (N = 867), Hanson et al. (in press) found informative empirical
mappings between Static-2002 scores and probability of sexual recidivism for both
rapists and child molesters. For instance, Static-2002 scores of 0, 1, and 2 (for rapists)
were associated with recidivism rates of roughly 10% or lower whereas Static-2002
scores of 9 and above corresponded to recidivism rates of 50% or greater. Although not
framed as such in this particular report, evidence of this kind, which demonstrates
empirical linkages between Static-2002 scores and meaningful external reference points,
imbues the metric of Static-2002 scores with more meaning and hence increases score
interpretability.

1.7.3

Sport Psychology

Researchers in sport psychology typically raise the issue of arbitrary metrics in the
context of interpreting exercise intervention studies aimed at helping athletes improve the
mental aspect of their sport with the ultimate goal of improving actual athletic
performance. For example, Andersen et al. (2007) reviewed all articles in three of the top
sport psychology journals published in 2005 and concluded that 86% of studies that used
measures with arbitrary metrics did not discuss the results in terms of real-world sport
behaviors and that this severely limits knowledge advancement in the field. In particular,
Andersen et al. argued that if measures of mental subjective states are not calibrated
against real-world sport behavior, then there is no way of knowing whether the effect
(mean group difference between treatment and control group) of an exercise intervention
study is meaningful or worth paying for. In their own words:
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Establishing that an intervention helps reduce competitive state anxiety by an
average of 8 points on an inventory seems to be a diminished form of
legitimization evidence. Is 8 points a big drop? Or better yet, is 8 points worth
paying for? The answer to both those questions is that we really do not know. For
a coach, which of the following would be more convincing: (a) with this
relaxation and imagery program we can drop your runners’ anxiety scores by 10
to 15 points, or (b) with this relaxation and imagery program we can reduce your
runners’ times by an average of 2.0%? We may be able to say the former, but the
coach wants to hear the latter. And on the latter, in most cases, we must be silent,
otherwise the aroma of snake oil will begin to waft across the sport and exercise
psychology landscape (p. 666).
Hence, Andersen et al. make a strong case that exercise intervention studies that use
outcome measures with arbitrary metrics are severely limited in terms of their
interpretability. Strong recommendations are made for the calibration of sport psychology
measures to real-world sport behaviors that are more meaningfully interpretable to
coaches and practitioners.

1.7.4

Individual-Level Diagnoses

In a different vein altogether, Blanton and Jaccard (2006a) criticized the practice of
giving individual-level diagnoses of “implicit racial preferences” to individuals based on
6

their responses to an online instantiation of the race IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). The
race IAT assesses “implicit preferences” by requiring individuals to classify certain types
of stimuli (words and pictures) presented serially on a computer screen. In the case of the
race IAT, the categories are Whites (pictures of Caucasian individuals) versus Blacks
(pictures of African-American individuals) and pleasant versus unpleasant words (e.g.,
“sunshine” or “vomit”, respectively). In a first task, participants’ classify as quickly as
possible (without making too many mistakes) whether the presented stimulus falls into
the category of “White or pleasant” by pressing one key or whether the stimulus falls into
the category of “Black or unpleasant” by pressing another key. The fundamental unit of
analysis is the time taken to make these categorizations (i.e., response latency; RT). This
task is generally referred to as the compatible task. In a second task, individuals classify
as quickly as possible whether the stimulus falls into the category of “White or

6

This website can be accessed via the following link: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ .
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unpleasant” with one key or whether the stimulus falls into the category of “Black or
pleasant” with another key. This task is generally referred to as the incompatible task.
The “IAT effect” is calculated as the difference between the mean RTs from the
incompatible task and the compatible task divided by the variability of the RTs (in
addition to other transformations, see Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Individuals
who perform the compatible task faster than the incompatible task end up with positive
race IAT scores and are characterized as having “automatic preferences for Whites over
Blacks” whereas those performing the incompatible task faster than the compatible task
end up with negative race IAT scores and are characterized as having “automatic
preferences for Blacks over Whites.”
As previously mentioned, Blanton and Jaccard (2006a, 2006b) provide strong arguments
against the strategy of meter reading and norming, which the researchers at the Project
Implicit website use to make absolute statements about individuals’ standing on the
underlying dimension of “implicit preferences.” Blanton and Jaccard’s main message is
that it is both scientifically unfounded and ethically impermissible to make individual
diagnoses of “implicit racial preferences” based on the scores of a measurement
procedure that has a non-calibrated arbitrary metric. As previously elaborated upon, there
are a multitude of factors that can conspire to shift the zero point of IAT scores away
from the theoretical midpoint of no implicit preference (not to mention the logical
reasons against meter reading; see Figure 1, panel B). In the particular case of the race
IAT, Blanton and Jaccard mention that stimulus features can influence measurement
scores, if for example, the pleasant words are more positive in character than the negative
words are negative in character or if the pictures depicting African-Americans are more
prototypical of Blacks than the pictures depicting Whites are prototypical of Whites
(Bluemke & Friese, 2006). What’s more, the various algorithmic transformations
imposed on the raw RT data can also shift the zero point on the IAT away from the
theoretical midpoint.
Indeed, in an analysis of race IAT data, Blanton and Jaccard (2006b) provided evidence
against a meter reading strategy of IAT scores. Creatively, they aggregated scores from a
standard race IAT using the original IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 1998) and

42

also using the new scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) and then regressed the IAT
scores from the new algorithm onto IAT scores aggregated using the original algorithm.
Interestingly, a statistically significant non-zero intercept was found, demonstrating that a
participant receiving a score of “0” on the old algorithm would now, on average, receive
a positive IAT score with the new algorithm. Therefore, a participant diagnosed as
lacking an implicit preference for Whites over Blacks in the year 2000, would now, based
on exactly the same IAT responses, be diagnosed as having an implicit preference for
Whites over Blacks. As this example demonstrates, the score on the IAT metric that maps
onto the underlying dimension of no implicit preference must be empirically established
rather than being embraced as a measurement assumption. To make individual diagnosis
claims about the absolute standing of individuals on a psychological construct, which are
defensible (both scientifically and ethically), it is imperative to have an empirically
calibrated measure with a non-arbitrary metric. This is not the case with the IAT and no
calibration research has been done with the IAT to achieve a non-arbitrary metric.
That being said, Blanton and Jaccard (2006a, 2006b) explicitly stated that metric
arbitrariness is generally not an issue for theory testing purposes within the realm of basic
psychological research. They mention that for most research purposes in psychology, the
use of measures with arbitrary metrics is not problematic when, for instance, the focus of
the research is on the study of basic processes which aims to test for the presence or
absence of predicted linkages between theoretical variables. Blanton and Jaccard’s
position is based on the fact that testing directional predictions derived from theory
(which typically represents the bulk of psychological research) only requires a relative
interpretation of measurement scores, which is permissible for measures with arbitrary
metrics. These authors are mute, however, on whether using measures with non-arbitrary
metrics could benefit basic psychology. Hence, my main thesis clearly goes beyond
Blanton and Jaccard’s analysis, such that I make the specific claim that metric
arbitrariness is also an important issue in basic psychological research and that calibrating
the metrics of our instruments has the potential to benefit basic psychological research in
several important respects.

43

Chapter 2

2

Benefits of Metric Calibration for Basic Psychological
Research

To re-iterate, the goal of my dissertation is to make the case that it is both useful and
feasible to calibrate the metric of instruments commonly used in basic psychological
research. To achieve this goal with regard to the utility of metric calibration, I will first
present a conceptual analysis that elaborates on the potential benefits of non-arbitrary
metrics for basic psychological research, given the premise that one is working with
empirically established calibrated metrics. I will do so by delineating arguments for four
distinct categories of benefits of non-arbitrary metrics for basic psychological research.
Although distinct, the four benefits are hierarchically related with respect to how specific
versus general the potential benefits are for basic psychological science. Hence, I will
elaborate on these four distinct categories of benefits in an ascending order, from more
specific benefits to more general benefits. I will argue that non-arbitrary metrics can
benefit basic psychological research in the following four respects: (1) help in the
interpretation of data, (2) facilitate construct validity research, (3) contribute to
theoretical development, and (4) facilitate the general accumulation of knowledge (see
Table 1 for a list of all proposed benefits).
Table 1: List of proposed benefits of non-arbitrary metrics.
Proposed benefits
1. Help in the interpretation of data
a. Enhance the interpretability of statistical effects
b. Allow and facilitate the extraction of more information from data patterns
c. Help overcome important limitations of NHST
2. Facilitate construct validity research
a. Metric calibration can shed brighter light on psychological constructs
b. Metric approach can help with conceptual challenges that arise in construct validity research
c. Provide benchmark for detecting measurement problems and/or improving measures
3. Contribute to theoretical development
a. Aid and facilitate theoretical debates involving absolute claims
b. Allow for more precise theorizing via enhanced scientific language
c. Provide preliminary interpretive platform for quantitative testing of theories (Meehl, 1978)
4. Facilitate general accumulation of knowledge
a. Metric calibration findings are valuable information in their own right
b. Metric approach as guiding framework for cataloguing the magnitude of psychological effects
c. Facilitate phenomenon-based research (Rozin, 2001)
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To strengthen my case regarding these proposed benefits, in the General Discussion I will
further demonstrate some of these benefits by applying some of my preliminary metric
calibration findings to actual research findings in the literature.

2.1

Help in the Interpretation of Data

The first, and most specific, benefit involves facilitating the interpretation of data. To
support my argument that non-arbitrary metrics could facilitate the process of interpreting
data, I will elaborate on the following three ways that working with calibrated metrics
could help the interpretation of data: (a) enhance the interpretability of basic statistical
effects, (b) allow for the extraction of more information from data patterns, and (c) help
overcome important limitations of NHST. I will elaborate on each of these aspects and
support my reasoning with corresponding relevant examples.

2.1.1

Enhanced Interpretability of Statistical Effects

First, I put forth that working with calibrated metrics could enhance the interpretation of
statistical effects for common statistical procedures. That is, if psychological variables
were measured with instruments having non-arbitrary metrics, analyses using common
statistical techniques (e.g., t-test for 2-group between-subjects design, moderated multiple
regression) would be enhanced in the sense of being easier and more meaningful to
interpret. I will unpack this point by focusing most of my attention on moderated multiple
regression (MMR), which has become the preferred statistical procedure in basic research
to analyze the interaction between continuous predictors or between a continuous and
categorical predictor (rather than using the sub-optimal median split method and
ANOVA; MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). In the case where two
continuous predictors (e.g., X and Z) are hypothesized to interact to predict an outcome
variable (e.g., Y), predictors are typically mean-centered and a product term created
(Aiken & West, 1991). Then, a statistically significant interaction term is typically
followed up by plotting and statistically testing the simple slopes between X and Y at 1
standard deviation (SD) above the sample specific mean and 1 SD below the sample
mean of Z (Aiken & West, 1991). Graphically, this would be depicted as in Figure 8
(panel A), which reflects the examination of the relation between X and Y at 1 SD above
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the mean on Z (i.e., the positive slope) and the relation between X and Y at 1 SD below
the mean on Z (i.e., the negative slope). (Alternatively, one could examine the relation
between Z and Y at 1 SD above the mean on X and the relation between Z and Y at 1 SD
below the mean on X.)

Figure 8: A typical moderated multiple regression model when both predictors are
continuous (panel A) with an actual example from the literature (panel B, Jordan et
al., 2003; reproduced with permission).
Using the +/-1 SD convention to examine the interaction between two continuous
predictors has become common practice in the literature (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003) and in general it does the job of explicating these types of interactions. From a
metrics perspective, however, it becomes clear that the meaning of examining the relation
between X and Y at the particular value of 1 SD above (or below) the mean of Z may be
quite limited. This is the case because assuming the metric of the measured Z variable is
arbitrary, it is unclear what a value of 1 SD above (or below) the mean of Z actually
means with reference to the underlying dimension (other than a relative interpretation
such that a value 1 SD above the mean implies greater levels of the underlying construct
as compared to the mean, which in turn implies greater levels of the underlying construct
as compared to 1 SD below the mean).

46

An actual case from the social psychological literature may more clearly demonstrate the
limitations of using the arbitrary +/-1 SD convention when probing continuous predictor
interactions. Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, and Correll (2003) examined the
joint effect of explicit self-esteem (ESE) and so-called implicit self-esteem (ISE) on
defensiveness, as reflected in narcissism, in-group bias, and cognitive dissonance
reduction. As seen in Figure 8 (panel B), Jordan et al. found that the relation between ISE
and self-reported narcissism became increasingly more negative as ESE scores increased.
Probing the interaction more deeply by using the standard +/-1 SD convention, Jordan et
al. found that “there was a significant negative relation between IAT scores and NPI
scores for participants with high explicit SE (+1 SD)... [whereas]… among individuals
with low explicit SE (-1 SD), the relation between implicit SE and narcissism was nonsignificantly positive” (p. 971). These results were argued to support their “nagging
doubt” hypothesis, which states that individuals with “high explicit SE” differ markedly
in their defensiveness depending on their levels of ISE. That is, “high explicit SE”
individuals who have “low implicit SE” may experience “negative” implicit self-feelings
as nagging doubts, which leads to defensive behavior.
It is important to note, however, that this interpretation hinges upon the assumption that
ISE and ESE discrepancies at the statistical (or distributional) level translate into
corresponding psychological discrepancies that are experienced subjectively as such. This
is not necessarily the case when one appreciates the arbitrary nature of the metric of the
self-esteem measures. Just because an individual has a high score on the ESE measure
and a low score on the ISE measure, does not mean he or she will experience a
subjectively felt discrepancy, as required by Jordan et al.’s position. This is so because
the metrics of these self-esteem measures are arbitrary and hence it is completely
unknown how particular scores on these measures map onto different locations on the
underlying dimensions of the respective constructs. For instance, it is taken completely
on faith that a score 1 SD below the mean on the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale
(RSES; typically a score of about “4” on a 1 to 7-point scale) actually reflects low selfesteem in absolute sense. The only way to know this is to empirically calibrate the metric
of the measure to theoretically-relevant behaviors argued to be indicative of low selfesteem.
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What’s more, another typically unacknowledged limitation of the +/- 1 SD convention
when working with arbitrary metrics is that the +1 and -1 SD values are relative to the
sample specific range of scores. Thus, if the range of scores is different across two
samples (e.g., scores ranging from 3 and 5 in one sample vs. 1 and 3 in another sample,
on a 5-point scale), the +/- 1 SD values may refer to different levels of the underlying
dimensions, further complicating the interpretation of these types of data. In other words,
it is possible due to sampling error alone, to get different sample specific means (and
sample specific standard deviations) for either predictors, which could lead to different
theoretical interpretations of interaction patterns that would be spurious due to sampling
error.
I argue, however, that if the instruments used to assess the predictors in these types of
interaction analyses had non-arbitrary metrics, the interpretation of the data would be
enhanced in at least three respects. First, rather than relying on the arbitrary +/-1 SD
convention, calibrated values for the moderator variable could be used to statistically
analyze these types of interactions. Hence, one could examine the relation of X and Y at
particular calibrated values of Z, which correspond to external behaviors indicative of a
high or low level of the underlying construct. This would enhance the interpretation
because one would get a better sense of what the interaction means psychologically given
the relevant slopes could be interpreted with respect to the behaviors corresponding to the
calibrated values. Second, the data interpretation would be enhanced because the
interaction analysis using calibrated values, which would be grounded in theoreticallyrelevant behavior, could yield different patterns of results that could have different and
potentially important theoretical implications (see hypothetical example below). And
finally, data interpretation would be improved because the use of (consensually agreedupon) calibrated values would overcome the sampling error issue given that exactly the
same calibrated values would be used across different samples rather than the fluctuating
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sample-specific values. I will further discuss and demonstrate this potential benefit in
the General Discussion.
Consider for the defensiveness research question from above, that the RSES measure had
been calibrated to the probability of asking a clarifying question in a small group
discussion (e.g., from a sociometer perspective), such that scores of “3.2”, “4.2”, “5.2”,
and “6.2” on the RSES corresponded to probabilities of “0.2”, “0.6”, “0.7”, and “0.8”,
respectively of asking a clarifying question. Given this calibration information, one could
decide that the RSES value 1 SD below the mean (i.e., “4.2”) does not really reflect a
condition of low self-esteem in a psychological sense, given that it is associated with a .6
probability of asking a clarifying question. Rather, one may decide that it would be more
appropriate theoretically to examine the relation between ISE and narcissism at the RSES
value of “3.2”, which corresponds to a qualitatively distinct behavioral manifestation of
self-esteem which arguably is more diagnostic of the low end of the underlying selfesteem continuum (e.g., a .2 probability of asking a clarifying question).

2.1.2

Allow Extraction of More Information from Data Patterns

The second way non-arbitrary metrics could help data interpretation in psychological
research is that non-arbitrary metrics would facilitate the process of extracting more
information from data patterns. That is, using measures with calibrated metrics would
allow researchers to glean more details from data patterns and hence facilitate more
nuanced interpretations of data patterns. In a broad sense, this would be the case because
of the more intuitive nature of calibrated metrics, which allow for a more natural focus on
score interpretation. To unpack the reasoning behind this proposed benefit, I will again
use specific relevant examples.

7

This benefit could be demonstrated concretely by using a Monte Carlo simulation where an interaction
with a certain known form (e.g., cross-over interaction) is defined in the population and then samples of
size n (typical of sample sizes used in the literature) are repeatedly drawn from such population. Each
sample could then be analyzed using both the conventional +/- 1 SD above the sample specific mean values
and using calibrated values. Tabulated results would then show in concrete terms the superiority of the
calibrated values approach in yielding more accurate conclusions with regard to the true interaction pattern.
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First, in the case of a between-subjects design, I contend that if the DV is assessed using
a measure with a meaningful metric, then between-group mean differences that occur at
different locations on the measurement scale across studies would become more apparent
and hence more easily noticed and interpreted accordingly. Also, and importantly,
experimental effects that emerge at different locations on the scale could mean something
quite different psychologically, hence DVs with non-arbitrary metrics may be quite
useful in facilitating more nuanced interpretations of data. For example, consider a
researcher studying the effect of self-construal on self-reported extraversion using
Eysenck’s IES scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). For a simple 2-group between-subjects
design, imagine that a researcher finds that construing one’s self in broader versus more
concrete terms lead to higher levels of self-reported extraversion (mean of “7.1” vs.
“6.0”; see Figure 9, Sample 1). Now imagine that the same researcher runs the same
study again and finds the same general pattern except in the second sample the mean
group difference is shifted down the scale (mean of “4.2” vs. “3.1” in the same direction;

Eysenck’s Introversion-Extraversion
Scale Scores

see Figure 9, Sample 2).
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Figure 9: Hypothetical experimental results across two samples at different
locations on the DV scale.
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Although the effect was replicated in the predicted direction in Sample 2, the effect
emerged at a different location on the scale of the DV measure. Standard research
practice would typically ignore this fact and simply emphasize that the research finding
was replicated across studies. If, however, the DV measure was calibrated to meaningful
behavioral reference points (i.e., had a non-arbitrary metric), this difference across
sample would become easier to notice. Most importantly, non-arbitrary metrics would
allow a more nuanced interpretation of the data in these situations given that the
experimental effects emerging at different locations on the DV scale can be interpreted
with respect to the calibrated relevant behaviors. For instance, referring back to the
hypothetical extraversion metric mapping in Figure 4 (dotted line), it can be seen that
extraversion scores of “7.1” and “6.0” correspond to about 8 and 5 hours of socializing,
respectively, whereas extraversion scores of “4.2” and “3.1” correspond to about 3 and
2.5 hours of socializing, respectively. It is clear that these experimental effects emerging
at different locations on the DV scale would mean something quite different
psychologically and hence should be interpreted as such. Hence, not only can nonarbitrary metrics make it more likely that these cross-sample differences are noticed in
the first place, but the additional metric calibration information afforded by non-arbitrary
metrics could also allow for more nuanced interpretations of data patterns that could also
have theoretical value.
Furthermore, the exact logic above can also be applied to factorial designs and the
interpretation of simple main effects that emerge at different locations on the DV scale.
These subtle differences in simple main effects across data patterns would become much
more salient with non-arbitrary metrics, and hence could also advance knowledge by
facilitating more nuanced interpretations of data patterns for such factorial designs.
Finally, another illustration of the utility of non-arbitrary metrics in this context can be
demonstrated using a slightly different scenario from the above example. Consider in that
example, that the second sample revealed an effect opposite to the one in the first sample.
That is, broad self-construal versus specific self-construal led to lower (“3.1” vs. “4.2”),
rather than higher, levels of self-reported extraversion. With a calibrated metric, it would
be easier to see that the second finding does not represent a failed replication of the first
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sample, but rather that the manipulation increases whatever personality characteristic is
prevalent in the sample (i.e., extraversion vs. introversion). A broader point that is
implied by this particular example is that non-arbitrary metrics may be especially useful
for research investigations involving bipolar constructs. That is, it would be especially
valuable to calibrate the scale midpoint on such bipolar constructs to diagnostic behavior
that distinguishes individuals from the opposing poles of the construct. For instance, for
Eysenck’s IES scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), this could mean linking up the
midpoint of the scale to a diagnostic behavior argued to distinguish an extravert from an
introvert. The scale could then be converted into a more intuitive metric with the
calibrated scale midpoint labeled as “0” and negative and positive values centered on this
“0” value.

2.1.3

Help Overcome Limitations of NHST

The third and final way non-arbitrary metrics may help the interpretation of data is in the
context of the limitations of NHST. Even though NHST is the dominant approach to
hypothesis testing in psychology, it has, throughout its existence, been repeatedly
attacked as a flawed or severely limited statistical practice (Berkson, 1942; Boring, 1919;
Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1990, 1994; Cronbach, 1975; Cumming, 2008; Dracup, 1995;
Eysenck, 1960; Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Folger, 1989; Gigerenzer, 1998; Guttman,
1977, 1985; Hunter, 1997; Kirk, 1972, 1996; Lykken, 1968; McNemar, 1960; Meehl,
1967, 1978, 1990a, 1990b; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991; Pollard, 1993; Rozeboom,
1960, 1997; Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1997; Shaver, 1993; Shrout, 1997;
Signorelli, 1974; Thompson, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998; for reviews see Harlow, Mulaik, &
Steiger, 1997; Nickerson, 2000; Wagenmakers, 2007). Although criticism against NHST
is multi-faceted and varied, the brewing controversy can be roughly summarized by five
main criticisms: (a) NHST does not tell researchers what they want to know (i.e., it tells
them the probability of obtaining a certain data point, D, given the null is true rather than
telling them the probability that the null is true given the obtained D), (b) NHST is a
trivial exercise given that the null hypothesis is always false with a large enough sample
size, (c) rejecting the null in no way corroborates the substantive theory that implies the
falsity of the null, (d) p-values yielded by NHST do not reflect result replicability, and (e)
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the dichotomous or all-or-none nature of NHST and the arbitrariness of the decision
criterion α are problematic. Given these criticisms and limitations, methodologists have
made different recommendations concerning NHST, ranging from an outright ban on the
technique (Hunter, 1997; Schmidt, 1996), the use of the technique alongside the use of
effect size and confidence intervals (Mulaik, Raju, & Harshman, 1997), the modified uses
of the technique (Granaas, 2002; Kirk, 1996), or the use of alternative techniques such as
Bayesian data analytic approaches (e.g., Kruschke, 2010; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2005).
Even though it can only be hoped that improved use of NHST will take place and/or that
researchers will adopt superior alternative strategies, it seems clear that NHST is here to
stay in some shape or form. Given this state of affairs, it seems fair to say even with
improved usage and interpretation of NHST, that some limitations of NHST are
inherently unavoidable. Given, for example, that the null hypothesis is always false with
a large enough sample size and that the decision criterion α is an arbitrary value, NHST
can be seen at best as insufficient or incomplete. One of the most frequently cited
recommendations to overcome limitations of NHST is an increased focus on the
estimation of effect sizes of experimental effects (Thompson, 2001, 2002; Wilkinson
Task Force, 1999). Although I agree with this general recommendation, it is important to
keep in mind that the quantification of effect sizes into small (e.g., d = 0.2), medium (e.g.,
d = 0.5), and large (e.g., d = 0.8) categories (Cohen, 1969, 1988) was proposed by Cohen
only as a general guide to gauge the size of an effect (Thompson, 2002). As has been
stated (Thompson, 2001, 2002, Kirk, 1996), if researchers sanctify these categories of
effect sizes as much as they have sanctified p-value levels, we would “merely be being
stupid in a different metric” (Thompson, 2001, p. 83). Hence, viewed from this
perspective, effect size estimation can also be considered in a sense arbitrary and
therefore insufficient in informing our research conclusions concerning empirical data
sets.
The famous aspirin study (Belanger et al., 1988) provides a compelling case to support
the claim that these standardized effect sizes can also be considered arbitrary. In this
randomized controlled trial, physicians given low dosage of aspirin experienced fewer
heart attacks (and hence deaths from heart attacks) than those in a placebo control
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condition. The trial had to be terminated early because the beneficial effect of the
treatment was so clear that it was deemed unethical to continue to give the placebo to
individuals in the control condition. What is most interesting, however, is that the
magnitude of the experiment effect explained less than 1% of the variance in the DV.
However, because the outcome variable had such a clear interpretation (255 heart attacks
per 100,000 for the aspirin group compared to 440 heart attacks per 100,000 for the
control group and hence fewer deaths), the importance of the experimental effect was
easy to gauge. Hence, as this example clearly demonstrates, percentage of variability
explained in a DV (i.e., effect size estimation) alone is insufficient to determine the
importance or utility of an effect. Hence, if NHST and effect size estimation are both (in
their most proper usage) insufficient, then where can we turn for additional guidance on
how to interpret the importance or noteworthiness of a data pattern?
I contend the answer to this question relates to the meaning of measurement metrics. I
argue that working with measures with calibrated metrics may facilitate the task of
determining whether a particular experimental finding is worth paying attention to. That
is, a researcher could use metric calibration information (e.g., a mean difference of 0.6 on
the DV is equivalent to a certain difference in behavior) to help the decision process of
determining whether the data pattern supports the research hypothesis and/or whether the
pattern is non-trivial. Ultimately, the interpretation of empirical findings boils down to
meaning. To answer the question of whether the results are “noteworthy” or “significant”
(literally speaking), one must know what the results actually mean. But to know what
results mean, one has to know the meaning of the measured variables, especially the
meaning of the DV measure scores (in the context of experimental studies). My
contention is that if the metric of the DV was more meaningful (i.e., non-arbitrary), this
could help us gauge the meaning of an empirical finding. For instance, following an
example used by Kirk (1996), consider a hypothetical situation where a researcher
examining the effect of a drug for 12 Alzheimer patients on intelligence (vs. 12 patients
in a control group), finds to her dismay that an increase of 13 IQ points in the treatment
compared to the control group did not attain conventional levels of statistical significance
(i.e., p = .14, d = 0.90). As Kirk mentions, the “non-significant” p-value does not
necessarily mean that there is no IQ difference between groups, but rather that the effect
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size found in the sample is not large enough to yield a statistically favorable p-value
8

given the sample size used (N = 24; 12 in each group). However, because most
researchers familiar with the IQ metric would likely agree that the 13 IQ points increase
is a potentially noteworthy result, the study results can be seen as providing evidence for
the hypothesis that the Alzheimer drug is effective. Is the effect real or rather simply due
to sampling error? The only way to know is to attempt to replicate the observed effect.
My position that non-arbitrary metrics may help gauge the noteworthiness of
experimental effects is broadly consistent with recent recommendations by Kashy,
Donnellan, Ackerman, and Russell (2009) who emphasize that it is crucial to distinguish
between findings that are theoretically important and those that are “significant” in a
strictly statistical sense. My position is also in line with Kirk (1996) who argued that the
decision of whether a certain data pattern support one’s research hypotheses should be a
difficult one and that it is unrealistic to think that a completely objective statistical
technique could ever be invented to do the job for us (see also Abelson, 1995; Thompson,
1996). Indeed, in Cohen’s (1994) own words: “…don’t look for a magic alternative to
NHST, or some other objective mechanical ritual to replace it. It doesn’t exist” (p. 1001).

2.2

Facilitate Construct Validity Research

Metric calibration research may also benefit psychological research by facilitating the
research process in the context of construct validity research. I will argue that metric

8

Some may object to this conclusion, under the assumption that the greater than .05 p-value means that the
results of the study could be attributable to mere chance. Although many researchers do interpret p-values
in this fashion, some have argued that NHST cannot (unfortunately) separate “real” findings from those
arising merely due to chance (Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1997). The argument goes like this. Metaanalytic reviews from many different research domains demonstrate that average statistical power
(correctly concluding an effect exists) is in the range of .40 to .60 (Cohen, 1962, 1992; Schmidt, 1996;
Schmidt, Hunter, & Urry, 1976). Hence, in these research domains, about 50% of all statistical conclusions
that non-statistically significant effects are merely due to chance are actually erroneous. In some areas of
research (e.g., job satisfaction), average statistical power is only .20 (Schmidt et al., 1976), which means
using a coin flip would be a more accurate way of determining real from chance findings than using NHST.
Furthermore, requiring sufficient statistical power as a solution to this problem does not work, because this
would make it impossible to conduct the large proportion of studies that examine small effects, given that
sufficiently large sample sizes to achieve power of .80 would be too costly or infeasible to run. This is a
serious problem given that as knowledge increases in a certain research area, the effect sizes studied tend to
become smaller (Schmidt, 1996).
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calibration research could potentially facilitate construct validity investigations in at least
three regards. That is, by (a) shedding more light on the construct itself, (b) aiding in
conceptual challenges that arise in developing psychological instruments (e.g., construct
definition), and (c) by providing a benchmark for detecting problems and/or improving
psychological instruments.

2.2.1

Construct Illumination

First, the metric calibration approach in general, and metric calibration studies in
particular, may help shed more light on a construct itself. The act of linking test scores to
meaningful theoretically related behavioral referents can be seen as additional evidence
supporting the validity of a construct. Indeed, Samuel Messick (1989), who wrote one of
the most authoritative treaty on the topic of validity, actually mentions the idea of
“criterion-referenced behaviors” as a strategy to help the process of interpreting scores:
“…scores may be interpreted criterially in terms of performance standards or behavioral
referents” (p. 44). Furthermore, in his discussion of the external component of construct
validity, Messick states that the meaning of test scores is “substantiated externally by
appraising the degree to which empirical relationships with other measures, …, are
consistent with that meaning” (p. 45). It is important to keep in mind that Messick’s
conceptualization of construct validity differs from the conceptualization that has been
entrenched in mainstream psychology, which views construct validity as the simpler
question of whether a psychological instrument measures what it was intended to
measure (but see Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004). Rather, Messick sees
validity as “an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence
and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and
actions based on test scores …” (p. 13, emphasis in original). This is similar to the
conceptualization of the inventors of the concept of validity, who viewed validity as the
complex question of whether test score interpretations are consistent with a nomological
network involving theoretical and observational terms (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
Hence, viewed from these two more nuanced conceptualizations of validity, metric
calibration research can be seen as contributing to construct validity by providing
additional evidence and support for the interpretation of test scores (Messick, 1995).
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What’s more, the kind of metric research I propose can be seen as providing even more
specific evidence for construct validity given that the focus is on the particular response
functions or functional forms established between test scores and behavioral referents
rather than an exclusive focus on zero-order correlations to other theoretically-related
measures. For instance, successfully linking neuroticism test scores to the probability of
reacting with anger to a mild stressor would provide further evidence for the construct
validity of the neuroticism measure. Furthermore, a stronger case could be made that
research providing empirical evidence for metric meaning should be seen as a
requirement in the validation of any measure. This would be consistent with Messick’s
(1989) idea that “test validation in essence is scientific inquiry into score meaning” (p.
56) and also consistent with Sechrest et al. (1996) who stated that one cannot claim to
have a “high-quality measure” if one has no idea about the meaning of the metric (see
also Messick, 1995).

2.2.2

Help with Conceptual Challenges

A second and related way that metric research may facilitate construct validity is by
providing a general framework for clarifying difficult conceptual challenges that arise
when developing or improving psychological instruments. In particular, metric
calibration may help with conceptual issues involving construct definition and construct
theory (Messick, 1989). That is, the process of designing and executing metric research
aimed at empirically linking particular scores on one measure to external behavioral
reference points, may help a researcher deal with the difficult questions surrounding what
precisely a measure is measuring. For example, when attempting to find the most relevant
behavioral reference points to calibrate test scores, one might realize that the construct
has been defined too broadly or too narrowly, or that the construct suffers from other
conceptual ambiguities (conceptual clarity issues, as discussed by Machado & Silva,
2007).
As an actual example, consider calibrating a measure of conscientiousness as assessed by
the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Given the goal of metric research of linking
scores from a measure to theoretically related behaviors that can serve as reference
points, in the context of conscientiousness, researchers would need to ask themselves
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what relevant behaviors would best represent the most meaningful reference points to
calibrate conscientiousness test scores. Clearly, this depends on the actual definition of
the construct and the theoretical framework from which the construct was derived. In the
case of conscientiousness, one quickly realizes that even though most researchers likely
agree with the working definition of conscientiousness as the propensity of being
painstaking and careful in acting according to the dictates of one’s conscience (John &
Srivastava, 1999), conscientiousness is actually posited to have many different facets
including Self-Discipline, Carefulness, Thoroughness, Organization and Orderliness,
Deliberation, Industriousness, Conventionality, Reliability, Virtue, and even Need for
Achievement (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, &
Goldberg, 2005). For instance, a researcher could decide to examine the lower-order facet
of Orderliness, which has been conceptualized as the propensity to be organized and neat
versus being messy (Jackson et al., 2009), by searching for empirical linkages between
self-report scores of the Orderliness facet of the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and
trained judges’ ratings of the neatness of one’s home or work office (Gosling, 2008).
Hence, in the case of the conscientiousness construct, metric research may provide a
useful framework for questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying
conscientiousness, such as whether the construct is too broad in scope.
In fact, going through this process myself, I contend that a case could be made that
conscientiousness (at least as it is conceptualized by most) might be too broad in scope
and that it lacks tight construct theory given it posits the existence of so many
heterogeneous lower-order facets under the rubric of conscientiousness. For example, is
Industriousness (propensity to work hard), or Need for Achievement, or Virtue, really a
reflection of conscientiousness? It would seem that more conceptual clarity could be
achieved by relegating these lower-order facets to their proper distinct constructs; that is,
Industriousness to the task persistence construct and Need for Achievement to the need
for achievement construct (McClelland, 1951; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell,
1958). Some of these ambiguities likely lie in the fact that many personality inventories
were derived using data reduction techniques that do not require strong construct theory
(Borsboom, 2006). The strategy of linking distinct lower-order facets to distinct
meaningful behavioral reference points, as required by metric research, could hence be
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seen as a superior method of determining the lower-order structure of constructs. At any
rate, I argue that metric calibration research has the potential to facilitate the challenging
(and often under-appreciated) task of working through the fundamental conceptual work
underlying the measurement of constructs (see also Gawronski, Peters, & LeBel, 2008).

2.2.3

Measurement Benchmark

Finally, metric research may also facilitate construct validity research by providing a kind
of benchmark for detecting problems with and/or improving psychological measures.
That is, the empirical process of calibrating measures to relevant behavioral reference
points may provide concrete information about psychometric problems plaguing a
measure. In addition, the metric calibration approach may provide a concrete yardstick
for improving measures by offering more diagnostic information than traditional validity
investigations. This would be the case because finding empirical mappings between test
scores and behavioral criteria has the potential to supply richer and more proximal
information than standard convergent validity investigations. Metric research involves the
discovery of a specific response function between test scores and behavioral
manifestation of the construct, which stands in contrast to traditional criterion validity
research which typically involves establishing zero-order correlations between test scores
of the construct and test scores from other theoretically-related constructs. Indeed, in the
General Discussion I will describe an actual example of this principle below, which I
encountered when calibrating the scores of a task-persistence measure (Study 1), whereby
the consideration of a metric calibration mapping revealed evidence suggestive of a
construct validity issue.
As a further example of how metric research may aid in the detection of measurement
issues, consider a researcher who has run a series of metric calibration studies and
discovers that test scores are consistently not linking up with a theoretically-relevant
behavioral referent. This may suggest that something is wrong with the measure and/or
the construct theory that led to examining the particular behavioral referent. For example,
imagine that no empirical linkage (linear, curvilinear, or otherwise) is found between
extraversion facet scores and average time spent socializing per day (as assessed using
Mehl et al.’s, 2001 EAR for e.g.). This may suggest that something is wrong with the
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extraversion measure or that the construct theory underlying extraversion needs revision
(or both). Upon closer scrutiny, one may notice that a particular extraversion score of
“36”, for example, corresponds to almost any value on the criterion measure (0.5, 1, 2,
3,4 and even 7 hours socializing per day). This could suggest that something is wrong
with the measurement and/or conceptualization of extraversion. Hence, assuming solid
measurement of the criterion behaviors and sound reasoning concerning important metric
calibration principles (e.g., features of the context, level of measurement), metric research
may provide a valuable benchmark for developing psychological measures. Furthermore,
once an empirical mapping is established, all of the relevant calibration information can
be used when improving a measure (or when attempting to improve the scoring algorithm
of a measure) to ensure the integrity of the measure has not been compromised. In other
words, the increased information provided by metric research may help researchers gauge
their progress in improving a measure. Indeed, this form of construct validity research
resonates well with the position of some theorists, who have argued that validity is more
properly seen as a continuous research process that (a) aims to continually build a better
evidence base to support score interpretation (Messick, 1989) and (b) strives to
continually increase our understanding of the measurement error that contaminates test
scores (and hence continually trying to reduce this error component; DeShon, 1998). In
summary, metric calibration research could facilitate construct validity research by
shedding more light on psychological constructs, aiding in challenging conceptual issues
(e.g., construct definition), and by providing a clearer benchmark for developing and
improving psychological instruments.

2.3

Contribution to Theoretical Development

In this section, I will elaborate on how non-arbitrary metrics could benefit psychological
research by having the potential to advance theory development in basic psychological
research. I will argue that using psychological measures with calibrated metrics could
contribute to theory development by (a) shedding light on theoretical debates involving
absolute claims, (b) allowing for more precise theorizing of psychological phenomena via
enhanced scientific language, and (c) allowing researchers to test substantive theories
more precisely (i.e., make specific point-value predictions).
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2.3.1

Aid in Theoretical Debates Involving Absolute Claims

In a first sense, non-arbitrary metrics could contribute to theory development in
potentially important ways by shedding light on theoretical claims based on assertions
made about the absolute level of a certain psychological phenomenon. Though the bulk
of basic psychological research involves testing directional hypotheses involving relative
score comparisons across experimental conditions, certain theoretical questions in
psychological research involve making claims of an absolute nature. I contend that metric
calibration could contribute to theoretical development by providing empirical machinery
to more directly tackle such theoretical questions. One such example comes from the
research literature on the cross-cultural universality of self-enhancement. In this
literature, researchers often examine whether individuals rate themselves more favorably
on a series of culturally relevant desirable traits as compared to a hypothetical average
other person, by testing mean ratings against the scale midpoint (e.g., 1 = much less than
the average person; 4 = about the same as the average person; 7 = much more than the
average person). If the mean ratings are statistically significantly greater than the scale
midpoint, then it is inferred that self-enhancement is present in that culture (e.g.,
Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008). However, as already stated, it is unfounded to
assume that the scale midpoint coincides with the theoretical midpoint on the underlying
dimension of self-enhancement. As mentioned, many factors may shift the numerical
midpoint away from the theoretical midpoint on the underlying dimension (not to
mention the aforementioned logical reasons against meter reading).
If trait ratings of self-enhancement, however, were linked to a behavioral index of selfenhancement (e.g., Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy’s, 2003 over-claiming technique),
then the scores on the self-report self-enhancement measure would gain meaning that
would potentially shed light on the theoretical claim regarding the universality of selfenhancement (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). For instance, it would be critical
to examine how scores typically interpreted as self-enhancement (e.g., a “5” on a 1 to 7
point scale with scale midpoint of “4”) map onto the behavioral indices of selfenhancement, to get an actual sense of what kind of self-enhancement behaviors
correspond to particular trait rating scores. If trait rating scores typically interpreted as
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self-enhancement do not map onto behavioral indices of over-claiming, this could cast
doubt on the universality of self-enhancement claim based on the absolute interpretation
of trait rating scores. This example demonstrates the potential that metric calibration
research could hold in advancing or revising theoretical claims involving assertions of an
absolute nature, which could contribute to theory development more broadly.

2.3.2

Allow More Precise Theorizing via Enhanced Scientific
Language

A second way non-arbitrary metrics could contribute to theoretical development is by
helping researchers more accurately and precisely theorize about psychological
phenomena. This would be the case because non-arbitrary calibrated metrics would
enhance our scientific language by empirically substantiating claims about the standing
of individuals on underlying psychological dimensions. It is easy to find examples in the
literature of theorizing that contain reference to “high-X individuals” or “low-X
individuals” doing certain things under certain conditions (where the X can be any
psychological construct). For example, “…it was found that individuals with a high need
for closure were more likely to report having voted for conservative parties” (Chirumbolo
& Leone, 2008, p. 1286); “our results provide support for Sedikides et al’s (2002)
contention that people high in narcissism show a lack of contextual sensitivity…”
(Collins & Stukas, 2008, p. 1629); “in such situations, high self-esteem individuals might
be more resistant to persuasion than low self-esteem individuals…” (Briñol & Petty,
2005, p. 591). These kinds of claims, which are rampant in the literature, are
unsubstantiated and potentially misleading given that claims about the standing of
individuals on an underlying psychological dimension requires systematic empirical
linkages to meaningful external referents (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b). Hence,
theorizing that emerge from these unfounded claims can impede accurate theorizing
about psychological phenomena and hence interfere with theory development.
Some readers may feel that it is unfair to characterize claims of the sort described above
(“high-X individuals”) as unfounded. An astute reader could point out that researchers
may indeed have some empirical knowledge to substantiate their claims about individuals
being “high” or “low” on a certain psychological construct. For example, it could be
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brought up that the finding from the self-esteem literature showing that median-split
“low” self-esteem individuals trust their relationship partners less than “high” self-esteem
individuals (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000) actually provides support for using the
labels “high” versus “low” self-esteem individuals. On this point, I would partially agree.
Viewed in a broad sense, studies showing how a median-split continuous predictor
variable patterns itself on a certain DV can actually be seen as a very coarse version of
metric calibration research. I would argue, however, that such evidence is insufficient for
making claims regarding individuals’ standing on a construct for at least two reasons.
First, the very rough (and arbitrary) nature of doing a median-split on the scores can
mask/hide important information about the mappings between particular scores and the
relevant behavioral referents. Furthermore, nowadays researchers typically avoid mediansplits (as they should, see MacCallum et al., 2002), which means that these types of
relations would be simply reported as the correlation between the variable in question and
the DV. A correlation, of course, in and of itself, does not provide information about
metric meaning (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006b). Second, more systematic thinking is
required to generate the relevant behavioral referents to be used as reference points in the
calibration process. Notwithstanding these limitations, I think it is potentially informative
to review the literature for a certain construct (e.g., narcissism) and examine what kinds
of DVs have been linked to it in these median-split or correlational studies. This could
provide a starting point for determining what kinds of phenomena or manifest behaviors
are related to the construct whose measure one is interested in calibrating. Actually, data
from these studies could be re-analyzed (if recoverable from the authors) to examine the
specific mapping between the non-median-split (i.e., full-range) scores of the predictor
and the relevant behavioral DV.

2.3.3

Quantitative Testing of Psychological Theories

In a third and final way, non-arbitrary metrics have the potential to contribute to theory
development by providing a guiding framework that might eventually allow basic
psychologists to more precisely test psychological theories. That is, using more
meaningful calibrated metrics may eventually allow researchers to make theoretical
predictions about particular point-values of psychological phenomena. An important
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caveat to note, however, is that a pre-requisite for this potential benefit is that substantive
theories need to be developed enough to actually be able to generate point-predictions
(Meehl, 1967; but see Granaas, 2002). Although perhaps many would agree that in most
areas of psychology theories may not be developed enough to make specific point
predictions (Cook & Shadish, 1994), as previously mentioned, Granaas (2002) wonders
whether it is the methodological training of psychological researchers that prevents
psychologists from designing studies that make specific point-value predictions rather
than the fact that most psychological theories are too weak to make such point-value
predictions. Although the relatively young nature of psychological science undoubtedly
plays a part, I argue that the use of arbitrary metrics also likely contributes to this
problem. That is, psychologists are not trained to think about metric score meaning
because virtually all metrics in psychology are arbitrary; and without paying attention to
what particular scores mean, it seems unlikely one could develop a psychological theory
that makes specific predictions about magnitude and particular values. Hence, I argue that
the general metric calibration research approach proposed in this dissertation might
eventually increase the possibility of testing psychological theory in a more quantitative
fashion, whereby particular point-value predictions are made and then empirically tested.
In physics, specific point-value predictions involve comparing a theoretically predicted
value xo (based on the particular experimental or natural factors embedded in a situation)
with the empirically observed mean x o, and asking whether the predicted value falls
within the band of probable error (due to random error of measurement) of the
empirically observed mean (Meehl, 1967). For example, Mulaik et al. (1997) recounts the
scenario, early in the 20th century, where Newton’s theory of gravity predicted that
gravitation would deflect light from a star passing near the edge of the sun by one-half
the amount predicted by Einstein’s theory of relativity (0”.87 r0/r vs. 1”.75 r0/r, where r0
= the radius of the sun and r = closest distance of the star’s light to center of the sun).
Observed data from two independent observation sites during a total eclipse of the sun
confirmed that Einstein’s predicted value fell within the band of probable error of the
observed value for both sites whereas Newton’s predicted value fell outside the band,
hence supporting Einstein’s theory over Newton’s theory.
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Although it might be difficult to imagine that psychological research will ever reach this
level of exactitude, I contend that we should perhaps nonetheless strive toward this
general direction. This would be in line with recommendations by Harlow (1997) who
suggested that more emphasis should be placed on creating very specific “defeatable”
hypotheses, rather than the common practice of having a null hypothesis of no effect and
a non-specific alternative hypothesis (see also Granaas, 2002, who recommends training
psychologists to use theoretically meaningful null hypothesis values). Furthermore,
perhaps we need to start thinking about how we can combine theories and/or design our
studies such that we can derive possible ranges of values that we theoretically expect
from placing individuals in a particular experimental situation (e.g., 1.2 < B < 1.6; Meehl,
1967). Roughly paralleling the physics example from above, this could correspond to
building a model (e.g., set of equations) based on a substantive theory that integrates how
the different factors (impinging on the participant in the experimental situation), combine
to influence the participant’s behavior. After a range of possible values is generated by
the constructed model, one would empirically observe the behavior in the experimental
situation and determine if the observed value fell within the model’s predicted range of
values. If the value falls outside the range, then one would try to figure out why the
prediction was not borne out, for example, by improving the relevant model and
importantly ruling out other methodological and measurement issues (as is done in
physics). If after repeated experimental tests, the observed value still lies outside the
predicted range, one would be forced to revise the theory and/or auxiliary assumptions
used to generate the substantive model.

2.4

Facilitation of General Accumulation of Knowledge

The last, and most general benefit of the metric calibration approach, reflects the
proposition that metric calibration could potentially benefit basic psychological research
by facilitating the accumulation of knowledge more broadly. I will expand on the three
ways in which both the metric calibration approach and the resulting non-arbitrary
metrics may facilitate the general accumulation of knowledge. That is, non-arbitrary
metrics (a) may provide valuable general information in its own right, (b) may be a
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guiding framework for keeping track and cataloguing the magnitude of psychological
effects, and (c) may facilitate phenomenon-based research.

2.4.1

Valuable Information in its Own Right

Metric research that seeks to find empirical linkages between a measure’s scores and
theoretically-relevant noteworthy behaviors can be seen as very useful information in its
own right. That is, knowing that specific scores on a particular measure correspond to
specific theoretically-relevant behavioral reference points can be viewed as providing
valuable knowledge about human psychology, in the same way that scientists in the
physical sciences seemed to think that calibration research provided valuable information
in the early days of instrument development (e.g., thermoscope, hygrometer). Indeed,
Sechrest et al. (1996) mention it is surprising that no psychological measure known to
them has been systematically calibrated against relevant behavior. That is, Sechrest et al.
state that it is strange that psychologists do not know, for example, what reduction in
probability of being seen smiling is associated with each point increase on the BDI, or
how many points on the Eysenck Introversion-Extraversion Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1975) are associated with each additional hour spent alone per day or how many points
on Scale 4 (Psychopathic Deviate) of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(Dahlstrom & Welsh, 1960) are associated with each arrest by age 25.

2.4.2

Guiding Framework for Cataloguing the Magnitude of
Psychological Effects

Metric calibration research could also facilitate the accumulation of knowledge by
providing a guiding framework for keeping track and cataloguing the magnitude or
“quantity” of psychological effects, above and beyond direction, as Jacob Cohen has
advocated (Cohen, 1994). Without metrics that have any inherent meaning, the
“stockpiling” of information on quantity may not be very productive. That is, the utility
of storing up information about the magnitude of experimental effects based on arbitrary
effect size indices on scores from measures with arbitrary metrics might be quite limited.
With metrics that do have some inherent meaning, however, the situation could be very
different. Researchers would then have a guiding framework for systematically
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cataloguing information about the amount of an experimental effect, above and beyond
its direction expressed in terms of arbitrary effect size. For example, one could catalogue
that an intelligence-based self-concept threat decreased state self-esteem scores
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) by 1.5 points (d = 0.5), which is behaviorally equivalent to a
50% increase in time spent on a self-affirmation task whereas a social-exclusion-based
self-concept threat decreased state self-esteem scores by 2.0 points (d = 0.6), behaviorally
equivalent to a 75% increase in time spent on the self-affirmation task. If systematically
catalogued in the context of other related studies employing similar and different
manipulations, this information – valuable in its own right – could become even more
valuable in developing a database of “amounts” by which certain experimental
manipulation impact different kinds of human behavior. This could facilitate the
accumulation of knowledge by providing an organized system for structuring a research
area’s knowledge base in a much more information-rich manner.

2.4.3

Facilitate Phenomenon-Based Research

Finally, a third perspective on the way the metric calibration approach may facilitate the
accretion of knowledge can be put forward from the perspective of phenomenon-based
research (Asch, 1952/1987; Rozin, 2001; see also Funder, 2009; Rozin, 2009). From this
perspective, it is critical to identify and describe phenomena and invariances (i.e., to
describe what is), before engaging in modeling and hypothesis testing of complex
research questions requiring sophisticated methodological designs and statistical
techniques. A Soloman Asch quote (as cited in Rozin, 2001) reflects this idea poignantly:
“Before we inquire into origins and functional relations, it is necessary to know the thing
we are trying to explain” (Asch, 1952/1987, p. 65). Rozin reviewed objective data
comparing research practices in the natural sciences versus psychology and demonstrates
that natural scientists (a) much more often engage in descriptive research aimed at
becoming familiar with the phenomenon at hand, (b) less often engage in specific model
or hypothesis driven research aimed at testing specific hypotheses, and (c) less often use
experimental designs to make statistical inferences. In addition, Rozin provided an
interesting conceptual argument that the discovery of the molecular basis of genetic
transmission, which Rozin claimed was the most important advance in the life sciences in
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the 20th century, occurred because scientists in this domain engaged heavily in
descriptive, phenomenon-based research. Rozin states that the scientists’ motive for early
studies on x-ray diffraction and nucleotide was basically something along the lines of: “It
looks like DNA is really important and a likely vehicle for genetic transmission. Let’s
find out more about it. What is its shape and what is it made of?” (p. 7). A potential
implication of Rozin’s arguments is that researchers in psychology have perhaps been too
hasty or skipped altogether the valuable descriptive, phenomenon-based stage of
research, and that this has interfered with the development of a cumulative knowledge
base in psychology. Viewed from this perspective, I argue that metric calibration research
can provide a useful framework to engage in this type of descriptive, phenomenon-based
research. Indeed, metric research aimed at discovering the relevant behavioral
manifestations of a construct, and how these manifest behaviors pattern themselves onto
a corresponding measure’s scores, could be viewed as accomplishing the goal of knowing
in more depth, richer information about a certain phenomenon. Viewed in this light,
metric research could facilitate the process of investing more energy in the fundamental
early stages of science, argued to be critically needed for psychological science to reach
its full potential (Asch, 1952/1987).
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Chapter 3

3

Empirical Demonstrations

I now turn to the empirical demonstration of the metric calibration approach applied to
psychological instruments of constructs commonly examined in basic psychological
research. These preliminary empirical demonstrations were meant to showcase in more
concrete ways the steps required, both at the conceptual and procedural level, to calibrate
the metrics of psychological measures typically used in psychological research. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that these empirical demonstrations were executed
primarily for illustrative purposes only, given that (a) collective agreement on the
appropriateness of the behavioral criteria is a prerequisite and (b) much larger targeted
samples are required in practice to ensure that the calibration values found are precise
enough estimates of the population values (i.e., the particular mappings between test
scores and behaviors are sufficiently stable). Study 1 focused on illustrating the metric
calibration approach for need for cognition, task persistence, and conscientiousness
instruments; Study 2 focused on the calibration of a self-enhancement measure in the
context of the pan-cultural debate of self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2003); and Study
3 focused on the metric calibration of behavioral instruments of risk-taking. Finally, reanalyses from two shared datasets further illustrated the metric calibration approach for
instruments assessing self-control, extraversion, and once more conscientiousness.

3.1

Study 1

The primary goal of the first study was to provide preliminary empirical demonstrations
of the metric approach applied to three constructs commonly used in basic psychological
research: need for cognition, task persistence, and conscientiousness. In a broad sense,
these constructs fall under the broader umbrella concept of cognitive effort, which plays
an important role in dual-process models that have become increasingly popular in many
areas of psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Devine, 1989; Epstein, 1990; Fazio,
1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gilbert, 1989; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004;
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Trope, 1986). In these dual-process models, cognitive effort (i.e., cognitive elaboration)
is posited to impact how different pieces of information influence social or self
judgments and/or behaviors. For instance, in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM;
Petty & Caciooppo, 1986), the extent to which individuals process and analyze
information (i.e., the “elaboration continuum”) contained in a persuasive message is
posited to influence the impact of central versus peripheral cues on attitude change. For
example, under conditions of high elaboration (e.g., individuals high in need for
cognition), central cues, such as argument strength, are posited to be the main
determinants of attitude change whereas under conditions of low elaboration, peripheral
cues, such as source credibility, are posited to be the primary determinants of attitude
change. Given the emphasis on cognitive elaboration in such models, it becomes apparent
why shedding light on the metric meaning of measures of constructs in such category
would be important. These constructs were also selected for study because our current
level of understanding of the constructs and related phenomena seemed sufficiently
developed to be good candidates for engaging in metric calibration research.
To illustrate the feasibility of increasing metric meaning in the context of basic
psychological research, respective measures for each of these three constructs were
calibrated to each of their own theoretically-relevant behavioral referents (details of the
particular behavioral referents below). The calibration process involved examining the
particular response function that connected the measurement scores (e.g., need for
cognition scores) with the relevant behavioral reference points (e.g., probability of
choosing cognitively challenging vs. simpler task). The goal in this first step was to
illustrate empirically the practical feasibility of this type of metric calibration approach
for constructs studied in this area of psychology.

3.1.1

Theoretical Derivation of Relevant Behavioral Referents

In this section, I will elaborate on my theoretical reasoning for examining the particular
external behavioral referents chosen to calibrate the scores of the respective measures.
When going through the derivation of behavioral reference points for the three constructs,
it is important to keep in mind the broader context of dual-process models in which the
concept of cognitive elaboration plays an important role.
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First, let’s consider need for cognition (NFC). NFC is conceptualized as the tendency for
an individual to engage in cognitively effortful activities and enjoy thinking in its own
right (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). The NFC construct
originated based on earlier research examining individuals’ behavioral tendencies in how
they organize, understand, and evaluate information in their environments (Cohen,
Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955; Cohen, 1957). NFC is typically measured using the revised and
shortened 18-item scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984), which is based on the original 34-item
scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Based on the abovementioned conceptual definition (and
the conceptual framework from which the construct arose), one potential external
behavior to examine as a possible behavioral reference point to imbue NFC scores with
meaning, is the probability of choosing to complete a cognitively challenging versus
simple task. Individuals high in the underlying dimension of NFC should be more likely
to engage in a cognitive task that is described as being more cognitively challenging
compared to one that is described as cognitively simpler, given that these individuals find
cognitively effortful activities intrinsically enjoyable. However, the type of task and
specific features of the task would need to be specifically configured, so that it is able to
capture a behavioral manifestation of NFC. For instance, it is critical to choose a type of
cognitive task from which two versions of the task (i.e., a cognitively challenging and
cognitively simpler version) could be constructed. The cognitively challenging version
would need to actually appear cognitively more challenging, but not so much that most
individuals would think it was too difficult; conversely, the cognitively simpler task
version would need to appear cognitively simpler, but not so much that most individuals
would consider it too boring. In addition, the presentation of the two versions of the task
should be done in a way that minimizes the possibility of having the vast majority of
individuals choosing one task over the other.
The task chosen in the present study was a modification of the Remotes Association Test
(RAT; Mednick & Mednick, 1967), originally used to measure word-based creativity. In
this task, individuals are presented with three distinct words and are asked to generate a
fourth word that relates in some way to each of the three stem words. For example, if
presented with the words “turkey”, “freezing”, and “war”, a possible answer would be
“cold”. It was expected that this task would be relevant in capturing variations in the
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underlying dimension of NFC because the type of thinking required to solve these
puzzles resonates well with the fundamental conceptualization of the NFC construct (i.e.,
engaging in cognitively effortful activities involving the organization, processing, and
understanding of information). More importantly, with this task it was possible to
develop two versions (varying in cognitive difficulty) in a way that could potentially
discriminate between those high and low on the underlying dimension of NFC. These two
versions were presented to participants via actual example items for each task and
specific explanations were given as to how the two tasks differed. This was done in a way
that specifically matched the conceptualization of NFC, such that the more cognitively
challenging task was framed as requiring more intricate thinking than the simpler task.
That is, it was explained that in the simple task the fourth word would generally relate to
the three words in the same way (e.g., semantically related) whereas in the more
cognitively challenging task, the fourth word could relate to each of the three words in a
different way (e.g., semantic, conceptual, visual). Hence, it was predicted, based on
construct theory, that individuals high in NFC would see the more cognitive challenging
task as more cognitively effortful than the simpler task and hence be more likely to seize
the opportunity to engage in and enjoy the more effortful task (see below for more details
on the specific parameters of the tasks).
With regard to conscientiousness, although the construct originated from personality
psychology (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; John & Srivastava, 1999; Tellegen
& Waller, 1994), it is now examined in the context of many other research areas
including social (Kelly & Conley, 1987), health (Booth-Kewley & Vickers, 1994), and
personnel psychology (Hogan, Rybicki, Motowidlo, & Borman, 1998). According to
dictionary definitions, conscientiousness refers to the “trait of being painstaking and
careful” or the “quality of being in accord with the dictates of conscience” (MerriamWebster; Princeton WordNet Dictionary). Psychological research, however, seems to
have progressed to a more differentiated conceptualization that views conscientiousness
as reflecting the tendency to follow socially prescribed norms and rules, to be goaldirected, planful, able to delay gratification, and to control impulses (John & Srivastava,
1999) or, worded slightly differently, as the degree of organization, persistence, and
motivation in goal-directed behavior (Costa & McCrae, 1992). This heterogeneity in
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conceptualization makes it somewhat difficult to theorize about which behavioral
referents to use to calibrate the scores of the conscientiousness measure. As elaborated in
the introduction, however, during the calibration process, one needs to carefully consider
the (possible) multi-faceted nature of a construct, and if applicable, to find separate scorebehavior linkages for each facet. Given the multi-faceted nature of conscientiousness, I
decided as a starting point to examine facets relating to detail-orientedness and tried to
link conscientiousness scores from relevant facets to performance on a difficult proofreading essay task that requires high levels of detail-orientedness. After careful scrutiny
of the many different facets of conscientiousness available via different assessment
instruments, the most theoretically-relevant facets were deemed to be the Deliberation
and Self-Discipline facets of the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the Self-Control
facet from the MPQ (Tellegen & Waller, 1994), and the Impulse Control facet from
Goldberg’s Abridged Big Five Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C; Goldberg, 1999). For
example, the Deliberation facet of the NEO-FFI contains items such as “I avoid
mistakes” and “I choose my words with care” and the self-control facet of the MPQ
contains items such as “I am exacting in my work” and “I pay attention to details.”
Hence, it was hypothesized that an empirical mapping would emerge between the
conscientiousness scores from those particular facets and the number of mistakes found
in a difficult 4-page essay proof-reading task.
The essay task, adopted from Glass, Singer, and Friedman (1969), was configured to
capture the behavioral manifestation of detail-orientedness. For example, special care was
taken to systematically introduce unambiguous mistakes that do not require grammatical
knowledge. That is, only clear typographical errors (e.g., “aspetcs”, “hows to”) and
unambiguous punctuation errors (“The Style; Template”, “stage of, publication”) were
introduced into the text. In addition, the task length (i.e., 4-pages with approximately 200
words per page) and task time (i.e., 8 minutes) were chosen to create optimal conditions
for capturing conscientiousness, such that the task was difficult enough so that nonconscientious individuals did not have enough time to find most of the mistakes (see
below for more details of the essay task). Also, and critically, to attempt to normalize
levels of motivation for performance in the task, instructions stressed that it was
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important that participants tried their best in finding as many mistakes as possible in the
allotted time.
Finally, concerning task persistence, this construct is of broad relevance to different areas
of psychology, having been investigated in the context of addictive behaviors and distress
tolerance (Rodman, Daughters, & Lejuez, 2009; Quinn, Brandon, & Copeland, 1996;
Steinberg et al., 2007), human motivation and goals (e.g., achievement motivation;
Feather, 1961), health psychology (e.g., mindfulness; Evans, Baer, & Segerstrom, 2009),
and social psychology (e.g., narcissism; Wallace, Ready, & Weitenhagen, 2009). Task
persistence is typically conceptualized as the tendency to persist in an effortful behavior
or frustration-inducing activity (Steinberg et al., 2007) and has been measured both
behaviorally (anagram persistence task: Brandon et al., 2003; mirror tracing persistence
task: Quinn et al., 1996) and via self-report (Steinberg et al., 2007; Pomerleau,
Pomerleau, Flessland, & Basson, 1992). As a potential demonstration of metric
calibration research, I decided to calibrate a self-report task persistence measure with a
theoretically-relevant manifest behavior. I decided to use Steinberg et al.’s (2007) 2-item
self-report measure, developed from Cloninger’s (1987) Tridimensional Personality
Questionnaire (TPQ), which were specifically derived from the theoretical framework of
Learned Industriousness Theory (Eisenberger, 1992). This brief self-report measure of
persistence is desirable because of its clear practical advantages over behavioral
persistence measures in terms of its ease of use, lower cost, and portability (Ditre &
Brandon, 2008). The items are as follows: “I will keep trying the same thing over again
even when I have not had success the first time” and “I will often continue to work on
something, even after other people have given up”. Steinberg et al. successfully used this
measure in the context of teenager smoking, showing that self-reported task persistence
was greater among adolescent non-smokers as compared to current adolescent smokers
(see also Ditre & Brandon, 2008, who also successfully used this measure).
As a behavioral manifestation of task persistence, I used a commonly used anagram
persistence task (Brandon et al., 2003; Evans et al., 2009; Nes, Segerstrom, & Sephton,
2005; Quinn et al., 1996), which involves unscrambling near-impossible (“X L Y I K” =
“K Y L I X”) and easy (“B E A H C” = “B E A C H”) anagram puzzles, with the average
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time persisting on the near-impossible items used as an index of task persistence.
Critically, participants are instructed that (a) they have 3 minutes to solve each anagram,
(b) as many attempts as desired can be made, and that (c) they can give up and skip to the
next item before the maximum time has elapsed. The assumption was that the self-report
measure would tap into some aspect of task persistence that would share some overlap
with the behavioral index of task persistence. Hence, it was predicted that a mapping
would emerge between scores of the self-report measure and actual behavioral
persistence exhibited in the anagram persistence task.

3.1.2

Method

3.1.2.1

Participants and Design

Ninety four (94) University of Western Ontario introductory psychology undergraduates
participated for partial course credit (69 females, 25 males; mean age = 18.46, SD = 2.18,
range = 17 to 30). No restrictions were imposed on participant sex, age, or ethnicity. No
experimental conditions were examined, hence all participants completed the same
measures and tasks in the same order (see below for details).

3.1.2.2

Procedure and Materials

Participants were run in groups of two to five in a large testing room where each
participant was seated in a separate cubicle in front of a PC computer. The experimenter
(myself) individually gave brief verbal instructions before participants started, stating:
All of the tasks you will complete today, except one, will be completed on the
computer. It is very important to thoroughly read all of the instructions before
starting any of the tasks. If you have any questions about any of the tasks, feel
free to ask me for clarification. Also, before starting, please turn off your cell
phone (or any other electronic devices).
Participants then followed on-screen instructions and completed each task in a serial
fashion in the following order: the measures of conscientiousness, the need for cognition
scale, the self-report measure of task persistence, the word association decision task, the
essay proofreading task, the anagram persistence task, and then demographics and
debriefing questions.
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3.1.2.2.1

Conscientiousness

To assess conscientiousness, I measured the Deliberation and Self-Discipline facets of the
NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the Self-Control facet from the MPQ (Tellegen &
Waller, 1994), and the Impulse Control facet from Goldberg’s Abridged Big Five
Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C; Goldberg, 1999). I used the International Personality
Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006) version of the relevant MPQ and NEO-FFI facets
(see Appendix A for actual instructions and items). For the NEO-FFI and MPQ items,
participants rated the extent to which each statement was an accurate description of
themselves, using a 5-point Likert scale, with the response categories 1 = “Very
Inaccurate”, 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”, 3 = “Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate”, 4 =
“Moderately Accurate”, and 5 = “Very Accurate”. Instructions emphasized that
participants should describe themselves as they generally are, to answer honestly, and to
answer in relation to other people the same sex and roughly the same age. For the AB5C
(impulse control), participants rated the extent to which 12 trait adjectives (e.g.,
“Careful”, “Cautious”) described them, using a 5-point Likert scale, with the response
categories 1 = “Strongly Disagree”, 2 = “Somewhat Disagree”, 3 = “Neither”, 4 =
“Somewhat Agree”, and 5 = “Strongly Agree” (see Appendix B for instructions and
items). Instructions emphasized that participants should describe themselves at the
present time and to describe themselves as they are generally or typically. About half of
the items on the four facets were negatively worded and hence were reverse-scored.
Reliability of the scores from the four facets were generally acceptable (deliberation, 10
items, α = .80; self-discipline, 10-items, α = .87; self-control, 10-items α = .76; impulsecontrol, 12-items, α = .76). For ease of interpretation, the ratings for each facet were
averaged, therefore creating a metric ranging from 1 to 5, with decimal numbers in
between.
For the essay task behavioral measure, participants were told that they would receive a 4page essay on actual paper and that their task would be to circle as many mistakes as
possible within a span of eight minutes (approximately 10 mistakes per page were
systematically introduced in the text, with a total of 42 mistakes). Participants were
clearly informed to look only for mistakes such as misspellings, incorrect punctuations,
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and typographical errors (but not formatting issues, e.g., spacing). They were also
informed that it was important that they do their best in finding as many mistakes as
possible in the allotted time. After reading these instructions, the experimenter brought
the 4-page essay and pen to the participant and started the 8-minute timer set in the
MediaLab software. In terms of scoring, I counted (using an answer overlay for accuracy
and expediency) the number of mistakes correctly circled by the participant. Scores were
expressed as a percentage of the total mistakes found by the participant. Scores ranged
from 17 to 88%.

3.1.2.2.2

Need for Cognition

As mentioned, Cacioppo et al.’s (1984) revised and shortened 18-item NFC scale was
used. The questionnaire was introduced as a tool assessing people’s individual thinking
styles and it was mentioned that there were no right or wrong answers. Participants rated
the extent to which each item was characteristic of them, using the response categories 1
= “Extremely Uncharacteristic”, 2 = “Somewhat Uncharacteristic”, 3 = “Uncertain”, 4 =
“Somewhat Characteristic”, and 5 = “Extremely Characteristic” (see Appendix C for
items). Negatively worded items were reverse scored and the mean of the 18 items was
computed, yielding a metric ranging from 1.0 to 5.0 (α = .88).
For the behavioral reference point, as mentioned, a choice was given to participants to
complete one of two word association tasks that were described as varying in terms of
their level of cognitive challenge. Introduced as a task used to measure individuals’
conceptual ability to solve problems involving the connections between words,
participants were explained the basic logic of the task (i.e., three words given, must find a
related fourth word) and told that they would complete 10 questions (having 20 seconds
for each). Then, an example problem for Task 1 (cognitively simpler task: “FRIES”
“KISS” “TOAST”) and Task 2 (cognitively more challenging task: “BOARD” “MAGIC”
“DEATH”) were presented without the answer, emphasizing that these example
questions reflected the level of cognitive challenge that would be found in the items of
the respective tasks. A minimum of 5 seconds was imposed before participants were
allowed to proceed to the next screen to see the answers to the Task 1 and 2 example
problems. This was done to ensure that participants would accurately perceive the level
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of cognitive challenge of the example questions (i.e., prevent people from thinking even
the challenging problem was obvious if they were presented with the problem and the
answer simultaneously). On the screen with the answer to the Task 1 and 2 examples, it
was clearly explained how the two examples differed in level of cognitive challenge by
explaining that in the Task 1 example, the answer (i.e., “FRENCH”) related to the three
words in the same way whereas in the Task 2 example, the answer (i.e., “BLACK”)
related to the three words in a different way (i.e., “BLACK” relates to “BOARD” in a
semantic way whereas “BLACK” relates “DEATH” in a visual way, etc.). Participants
then clicked on the respective button to make their choice and proceeded to complete the
10 questions. Overall, 58 individuals (62%) chose Task 1 and 36 individuals (38%) chose
Task 2.

3.1.2.2.3

Task Persistence

As described earlier, Steinberg et al.’s (2007) 2-item self-report measure of task
persistence was administered (“I will keep trying the same thing over again even when I
have not had success the first time” and “I will often continue to work on something,
even after other people have given up”). Participants rated their degree of persistence
using a 4-point scale, using the response categories 1 = Very untrue, not at all like me, 2
= Somewhat untrue or not like me, 3 = Somewhat true or like me, and 4 = Very true, very
much like me. The reliability estimate of the measurement scores was α = .67, which is
somewhat lower than the α = .73 reported by Steinberg et al. For ease of interpretation,
ratings from the two items were averaged, creating a metric ranging from 1 to 4, with half
steps in between.
For the behavioral measure, an anagram persistence task (Brandon et al., 2003; Nes et al.,
2005; Quinn et al., 1996) was used. Participants were told that they would complete
anagram puzzles and that although some of these would be very difficult, that they were
all solvable. Participants were given an example (i.e., re-arrange the letters “O B A T”
into “B O A T”) and then told that the task would contain 11 anagrams presented serially.
Participants were told that they would be allowed as many attempts as they wished to
figure out the correct answer, but that they would have a maximum of 3 minutes to work
on each question (at which time the program would automatically proceed to the next
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question). Importantly, participants were informed that if they wished to give up on an
anagram question before the maximum time, they could skip to the next question by
clicking the “SKIP” button. Unbeknownst to the participants, the Visual Basic software
program recorded the amount of time spent on each question and also how many attempts
were tried for each question (and the content of each attempt). The task contained 6 nearimpossible anagrams (e.g., “Q Y U I A” = “Y A Q U I”) and 5 relatively easy anagrams
(e.g., “B E C H A” = “B E A C H”; see Appendix D for all items). As done in past
research, average time spent persisting on the 6 near-impossible questions was used as
the index of task persistence. However, upon closer scrutiny of participants’ actual
answers on the near-impossible items, I noticed that many participants actually correctly
guessed the answer often within the first minute (surprisingly, 20.3% of the nearimpossible anagrams were correctly guessed within the allotted time; however, all
individuals left at least 2 anagrams unsolved, meaning no one had to be excluded due to
9

correctly guessing all near-impossible anagrams). To control for this contamination,
only unsolved anagrams were used to compute behavioral indices of task persistence.

3.1.3
3.1.3.1

Results
Preliminary Data Treatment

Data from all measures were first screened informally for any evidence of noncompliance. That is, I examined the time taken (as recorded by MediaLab) on instruction
screens and actual questionnaire items for any evidence of consistently short latencies
suggestive of non-compliance. No unambiguous cases were identified and hence all
participants were retained.

9

It is interesting to note that I did not find mention of this issue in any of the past research using this
persistence task. Indeed, Brandon et al. (2003) specifically mentioned that “the dependent measure was the
mean time spent on the six difficult anagrams, which were never solved by the participants” (p. 450). I
suspect this discrepancy may have arisen due to differences in the administration of the task, which in past
research has typically been done with an experimenter and a stop-watch, whose presence may drastically
reduce the amount of trial-and-error guessing and hence considerably reduce the number of correctly
guessed answers.
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3.1.3.2

Main Analyses

I now present the main metric mapping results. For rhetorical reasons, I will present
results for the constructs in the following order: need for cognition, task persistence, and
conscientiousness. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for
variables in Study 1.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables in Study 1 (N = 94).
Variable
NFC (metric = 1-5)
Conscientiousness
Deliberation
(NEO-FFI; 1-5)
Self-Discipline
(NEO-FFI; 1-5)
Self-Control
(MPQ; 1-5)
Impulse Control
(AB5C; 1-5)
Essay errors found
(%; 0-100)
Task Persistence (TP)
(self-report; 1-4)
Anagram Persistence
Task (avg mins /
question; 0-3)
Cognitive task choice

3.1.3.2.1

Mini
mum
1.83

Maxi
mum
4.78

Mea
n
3.37

0.65

1.70

4.70

3.39

0.62

.31*

1.80

4.80

3.16

0.74

.34*

.53*

2.10

4.80

3.55

0.57

.23*

.84*

.57*

2.50

4.58

3.71

0.49

.28*

.73*

.49*

.68*

17.0

88.0

45.0

14.0

.12

-.02

-.02

.04

-.03

1.00

4.00

3.07

0.64

.41*

.31*

.51*

.25*

.29*

-.14

0.16

3.00

1.51

0.78

.26*

.22*

.02

.12

.26*

-.01

.15

0.0

1.0

-

-

.34*

.13

.03

.15

.06

.06

.02

SD

NFC

Caut
ious.

Selfdisc.

Selfcont.

Imp
ulse

Erro
rs

TP

APT

.29*

Need for Cognition

The empirical linkages between NFC scores and probability of choosing the cognitively
challenging task over the simpler task was modeled using a logistic regression, with NFC
scores as the predictor and behavioral choice as the dichotomous outcome. Results from
the logistic regression revealed that indeed NFC scores were able to successfully
discriminate (72.3% classification accuracy compared to both the 50.0% baseline and
62.0% largest-group baseline) between those who chose the more cognitively challenging
task (Task 2) and those who chose the cognitively simpler task (Task 1), Wald’s χ2 =
9.71, B = 1.20, odds ratio (OR) = 3.33, p = .002. This indicates that for every unit
increase in NFC scores, the odds of choosing the challenging over simpler task more than
triples (i.e., OR = 3.33). This can be seen visually, by plotting the predicted probability of
choosing Task 2 over Task 1 (calculated using the coefficient and intercept values of the
best fitting exponential regression line) for each particular NFC score obtained in the
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sample (see Figure 10).

10

At least three important things can be gleaned from Figure 10,

which are critical to imbuing meaning to the metric of NFC scores. The first observation
that can be made is to garner general information about how the NFC scores along the
metric range map onto the relevant behavioral referent. In this case, it can be seen that
NFC scores of “2.0”, “2.5”, “3.0”, “3.5”, “4.0”, and “4.5” map onto about a 10%, 17%,
27%, 40%, 55%, and 70% chance of choosing the more cognitively challenging over
simpler task (i.e., Task 2 over Task 1).

Figure 10: Predicted probability of choosing a cognitively challenging task (Task 2)
over a cognitively simpler task (Task 1) given need for cognition (NFC) scores.

10

Interpretation of the odds ratio (in this case OR = 3.33) can be visualized in this figure. For example, an
NFC score of “2.0” yielded a predicted probability of choosing Task 2 over Task 1 of approximately 0.10,
equivalent to an odds of about 0.11 (0.10/0.90) whereas an NFC score of “3.0” yielded a predicted
probability of choosing Task 2 over Task 1 of approximately 0.27, equivalent to an odds of 0.37 (0.27/.73).
Hence, the odds of choosing Task 2 over Task 1 more than triples (0.37/0.11 = 3.33) for every 1-unit
increase in NFC scores.
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The second important observation that can be made from Figure 10, which follows the
general logic implied by Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006b) analysis, is to use the 50%
probability of choosing Task 2 over Task 1 as a qualitatively distinct behavioral reference
point to imbue meaning into NFC scores. That is, to the extent that one interprets 50% as
a meaningful behavioral reference point, the mapping between an NFC score of
approximately “3.8” and 50% can be used to imbue NFC scores with meaning, by
interpreting other NFC scores relative to the value of “3.8”. In other words, the
approximate location of the NFC scores on the underlying dimension of NFC can be
inferred relative to the “3.8” threshold value. Overall, this metric meaning analysis
implies that the metric range of NFC scores seems to be capturing the lower end of the
underlying continuum of NFC. This is based on the logic that the NFC numerical
midpoint (i.e., “3.0”) is associated with a value on the behavioral reference point that is
considerably lower than the behavioral threshold value (27% lower than 50%). If the
opposite would have emerged (i.e., the NFC numerical midpoint of “3.0” was associated
with a 75% chance of choosing the more cognitively challenging task), then this would
have suggested that the NFC measure would be capturing the higher end of the
underlying continuum of NFC.
A final observation that can be made from Figure 10 is that the scale midpoint (i.e.,
“3.0”) maps onto a 27% chance of choosing Task 2 over Task 1. This observation can be
seen as providing preliminary empirical evidence that the scale midpoint should not be
interpreted as reflecting a neutral position on the underlying dimension of NFC, assuming
that a 50% chance of choosing Task 2 over Task 1 is interpreted as a meaningful NFC
behavioral reference point. In other words, this result implies that characterizations of
individuals above the scale midpoint as “high” in NFC and those below the midpoint as
“low” in NFC would be misleading, given that the scale midpoint of “3.0” was associated
with an approximate 27% chance of choosing the more cognitive challenging task. In
addition, given that the median of NFC scores in the sample was “3.4”, the empirical
mapping found also implies that characterization of individuals above the median as
“high” or those as below the median as “low” on NFC could also be seen as misleading,
given that a score of “3.4” was associated with an approximate 32% chance of choosing
the more cognitive challenging task. Granted, these implications only hold to the extent
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that experts in this research area agree that this behavioral choice reflects a theoretically
meaningful reference point that actually reflects the underlying dimension (and is also
provisional on replicating the finding). Hence, as NFC scores are linked to other
meaningful and/or more extreme need for cognition behavioral reference points, NFC
scores could gain even more meaning and interpretability.

3.1.3.2.2

Task Persistence

Plotting mean time spent on the unsolved near-impossible anagram puzzles against selfreported task persistence (TP) scores revealed a linear trend (see Figure 11). A linear
regression confirmed the presence of a positive relation (B = 0.18, β = r = .15), though
the effect did not attain conventional levels of statistical significance (p = .15).
Interestingly, however, this effect is consistent with results from Ditre and Brandon
(2008) who found a small positive relation between the same self-report TP measure and
a mirror-tracing persistence task (r = .17, p = .056) and a breath-holding persistence task
(r = .16, p = .07). Given that Brandon et al. (2003) found a positive relation between this
mirror-tracing persistence task and the exact anagram persistence task used in my study
(r = .27, p = .001), this suggests that the correlation found in my study is a meaningful
effect given that it is consistent with past research. From Figure 11 (solid line), it can be
seen that a self-report TP score of “2.0” corresponded to approximately 1 minute and 19
seconds of mean time persisting on the near-impossible anagrams whereas a self-report
TP score of “3.0” corresponded to about 1 minute and 30 seconds of persistence. This
linear relationship can be gleaned more precisely by directly interpreting the
unstandardized regression coefficient (B = 0.18), which indicates that a 1-unit increase in
self-report TP scores is associated with an increase of 11 seconds (11 = 0.18 × 60) in
persistence.

11

11

Hence, although in this case the behavioral referent does not have a clear

This particular finding demonstrates the conceptual idea of how metric research can help us overcome
limitations of NHST. In this case, a researcher strictly relying on p-values or effect size would have likely
dismissed the result given the greater than .05 p-value and the “small” effect size (2.2% of the variance
explained). Focusing our attention on the meaning of measurement scores, however, reveals a potentially
more useful perspective on assessing the actual noteworthiness of this empirical finding. In this particular
case, a researcher must ask themselves the (potentially difficult) question of whether an 11-second increase
in actual task persistence for every 1-unit increase in the self-report measure scores is noteworthy.

83

qualitatively distinct threshold cut-off value, the mapping nonetheless imbues the selfreport TP scores with some meaning.

Figure 11: Mean time spent on unsolved near-impossible anagrams (in minutes) in
the anagram persistence task (APT) plotted against self-reported task persistence
scores using a linear (solid line) or cubic function (dotted line).
For example, knowing that a self-report TP score of “1.0” is associated with
approximately 1 minute and 8 seconds of actual persistence whereas a score of “4.0” is
associated with approximately 1 minute and 40 seconds of persistence helps one get a
sense of what these scores might mean in relation to the underlying dimension of task
persistence.
An interesting second perspective on the mapping between self-reported and actual
persistence can be gained when one takes a closer look at the scatterplot in Figure 11.
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Although overall it appears that as self-reported TP scores increase time persisting also
increases, for values greater than “3.5” on the self-report measure, time spent persisting
actually seems to decrease rather than increase. This could be the case if individuals who
endorsed the highest possible response option for both self-report items (“4”s on both
items) exhibited an over-reporting bias when indicating their typical persistence,
implying that this select group of individuals (those scoring “4”s on both items) exhibited
less persistence behaviorally than their “3.5” counterparts. Indeed, a cubic function
applied to the data seemed to fit the data reasonably well, explaining approximately three
times more variance than the linear function (6.2% versus 2.2%) (see Figure 11, dotted
line). Hence, using this response function, a score of “3.0” corresponded to about 1
minute and 36 seconds of persistence; a score of “3.5” corresponded to about 1 minute
and 44 seconds; whereas a score of “4.0” corresponded to only about 1 minute and 29
seconds. This could be seen as preliminary evidence suggesting that responses on the
self-report measure of task persistence may suffer from sub-optimalities that further
construct validity research should clarify. This curvilinear effect could also potentially
explain the consistently small positive linear relations observed between the self-report
measure and the three behavioral persistence measures (as found by Ditre and Brandon,
2008, and in my study).
Indeed, by re-analyzing Ditre and Brandon’s (2008) data (kindly provided by the authors
upon request), I was able to replicate this non-linear cubic response function in Ditre and
Brandon’s data. That is, a cubic function modeling the relation between the same selfreported task persistence scores and mean time persisting on unsolved mirror-tracing
trials (which has shown a sizable correlation to the exact anagram persistence task used in
my study) explained approximately twice the amount of variance than a linear function
(5.3% vs. 2.8%). The nature of the cubic function followed the same “dipping pattern” as
in my data, whereby a score of “3.0” corresponded to about 2 minutes and 52 seconds of
persistence; a score of “3.5” corresponded to about 3 minutes and 1 seconds; whereas a
score of “4.0” corresponded to only about 2 minutes and 48 seconds (all values
numerically higher because participants were allowed up to 5 minutes per trial compared
to a maximum of 3 minutes in my task). Hence, this finding provides further evidence
supporting the hypothesis that certain individuals (i.e., those scoring “4”s on both items)
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may be exhibiting a reporting bias. Furthermore, this finding implies that further
construct validity research could examine whether a strong accuracy instruction
eliminates the alleged over-reporting bias, which could be reflected in the data if a linear
function would explain more variance than the cubic function.

3.1.3.2.3

Conscientiousness

Contrary to expectations, scatterplots of percentage of errors found in the essay task
plotted against the scores from the relevant facets of conscientiousness did not reveal any
clear mappings for any of the four facets. That is, higher conscientiousness scores did not
necessarily correspond to a higher percentage of mistakes found in the essay task for
none of the facets (r = -.02, r = .04, r = -.02, r = -.03, for the Impulse Control, SelfControl, Self-Discipline, and Deliberation facets, respectively).
Many factors could underlie why no meaningful mappings were found between the
conscientiousness facets and performance in the specifically designed detail-oriented
task. I will elaborate on a few possibilities. First, although carefully constructed, the
essay task may not have been the best task to capture the intended “detail-orientedness”
manifestation of conscientiousness. The primarily language-based component of the task
may not have captured detail-orientedness in those less linguistically inclined. Indeed,
consistent with this idea, a post-experiment debriefing question tapping the extent to
which individuals read books, revealed a small positive correlation between reading and
percentage of errors found (r = .18, p = .09, overall and r = .22, p = .03 for errors found
on the first page, which is likely more diagnostic given most people did not get to the last
page of the essay task). Second, perhaps the essay task was mostly driven by (i.e.,
confounded with) motivation rather than conscientiousness. Third, my choice of
conscientiousness facets may have contributed to the null mappings. Although I took
great care in selecting facets that seemed to be most theoretically-relevant to detailorientedness, admittedly I was not satisfied with my final choices of measures. For
example, closer inspection of the items comprising the facets revealed odd items that do
not seem to reflect the facet I intended to measure (e.g., “I do crazy things,” which was
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part of the Deliberation facet).

12

Hence, perhaps the chosen facets did not accurately

reflect the construct I intended to capture. Similarly, the fact that I used the (briefer) IPIP
instantiations of the MPQ and NEO-FFI might have played a part. Finally, perhaps partial
violation of the matching principle with respect to temporality may have contributed to
the null mappings. Conscientiousness self-reports are typically assumed to capture
individuals’ recall of how they characteristically behave with respect to the
conscientiousness facets whereas the criterion behavior assessed in the study captured
individual’s transient momentary detail-oriented inclination at the present moment in
time. One possibility to overcome this issue would be to take the average performance on
the essay task across three independent occasions and then examine the mappings
between conscientiousness facet scores and behavioral performance.
Although the conscientiousness facet scores did not reveal meaningful mappings to essay
performance, the Impulse Control facet of conscientiousness did reveal some
interpretable linkages to the behavioral persistence in the APT (see Figure 12). As can be
seen in Figure 12, every unit increase in Impulse Control self-report scores corresponded
to roughly a 25 second increase in persistence on the APT (B = .41, t = 2.56, p = .01; .41
× 60 = 25 seconds). For example, individuals self-reporting conscientiousness around the
scale midpoint (i.e., “3”) persisted for an average of about 1 minute and 12 seconds on
the near-impossible unsolved anagrams whereas those self-reporting around “4” persisted
for about 1 minute and 37 seconds.
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Although psychometrically hazardous, I also examined empirical mappings between specific items
deemed most theoretically relevant in predicting detail-oriented behavior in the essay task (I a priori picked
four questions from the MPQ and NEO-FFI (i.e., “I am exacting in my work”, “I pay attention to details”,
“I avoid mistakes”, and “I choose my words with care”) and four items from the adjective ratings (i.e.,
“careful”, “cautious”, “conscientious”, and “systematic”) that seemed the most theoretically relevant).
Interestingly, I did find two meaningful mappings: one between the adjective ratings for the “cautious”
item and overall errors found (r = .30, p = .004) and another between the adjective ratings for the
“conscientious” item and errors found on the first page (r = .25, p = .02). These mappings, however, must
be interpreted with caution given that they involve a 1-item self-report measure. Nonetheless, this could be
seen as preliminary evidence suggesting, in line with the matching principle, that more specific self-report
measures would be more useful in predicting the specific expression of conscientiousness presumably
required for the essay task.
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Figure 12: Mean time spent on unsolved near-impossible anagrams in the anagram
persistence task plotted against self-reported Impulse-Control scores (Goldberg).
This metric mapping can actually be seen as consistent with the broad conceptualization
of conscientiousness which includes as a facet the degree of organization, persistence,
and motivation in goal-directed behavior (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Assuming that some
individuals had it as a goal to persist in the task, the conscientiousness-persistence metric
mapping could make sense theoretically to the extent that the particular conscientiousness
facet captured this tendency to persist in goal-directed behavior.

3.1.4

Discussion

Overall, Study 1 demonstrated the feasibility of calibrating the metric of measures
commonly used in basic psychological research by employing two metric calibration
strategies inspired by past research. In summary, I found a meaningful and illuminating
empirical mapping between NFC scores and probability of choosing a cognitively
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challenging versus simpler task. I also found an informative linkage between a
pragmatically useful self-report task persistence measure and actual behavioral
persistence in a commonly used persistence task. Finally, although no clear connection
was found between the conscientiousness facets and errors found in the essay task, I did
find some theoretically interpretable linkages between scores from the Impulse Control
facet (Goldberg) and behavioral persistence in the anagram task. Taken together, these
findings suggest that the metric calibration approach is feasible in achieving the goal of
calibrating the metric of measures commonly used in psychological research. Hence,
these promising results suggest that the benefits proposed in my conceptual analysis
could one day potentially bear fruit.
Supposing replication and consensus from the field as to the meaningfulness of the
behavioral reference points, these metric findings could speak to theoretical issues in the
research literatures involving the constructs of need for cognition, conscientiousness, and
task persistence. For instance, one could delve into the attitudes and persuasion literature
and find published studies that involved NFC as a moderating variable of attitude change.
One could then attempt to re-analyze moderated multiple regression analyses in these
studies using calibrated NFC metric values, which could shed additional light on the
research questions tested (e.g., NFC as a moderator of the impact of central vs. peripheral
cues on attitude change). In fact, in the implications section of the General Discussion, I
will report results of this kind of re-analysis using precisely such an approach.

3.2

Study 2

The primary goal of Study 2 was to provide a preliminary demonstration of the feasibility
and utility of the metric approach with regard to contributing to theoretical development.
More specifically, the goal was to illustrate how the metric calibration approach could be
used to shed light on theoretical debates that involve claims of an absolute nature.
Another goal of Study 2 was to further demonstrate the metric approach for a distinct
construct commonly studied in basic psychological research. The study centered on the
topic of self-enhancement in the context of theoretical controversies regarding the
question of pan-cultural self-enhancement. An important aspect of this theoretical debate
is that it involves making claims regarding the presence versus absence of self-
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enhancement within and across cultures, which involves making theoretical claims about
absolute levels of self-enhancement based on scores from trait rating measures which
have arbitrary metrics. Consequently, this topic was chosen precisely to attempt to
illustrate how the metric approach can potentially shed new light on the debate by
providing specific information regarding the metric meaning of trait rating scores for
those measures. Toward this end, two self-enhancement measures that play a focal role in
the debate were calibrated to a theoretically-relevant behavioral reference point.

3.2.1

Pan-cultural Self-Enhancement Debate

Although research on cultural differences in the self-enhancement motive has a long
history (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman,
1996; Pepitone & Triandis, 1987), the pan-cultural self-enhancement debate intensified
when Sedikides et al. (2003) asserted as misguided the idea that self-enhancement is
pervasive in individualistic cultures (Westerners) but absent collectivistic cultures
(Easterners). Rather, Sedikides et al. proposed that Westerners and Easterners use
different tactics to achieve the same goal of self-enhancement, such that Westerners selfenhance on individualistic attributes whereas Easterners self-enhance on collectivistic
attributes. This tactical self-enhancement hypothesis was supported empirically in a set of
two studies showing that Americans self-enhanced on individualistic attributes whereas
Japanese self-enhanced on collectivistic attributes. This led Sedikides et al. to conclude
that self-enhancement is a universal human motive. Heine (2005) challenged this claim
on empirical and methodological grounds. Specifically, Heine argued that Sedikides et al.
ignored numerous conflicting past findings that contradict their main conclusion and that
they used inappropriate cross-cultural samples. More relevant to the present dissertation,
Heine also called into question Sedikides et al.’s pan-cultural claim based on an
important methodological issue. Heine argued that the better-than-average paradigm used
by Sedikides et al. to index self-enhancement is flawed given that it is confounded with a
general cognitive bias. That is, past research has shown that individuals view not only
themselves as better than average, but they also view any randomly chosen individual as
better than average (the “everyone is better-than-average-effect” [EBTA]; Klar & Giladi,
1999; Sears, 1983). It is clear that rating a random other as better than average has
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nothing to do with self-enhancement and hence this cognitive bias contaminates the selfenhancement index scores in an upward fashion and seriously calls into question
Sedikides et al.’s main theoretical claim.
Although Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2005) responded to Heine’s (2005) challenge
with a meta-analytic investigation showing the same overall patterns of results across 27
combined samples, Heine, Kitayama, and Hamamura (2007a) further challenged
Sedikides et al.’s claim by showing their meta-analytic conclusions do not hold with the
inclusion of missing cross-cultural studies. Heine et al. also once more challenged
Sedikides et al. on methodological grounds (see also Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura,
2007b; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2007a, 2007b). Importantly, when considering all
cross-cultural studies available in the literature, Heine et al. (2007a) noticed a striking
pattern: the studies most consistently yielding evidence supportive of the pan-cultural
hypothesis used the better than average (BAE) method (either combining self-vs.-other
judgments or rendering the judgments separately). And, given that this method overestimates self-enhancement because of the abovementioned methodological artifact
conflated with the method (i.e., the EBTA), this calls into question the conclusion that
self-enhancement is universal. Taken together, one important aspect of the debate
involves the fact that much of the evidence in support of the pan-cultural selfenhancement hypothesis comes from studies using BAE measures, which suffer from a
methodological artifact that inflates estimates of self-enhancement.
From a metric perspective, I would argue that calibrating measures of self-enhancement
(e.g., BAE paradigm: self-vs.-other judgments simultaneously or self minus other
separately) could shed light on the pan-cultural theoretical controversy, by attempting to
provide evidence about what types of self-enhancement behaviors correspond to different
scores on these trait rating measures of self-enhancement. In the process, metric research
may also reveal more directly how much construct-irrelevant cognitive biases are
contaminating these self-enhancement trait measures. Critically, one would examine what
type of self-enhancement behaviors actually correspond to particular scores on the trait
measures, including critically scores that are typically interpreted as self-enhancement
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(e.g., scores statistically greater than the scale midpoint for the self-vs.-other judgments
made simultaneously).
The main goal of Study 2 was to calibrate two of the trait self-enhancement measures
(Alicke et al., 1995; Sedikides et al., 2003) that feature prominently in this debate,
namely a trait rating measure involving self versus other judgments made simultaneously
and a trait rating measure where other judgments are subtracted from self judgments. This
was achieved by calibrating the metric of these two measures to behaviors reflective of
self-enhancement, which could be used as a reference point. I used Paulhus et al.’s (2003)
over-claiming technique (OCT) as the behavioral index of self-enhancement. The
calibration of these trait rating self-enhancement measures could potentially shed light on
the universality of self-enhancement debate because part of this debate involves trait
rating measures of self-enhancement that are often interpreted in an absolute fashion
(e.g., Gaertner et al., 2008). As reviewed in the introduction, this strategy of meter
reading is unfounded given that the metrics of these trait rating measures are arbitrary and
hence it is unknown what region of the underlying dimension of self-enhancement is
captured by these trait rating measures. Applying a metric approach to this topic,
however, could potentially shed new light on this controversy by examining what kinds
of behavioral manifestations of self-enhancement correspond to scores typically
interpreted as self-enhancement. If, for instance, scores above the midpoint traditionally
interpreted as self-enhancement (e.g., mean trait rating of “4.5” tested against a scale
midpoint of “3.5”; see Gaertner et al., 2008) are associated with negligible behavioral
manifestations of self-enhancement, then this would cast doubt on claims of selfenhancement based on greater-than-the-midpoint analyses of trait rating measures.
Granted, this would represent only the first step toward speaking to this controversy,
given that consensus would need to be reached with respect to the behavioral criterion of
self-enhancement. An auxiliary goal of Study 2 was also to calibrate the Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984), another commonly used selfenhancement measure, to behavioral markers of self-enhancement manifested in the
OCT.
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3.2.2

Method

3.2.2.1

Design and Participants

One hundred ninety-four (194) University of Western Ontario undergraduates
participated for partial course credit (97 males, 97 females; mean age = 18.9, SD = 1.2,
range = 17 to 25). No restrictions were imposed on participant sex, age, or ethnicity. The
study included two experimental conditions, having altered instruction sets for the OCT
as a first exploration into the proposed experimental approach to metric calibration.
However, given that this instruction manipulation had virtually no effect on OCT scores,
I do not discuss these data further.

13

Hence, the final sample was composed of 97

undergraduates that completed the OCT with standard instructions (47 males, 50 females;
mean age = 18.9, SD = 1.3, range = 17 to 25). Thus, all participants completed the same
measures and tasks in the same order (see below for details).

3.2.2.2

Procedure and Materials

Participants were run in groups of two to five in a lab testing room where each participant
was seated in a separate cubicle in front of a PC computer. Before starting, the
experimenter verbally instructed each participant to carefully read all instructions and to
ask the experimenter for clarification if any questions arose. The experimenter also
instructed each participant to turn off any and all electronic devices before starting.
Participants then followed on-screen instructions and completed each measure in a serial
fashion in the following order: combined trait rating measure of self-enhancement (selfvs.-other judgments), separate trait rating measure (self and other judgments made
separately), a filler task (Remotes Association Test), the OCT, the BIDR, and then
demographics and debriefing questions.

3.2.2.2.1

Combined Self vs. Other Judgments

The first trait measure of self-enhancement involved self-versus-other judgments
following the logic and structure of the trait rating measures used in the literature on the

13

Specifically, the mean OCT scores across conditions were Mwarning = .09 (SD = .08), Mcontrol = .11 (SD =
.12), and Mconfidence = .09 (SD = .10).
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pan-cultural debate (Sedikides et al., 2003), except with culture-independent traits given
the present non-cross-cultural sample (the standard traits as used by Alicke et al., 1995).
The measure originated from the better-than-average effect literature and was
subsequently adopted by researchers in the pan-cultural debate. The better-than-average
effect has been argued to represent a fundamental type of self-enhancement reflected in
the tendency to view one’s behaviors, opinions, and characteristics more favorably than
those of others (Alicke et al., 1995). Assessment of these views typically involve making
ratings of oneself relative to an “average other” on a series of traits on a bipolar scale
anchored at the extremes by self and other (e.g., “To what extent does Trait A describe
you relative to the average other?”: 1 = much worse than the average other, 4 = as well
as the average other, 7 = much better than the average other). However, given research
showing that better-than-average effects can be inflated when the comparison target is
ambiguous (Alicke et al., 1995), researchers have often tried to make the comparison
target more concrete to permit more stringent analyses. Given that some of the past pancultural studies (but not all) have adopted these more stringent assessment conditions, I
decided to also adopt these more stringent measure configurations. Hence, following
Gaertner et al. (2008), participants rated the extent to which each listed trait described
themselves relative to the average Western university student of their own age and gender
on an 9-point scale (1 = much worse than the average university student of my age and
gender, 4 = as well as the average university student of my age and gender, 7 = much
better than the average university student of my age and gender). Participants rated the
following 10 positive and 10 negative traits (adopted from Alicke et al., 1995):
dependable, intelligent, considerate, observant, polite, respectful, cooperative, reliable,
friendly, creative and gullible, disobedient, snobbish, lazy, disrespectful, mean,
unforgiving, vain, uncivil, unpleasant (α = .75).

3.2.2.2.2

Separate Self vs. Other Judgments

For the second measure of self-enhancement, participants rated the extent to which a
series of statements were true of themselves and subsequently of others, assessed
separately (e.g., Hornsey & Jetten, 2005; Heine & Lehman, 1999). Mean ratings of others
were then subtracted from ratings of the self to form an index of self-enhancement.
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Participants rated the extent to which the following 10 traits were true of themselves (5
positive, 5 negative) and subsequently the extent to which these same traits were true of
others: clear-headed, resourceful, reliable, perceptive, trustful and insecure, spiteful,
unstudious, maladjusted, complaining (again from Alicke et al., 1995). Because past
research has failed to find order effects for whether self versus other ratings are
completed first, participants completed the ratings in one order only (self ratings first)
(Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Hornsey & Jetten, 2005). For self-ratings, participants were
informed to indicate the extent to which the traits were true of themselves whereas for
ratings of others, participants were informed to indicate the extent to which the traits
were true of the average Western student of their age and gender (using the scale anchors:
1 = not at all true and 7 = completely true) (α = .62).

3.2.2.2.3

Over-claiming Technique

After completing a brief filler task alleged to assess their creativity (i.e., the RAT; about 5
minutes), participants completed the OCT as a behavioral reference point of selfenhancement. The OCT involves the presentation of a series of words allegedly
describing people, places, and objects, some of which, unbeknownst to the participants,
refer to non-existent items (i.e., some words are foils). In the standard OCT task,
participants are instructed to indicate the extent to which they are familiar with each word
(0 = “never heard of it” to 6 = “completely familiar”). Independent indices are then
typically computed, using signal detection theory, to estimate actual knowledge (i.e.,
accuracy: hit rate – false alarm rate) and self-enhancement (i.e., over-claiming bias: [hit
rate + false alarm rate] / 2). Although the signal detection theory framework provides a
mathematically rigorous estimate of knowledge exaggeration, unfortunately these
estimates are interpretationally ambiguous given they are composed of the mean of both
the hit rate and false alarm rate. Given that the goal of metric research is to link test
scores to maximally meaningful (i.e., unambiguous) behavioral scores, I chose to use the
raw false-alarm rate to index the self-enhancement bias, given it provides the clearest and
most meaningfully interpretable face-valid operationalization of self-enhancement (i.e.,
the proportion of non-existent items claimed as familiar). Hence, this implied a slight
change in the response format of the task, whereby participants in this study indicated
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whether the item was familiar or unfamiliar using a binary choice format rather than the
usual 7-point polytomous choice format.
Participants completed a variant of the 150-item OCT (Paulhus et al., 2003), which is
broken down into 10 categories of 15 items. Three out of every 15 items per category
were foils, that is, they do not actually exist (see Appendix E). Standard instructions were
used, whereby participants were instructed to indicate whether each item was familiar to
them or unfamiliar to them. The number of non-existent words indicated as familiar
served as the main behavioral index of self-enhancement (metric range = 0 to 30).

3.2.2.2.4

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding

Participants completed the 40-item BIDR (Paulhus, 1984; 1991), a measure of social
desirable responding that has previously been used in the context of the over-claiming
technique (Paulhus et al., 2003). The BIDR involves the subscales of self-deception
(honestly held exaggeration of one’s positive attributes) and impression management
(positive self-presentation targeted at a public audience). Items were answered using a 7point Likert scale (1 = Not true, 4 = Somewhat true, and 7 = Very true) (BIDR Version 6,
Form 40; Paulhus, 1991). By convention, BIDR scoring involves adding one point for
each “6” or “7” item response indicated by the participant (Paulhus, 1984; 1991). Hence,
the metric for the total scores can range from 0 to 40. Scores from this measure were then
calibrated to the behavioral indices of self-enhancement in the OCT. After the BIDR,
participants completed a few debriefing and demographics questions (α = .76).

3.2.3
3.2.3.1

Results
Preliminary Data Treatment

Data from all measures were first screened informally for any evidence of noncompliance. I examined the time taken (as recorded by MediaLab) on instruction screens
and actual questionnaire items for any evidence of consistently short latencies suggestive
of non-compliance. No unambiguous cases were identified and hence all participants
were retained.

96

3.2.3.2

Main Analyses

The metric mapping results will be presented in the order the measures were introduced
in the Methods section. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations
for all Study 2 variables.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables in Study 2 (N = 97).
Variable
Combined trait rating
scores (1-7)
Separate trait rating
scores (self – other;
-6 to +6)
Self (1-7)
Other (1-7)
BIDR (0-40)
OCT (# of non-existent
items claimed as
familiar; 0-30)

3.2.3.2.1

Mini
mum
3.85

Maxi
mum
6.05

-1.00
3.4
2.3
1.00
0.0

Com
bined

Mean

SD

4.93

.56

2.9

.77

.82

.12

6.5
5.9
23.0
16.7

5.04
4.27
8.54
3.23

.68
.63
4.80
3.67

.34*
.21*
.23*
.29*

Sepa
rate

.67*
-.59*
.36*
.16

Self

Other

BIDR

.21*
.51*
.25*

.08
.06

.27*

Combined Trait Rating Measure

A regression analysis revealed that trait rating scores on the combined self-vs.-other
judgments were positively predictive of behavioral over-claiming scores (B = 1.88, β = r
= .29, p = .004). This metric mapping can be unpacked by visualizing Figure 13 (solid
line), whereby a 1-unit increase on the trait rating scale corresponds to over-claiming
knowledge of about 2 more non-existent words. Specific metric mappings for particular
trait rating scores revealed that a trait rating score of “4”, “5”, and “6” corresponded to
claiming familiarity of about 1.5, 3, and 5 non-existent words, respectively (derived from
using the intercept and regression coefficient). These particular metric mappings start to
give us a rough sense of the kinds of self-enhancement behaviors associated with
particular trait rating scores, hence imbuing the metric of the trait rating measure with
meaning. Once replicated on larger and culturally-appropriate samples, these metric
mappings could then potentially shed new light on the pan-cultural debate of selfenhancement by examining the kinds of self-enhancement behaviors associated with trait
rating scores typically interpreted as self-enhancement (e.g., trait rating score of “5” [on a
7-point scale] associated with over-claiming about 3 non-existing words).
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Figure 13: Number of non-existent words claimed familiar in OCT plotted against
trait rating scores using a linear (solid line) or cubic function (dotted line).
Given the odd shape of the scatterplot of trait rating scores and over-claiming behavior in
OCT, I also decided to examine the metric mapping using a non-linear cubic function.
This analysis revealed that the cubic function accounted for about 50% more variance
than the linear function (R2 = .12 vs. R2 = .083). As depicted in Figure 13 (dotted line), a
cubic functional form shows that trait rating scores between “4” and “5” corresponded to
over-claiming of approximately 3 words whereas trait rating scores greater than “5.5”
corresponded to a sharp increase in over-claiming (“5.5” was linked to about 4.5 words
whereas “6” was linked to about 8 words). Consistent with the linear metric mapping, the
non-linear metric mapping suggests that very little self-enhancement behaviors
corresponded to trait rating scores typically interpreted as self-enhancement.
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3.2.3.2.2

Separate Trait Rating Measure

Trait rating scores from the self versus other judgments made separately revealed a small
positive trend with OCT scores, however this was not statistically significant, B = .71, β
= r = .16, p = .12 (see Figure 14). A possible explanation for this less robust relation is
that trait rating scores in this measure involved difference scores. Such aggregate scores
are known to suffer in reliability in direct proportion to the correlation between the
individual components scores (Cronbach, 1958; Edwards, 2002).

Figure 14: Number of non-existent words claimed familiar in OCT plotted against
trait rating scores made separately using a linear function.

3.2.3.2.3

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding

Finally, a regression analysis revealed a linear relation between BIDR scores and OCT
scores (B = .21, β = r = .27, p = .008). That is, a 5-unit increase in BIDR scores
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corresponded to over-claiming of about one more non-existent word (5 × .21 = 1.05;
given the much wider metric range of the BIDR). For instance, a BIDR score of “1”
corresponded to about two non-existent words claimed as familiar, a mid-range BIDR
score of “21” corresponded to about six non-existent words claimed as familiar, whereas
a maximal BIDR score of “40” would have corresponded to about 10 non-existent words
claimed as familiar (see Figure 15). An examination of BIDR’s two subscales revealed
that this relation was primarily driven by the self-deception rather than the impression
management facet.

Figure 15: Number of non-existent words claimed familiar in OCT as a function of
BIDR scores using a linear function.
That is, a regression analysis revealed a more positive relation between BIDR selfdeception scores and OCT scores (B = .35, β = r = .29, p = .004) than between BIDR
impression management scores and OCT scores (B = .17, β = r = .14, p = .18).
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3.2.4

Discussion

Study 2 successfully applied the metric approach to the construct of self-enhancement.
More importantly, however, the current study illustrated how the metric approach could
potentially be valuable in shedding light on theoretical debates involving absolute claims,
by focusing on the pan-cultural debate of self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2003;
Heine, 2005). The metric mapping results for a trait rating measure of self-enhancement
commonly used in this debate, showed that very little behavioral evidence of selfenhancement corresponded to trait scores typically interpreted as self-enhancement. That
is, a trait rating score of “5” sometimes interpreted as self-enhancement (e.g., Gaertner et
al., 2008), corresponded to the over-claiming of only about 3 non-existent words. These
results are consistent with Heine’s (2005) concern that such better-than-average trait
rating judgments provide inflated estimates of self-enhancement. I will elaborate more on
these details and the broader implications of these findings in the General Discussion.

3.3

Study 3

The goal of Study 3 was twofold. First, Study 3 sought to demonstrate the utility and
feasibility of calibrating the scores of measures capturing predominantly state-like
constructs. In all of the empirical demonstrations thus far, predominantly trait-like
constructs have been examined. As previously mentioned, however, the potential benefits
of non-arbitrary metrics apply to the measurement of any construct, state-like or traitlike, or anywhere in between. That being said, some of the benefits proposed in my
conceptual analysis are best demonstrated using predominantly state-like constructs,
which are commonly assessed in the context of experimental studies. Consequently, the
primary goal of Study 3 was to empirically reveal the calibration process for a
predominantly state-like construct, in order to better demonstrate the proposed benefits
relevant in experimental contexts (e.g., extracting more information from data patterns).
Second, Study 3 was designed to illustrate the calibration approach for behavioral
measures. Up to now, all calibrated measures have happened to be self-report measures;
it is important to emphasize, however, that issues involving arbitrary metrics are pertinent
to any measure, whether self-report, behavioral, or unobtrusive (Blanton & Jaccard,
2006a, 2006b).
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To achieve these two primary goals, I examined the construct of risk-taking. In the
literature, risk-taking is typically defined as the purposive enacting of a behavior that
involves the possibility of some positive consequences or gains (e.g., personal thrill,
monetary gain), but with some potential negative consequences (e.g., danger, harm,
financial loss; Ben-zur & Zeidner, 2009; Lejuez et al., 2002). Empirical investigations of
risk-taking have been executed in different areas of basic psychological research
including developmental (Boyer, 2006; Steinberg, 2010), cognitive (Pleskac, 2008;
Pleskac, Wallsten, Wang, & Lejuez, 2008), and social psychology (Hamilton, 1974; Leith
& Baumeister, 1996). Furthermore, risk-taking has often been studied in an experimental
context, supporting the idea that risk-taking involves a substantial state-like component
amenable to change by situational manipulations (e.g., Goudriaan et al., 2010; Maner,
Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007), although this does not preclude the possibility for
temporal stability of the construct (e.g., White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008). Taken together,
these considerations rendered the construct of risk-taking as an ideal candidate for a
metric calibration study with the aforementioned goals.

3.3.1

Risk-taking Measures to be Calibrated

As mentioned, risk-taking involves behaviors that involve potential gains at the cost of
potential negative consequences. To capture this defining feature of risk-taking, the
primary behavioral measure calibrated in Study 3 was the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), which is currently the most widely used and tested
sequential risk-taking instrument in the literature (Pleskac et al., 2008). In this task,
participants inflate a series of simulated balloons presented on the computer screen. For
each balloon, participants can choose the risky option of pumping up the balloon, which
inflates the balloon and rewards the participant with a constant amount of money
(typically 5 cents), placed in a temporary bank. Naturally, pumping up the balloon
sometimes causes it to explode, causing the loss of the accumulated money and the end of
the trial. The safe option is to stop inflating the balloon at some point and collect the
earned money (which is placed in a permanent bank) and begin the next balloon trial. The
task adopts a sequential risk-taking paradigm whereby for each trial, participants must
sequentially choose between a risky play option and a safe stop option. Within each trial,
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risk therefore increases over time in a dynamic way such that choices within a trial
become incrementally risky. This is to be contrasted with many other risk-taking tasks
involving the choice between gambles involving static non-changing levels of risk (e.g.,
Brand et al., 2005). Importantly, the BART’s dynamic nature models real-world
situations in which excessive risk often results in diminishing returns. The BART then
was chosen as the primary measure of the study due to these valuable attributes, in
addition to its prominence in the literature and the fact that it is the most widely tested
and understood sequential risk task in the literature (Pleskac et al., 2008).
In addition to the BART, I also sought to calibrate scores from the hot version of the
Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009), a recently
developed behavioral risk-taking measure that has shown promising results in
understanding age-related changes in risk-taking and the informational use processes
underlying risk-taking. Similar to the BART, the CCT involves a sequential and dynamic
paradigm whereby risk-taking is assessed via participants’ voluntary stopping point
behavior in a series of incrementally risky choices. However, the CCT goes beyond the
BART by (a) assessing the complexity of the decision maker’s information use and (b)
providing a more optimal probabilistic environment to observe risk-taking behavior (see
below for more details). The CCT involves a series of trials in which participants turn
over 32 cards presented face down on the computer screen (arranged in four rows of eight
cards). The object of the game is to turn over as many cards as possible to accumulate
points (each card turned is worth a trial-specific amount). Participants are told they can
continue to turn cards over as long as gain cards (smiling face) are encountered. The
moment a loss card (frowning face) is encountered, the trial is over and the accumulated
points are deducted from the permanent bank. Similar to the BART, participants must
decide when to stop and collect their earned points.

3.3.2

Theoretical Derivation of Behavioral Reference Points

The search for the most theoretically-relevant and meaningful behavioral reference point
to calibrate the BART and CCT was guided primarily by (a) conceptual analysis, (b) past
empirical research, and (c) theorizing regarding the cognitive processes underlying risktaking. First, and consistent with the theoretical derivation of behavioral referents for
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Study 1 and 2, the starting point involved the careful consideration of the workingdefinition of the construct of risk-taking. To re-iterate, risk-taking is most typically
defined as behavior entailing the possibility of positive consequences, while at the same
time involving the possibility of negative outcomes (Lejuez et al., 2002). Hence, a
relevant behavioral reference point to ground the metric of the BART and CCT, first and
foremost, must fit within such conceptualization of risk-taking. Second, and following
from points raised in the introduction, the reference point must be an objective behavior
that has a clear interpretation. Objective, meaning that two independent observers could
agree that the behavior in question occurred and clear meaning that the observed scoring
of the behavioral reference point is directly interpretable (e.g., 1 = presence of a behavior
and 0 = absence of a behavior; or number of times engaging in some behavior).
Following from these considerations, I combed the literature in search of a behavioral
measure of risk-taking that satisfied these requirements.
After an extensive search, I decided on a task involving lottery risky choices (adapted
from Hsee & Weber, 1999, based on the classic lottery tasks from Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). These lottery choices typically involve a series of choices between two choice
options and participants must choose which option they would prefer to receive. For
instance, one could be faced with a choice between option A ($4 for certain) or option B
(a 50% chance of winning $10 or $0).

14

The behavior of choosing the risky option (rather

than the safe option) can then be used as a clear behavioral reference point to calibrate the
metric of the relevant target measures. In addition to satisfying all of the aforementioned
requirements, this behavioral measure was chosen because of empirical precedence
demonstrating that these lottery risky choices were successfully used as a criterion
measure to validate a risk propensity scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Theorizing
regarding the cognitive processes underlying risk-taking behavior in the BART also
supports the theoretical adequacy of the lottery choices as a behavioral reference point
(Bishara et al., 2009; Wallsten, Pleskac, & Lejuez, 2005). Wallsten et al. developed and

14

Following Tversky and Kahneman (1981), to enhance the realism of these behavioral choices,
participants were informed that two of the 100 participants would actually receive the monetary sum of one
of their realized choices.
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successfully substantiated a mathematical model of the multiple cognitive processes
underlying behavior in the BART. One of the four parameters in this model involves the
extent to which participants are sensitive to changes in the payoffs associated with
pumping a balloon on a particular trial (i.e., payoff sensitivity, γ). Participants with larger
values of γ are assumed to be more sensitive to the changing payoffs involving gains and
losses. Hence, to the extent that lottery choices are at least partially governed by
attending to the payoffs of the choice options, one would expect empirical linkages
between BART scores and choice behaviors in the lottery task.
For the sake of completeness, two self-report trait measures of risk propensity were also
included in the current study and calibrated to the same lottery choices. The measures
were the Risk Propensity Scale (RPS; Meertens & Lion, 2008) and the Domain-Specific
Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006) (see below for details of these
measures). This provided the opportunity to further demonstrate the calibration of selfreport measures to relevant behavioral fixed points for the distinct construct of risktaking.

3.3.3
3.3.3.1

Method
Participants and Design

Ninety nine (99) individuals from the University of Western Ontario campus participated
in the current study (58 males, 39 females, 2 non-specified; mean age = 24.46, SD = 5.48,
range = 17 to 46). Participants were compensated $5 (CDN) in addition to the money
earned in the balloon task (mean BART earnings = $7.37, SD = 2.67). Two a priori
randomly selected participants also received the money associated with one of their
lottery risk choices (both lucky participants chose the gamble; one of them won the $10
whereas the other lost). No restrictions were imposed on participant sex, age, or ethnicity.
No experimental conditions were examined, hence all participants completed all
measures and tasks in the same order (see below for details).
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3.3.3.2

Procedure and Materials

Participants were run in groups of two to four in a lab testing room where each
participant was seated in a separate cubicle in front of a PC computer. Before starting, the
experimenter verbally instructed each participant to carefully read all instructions and to
ask the experimenter for clarification if any questions arose. The experimenter also
instructed each participant to turn off any and all electronic devices before starting and to
put on the headphones for the first two tasks. Participants then followed on-screen
instructions and completed each measure in a serial fashion in the following order:
BART, game of dice (GDT) task, CCT, lottery risk choices, affect misattribution
procedure (AMP), RPS, DOSPERT, a volunteering questionnaire, and then demographics
and debriefing questions.

3.3.3.2.1

15

Balloon Analogue Risk Task

The balloon task was designed specifically to provide a diagnostic context to observe
actual risky behavior (Lejuez et al., 2002). The task involved 30 consecutive trials of
inflating balloons by clicking a button labeled “Pump up the balloon”. Each pump earned
participants exactly 1¢, which accrued in a temporary bank. Participants decided how
many pumps to inflate each balloon before collecting their accumulated earnings for that
trial by clicking a button labeled “Collect $$$”. If the balloon was inflated past its
explosion point, all earnings in the temporary bank were lost and the next trial started.
The balloon number, the current number of pumps, total winnings, and potential earning
for that trial were all displayed on the right-hand side of the screen. The task was
implemented and run using Inquisit 3.0 and featured a real-life picture of a red balloon
that inflated slightly with each pump (about 0.125 in. [0.3 cm] in all directions). To add
realism to the task, the computer generated the sound of a real balloon inflating for each
pump and also produced a balloon popping sound in the event of an explosion.
Participants were instructed that the explosion point for each balloon would be different.

15

The AMP and volunteering questionnaire were assessed for two unrelated investigations. The GDT was
assessed for the current study but was not correlated with any of the behavioral referents and hence will not
be discussed further.
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Also, following recent instruction improvements of the BART (Pleskac et al., 2008),
participants were explicitly informed that each balloon explosion point could range
anywhere from the first pump to a maximum of 128 pumps. The actual explosion point
for each balloon was determined randomly by the computer, by choosing a random
number between 1 and 128 without replacement from an array (the value 1 indicating an
explosion). Hence, the probability that a balloon would explode on the first trial was
1/128, second trial 1/127, and so on up until the 128th pump at which the probability of an
explosion was 1/1 (i.e., 100%). According to these parameters, the average explosion
point in the long run would be 64 pumps (i.e., if one were to pump a large number of
balloons 64 times each, one would expect about half to explode in the long run). As
previously mentioned, the sequential nature of this task models real-world situations
whereby excessive risk often results in diminishing returns (e.g., pumping the balloon on
the 3rd trial would only risk losing 2¢ and would possibly increase the total earnings by
50%; after the 60th pump, however, a subsequent pump would risk 60 cents but possibly
increase total earnings by only 1.6%). After reading two instruction screens, participants
pressed a button to begin the task. At the conclusion of the task, participants were paid
the amount earned in the task (rounded up to the nearest 25¢).

3.3.3.2.2

Columbia Card Task

The goal of the “hot” version of the Columbia Card Task is to accumulate as many points
as possible by sequentially turning over as many cards as possible (presented face down
in a 4 × 8 array on the computer screen). Participants are informed that the cards can be
either gain (smiling face) or loss (frowning face) cards. If a gain card is turned over,
participants earn a specified gain amount for that trial and are able to continue the trial. If
a loss card is turned over, participants lose a specified loss amount for that trial from their
total points earned up to that point, and the trial ends. Trials vary in terms of the
following parameters: number of loss cards (1, 2, or 3 loss cards out of the 32 cards total),
gain amount (10, 20, or 30 point per gain card), and loss amount (-250, -500, or -750
points from total points earned up to that point). This information is presented at the top
of the screen. These three game parameters are varied using a full factorial within-subject
design, presenting each of the 27 parameter combinations twice resulting in 54 trials.
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However, to maximize the assessment of voluntary stopping, the game is rigged such that
loss cards are always the last possible card turned over. To conceal this, nine additional
trials are randomly interspersed amount the 54 experimental trials whereby the
probability of turning a loss card anywhere in the array is very high. Hence, participants
completed a total of 63 trials. To turn over cards, participants were instructed to simply
click on the card. To stop turning cards and end the trial, participants were instructed to
click a button on the bottom of the screen labeled “STOP”. The CCT was also
implemented and run using Inquisit 3.0.

3.3.3.2.3

Lottery Risk Choices

Participants subsequently completed five lottery risk choices involving the choice
between two options (adapted from Hsee & Weber, 1999, based on the classic lottery
tasks from Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Instructions informed participants that they
would have to indicate which of the two (option A or B) lottery options they preferred.
Following Tversky and Kahneman (1981), it was explicitly mentioned (and emphasized
on two different screens) that two of the 100 participants would actually receive the
money associated with their preferred option for one of the lottery questions, and hence,
that they should make their choices as if they were actually playing these lotteries. As
displayed in Table 4, the lottery choices were as follows:
Table 4: Lottery options format in lottery risk task.
Lottery
1
2
3
4
5

Option A
$6 for certain
$2 for certain
$8 for certain
$5 for certain
$4 for certain

Option B
Flip a coin. Receive $10 if heads, receive $0 if tails.
Flip a coin. Receive $10 if heads, receive $0 if tails.
Flip a coin. Receive $10 if heads, receive $0 if tails.
Flip a coin. Receive $10 if heads, receive $0 if tails.
Flip a coin. Receive $10 if heads, receive $0 if tails.

It was explained to participants that if option B was selected, the experimenter would
actually flip a coin, and the participant would receive the dollar amount associated with
the coin flip outcome. Choice behaviors in this task were interpreted such that gambles
on questions involving larger sure bets reflected incrementally higher reference points for
higher levels of risk-taking (i.e., choosing the 50% gamble to win $10 over $8 for certain
represents a higher level of risk-taking then choosing the 50% gamble to win $10 over
$6, and so on).
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3.3.3.2.4

Risk Propensity Scale

Participants completed the 7-item risk propensity scale (Meertens & Lion, 2008), which
is a self-report measure that attempts to capture general risk-taking tendencies. The items
are: “Safety first”, “I do not take risks with my health”, “I prefer to avoid risks”, “I take
risks regularly”, “I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen”, “I usually view
risks as a challenge”, and “I view myself as a …” Participants were instructed to indicate
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements, and following standard
procedure, were asked not to think too long before answering each question (scale
anchors 1 = totally disagree and 9 = totally agree except for the last item where 1 = risk
avoider and 9 = risk seeker). The first, second, third and fifth items were reverse-scored.
Responses were averaged for each participant, with higher scores reflecting higher levels
of risk-propensity (α = .78).

3.3.3.2.5

Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale

Participants completed the 30-item version (Blais & Weber, 2006) of the domain-specific
risk-taking scale for adult populations (Weber et al., 2002). The measure attempts to
capture risk-taking tendencies across five distinct and commonly encountered content
domains including ethical, health/safety, social, recreation, and financial (further
decomposed into gambling and investment domains). Example items include: “Going
camping in the wilderness” (recreation), “Drinking heavily at a social function”
(health/safety domain), and “Having an affair with a married man/woman” (ethical; see
Appendix F for all items). Participants were informed to indicate the likelihood that they
would engage in the described activity or behavior if they were to find themselves in that
situation (using scale anchors 1 = Extremely Unlikely, 2 = Moderately Unlikely, 3 =
Somewhat Unlikely, 4 = Not Sure, 5 = Somewhat Likely, 6 = Moderately Likely, and 7 =
Extremely Likely). Responses were averaged, with higher scores reflecting higher levels
of risk-taking (α = .82).
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3.3.4
3.3.4.1

Results
Preliminary Data Treatment

Data from all measures were first screened informally for any evidence of noncompliance. I examined the time taken (as recorded by MediaLab) on instruction screens
and actual questionnaire items for any evidence of consistently short latencies suggestive
of non-compliance. One case was identified for the DOSPERT questionnaire (latencies <
350 milliseconds for the last 4 items) and so this participant was excluded in analyses
involving this measure. In addition, in the debriefing, 10 participants indicated
unambiguous suspicion regarding the rigged nature of the CCT and so were excluded in
analyses involving that measure.

3.3.4.2

Main Analyses

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all of the main
variables in Study 3. The metric mapping results will be presented in the following order:
BART scores, CCT scores, RPS scores, and DOSPERT scores, all calibrated to the risky
lottery choices (DOSPERT scores will also be linked to behavior in the BART).
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables in Study 3 (N = 99).
Variable
BART (mean # of
pumps on nonexplosion trials)
CCT (mean # of cards
turned over; 0-30)
RPS (1-9)
DOSPERT (1-7)
Risky lottery choices
(RLC)
$10 gamble vs. $2
for certain
$10 gamble vs. $4
for certain
$10 gamble vs. $5
for certain
$10 gamble vs. $6
for certain
$10 gamble vs. $8
for certain

Mini
mum

Maxi
mum

Mean

SD

BAR
T

2.24

88.33

39.0

17.95

2.29

28.70

22.86

5.24

.17

1.71
2.27

8.29
5.80

4.41
3.65

1.36
.73

0

1

-

0

1

0

DO
SPE
RT

RLC
$2

RLC
$4

RLC
$5

CCT

RPS

.16
.21*

-.01
-.01

.65*

-

.15

.13

-.08

.23*

-

-

.23*

.20†

.22*

.36*

.31*

1

-

-

-.07

.18

.02

.04

.26*

.33*

0

1

-

-

.11

.29*

.24*

.20*

.10

.03

.25*

0

1

-

-

-.24*

.10

.02

-.01

-.11

-.04

.01

RLC
$6

-.03
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To determine which choice behaviors in the lottery task to use as behavioral reference
points, in a first step, I examined the point bi-serial correlations between the different
measures and the five choice behaviors (see Table 5 for all correlations). Overall, results
revealed generally positive correlations (small to moderate in size) between the scores of
the different measures and the five binary choices (with some correlations, however,
negative in sign). Consideration of the frequencies of the particular choices for the
different lotteries revealed, however, that responses for the $2 and $8 lotteries were
highly polarized compared to the other lotteries, hence potentially explaining the
unexpected negative correlations (e.g., for the $8 lottery, 94% of participants selected the
safe bet). Given that correlations were the most consistent for the $4 lottery, I decided to
use this behavior as the main behavioral reference point for the current study and
sometimes used choices on the $6 lottery as a secondary reference point.

3.3.4.2.1

Balloon Analogue Risk Task

The empirical linkages between BART scores and probability of choosing the risky
gamble in the $4 lottery was modeled using a logistic regression, with BART scores as
the predictor and behavioral choice as the dichotomous outcome. Results from the
logistic regression revealed a statistically significant positive predictive relation between
BART scores and behavioral choice in the $4 lottery (Wald’s χ2 = 4.85, B = .03, odds
ratio (OR) = 1.03, p = .03). This indicates that for every unit increase in BART score, the
odds of choosing the risky gamble over the safe bet of $4 increases by 3% (i.e., OR =
1.03; in other words, an increase of 10-units in BART scores is associated with a 30%
odds increase of choosing the gamble, OR = 1.29). This can be seen visually in Figure
16, which plots the predicted probability of choosing the $10 gamble over the $4 sure bet
(calculated using the coefficient and intercept values of the best fitting exponential
regression line) for each particular BART score obtained in the sample. That is, BART
scores of “10”, “30”, “50”, “70”, and “90” approximately corresponded to a .37, .50, .64,
.76, and .84 probabilities, respectively, of choosing the gamble over the $4 safe bet.
These empirical mappings imbue the metric of BART scores with meaning in a general
sense. More specific meaning can be gleaned by focusing on the particular BART score
that corresponds to a .50 probability of choosing the risky gamble over the safe bet (i.e., a
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BART score of approximately “29”). To the extent that this behavior is interpreted as a
qualitatively distinct risky behavior (i.e., consensus among experts), then BART scores
gain meaning with respect to this threshold value of “29” (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006b).

Figure 16: Predicted probabilities of choosing $10 gamble over $4 safe bet plotted
against adjusted BART scores.

3.3.4.2.2

Columbia Card Task

The empirical linkages between CCT scores and probability of choosing the risky gamble
in the $4 lottery were similarly modeled using a logistic regression. Results of this
analysis revealed a positive predictive relation between CCT scores and probability of
choosing the risky gamble, though the p-value only reached marginal statistical
significance (Wald’s χ2 = 3.24, B = .08, odds ratio (OR) = 1.08, p = .07). The particular
functional form of this mapping can be visualized in Figure 17 (solid line). Of note, an
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approximate CCT score of “20” was associated with a 50/50 chance of choosing the $10
gamble over the safe $4 option.

Figure 17: Predicted probabilities of choosing $10 gamble over $4 safe bet (solid
line) or over $6 safe bet (dotted line) given CCT scores.
Hence, those who turned an average of 20 more cards in the task were statistically more
likely to choose the gamble than the safe bet whereas those who turned less than an
average of 20 cards were statistically more likely to choose the safe bet rather than the
gamble. Further insights into the meaning of the metric of CCT scores can be achieved by
examining how CCT scores map onto the act of choosing the $10 gamble over the $6 safe
bet. Choosing the gamble on this lottery clearly involves more risk than the previous
lottery (i.e., one can lose $6 vs. $4); hence, theoretically, one would expect a higher
threshold value for CCT scores that maps onto the probability of choosing this gamble.
Indeed, a logistic regression analysis revealed a positive predictive relation between CCT
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scores and probability of choosing the $10 gamble over the $6 safe bet (Wald’s χ2 = 5.78,
B = .30, odds ratio (OR) = 1.35, p = .02), such that the 50/50 gamble point mapped onto
an approximate CCT score of “29” (see Figure 17, dotted line). In other words, scoring
virtually the highest score in this card task (“30” is the maximal behavioral score on this
instrument) is associated with “only” a 50/50 chance of choosing the $10 gamble over the
$6 safe bet. Hence, this metric mapping result vividly illustrates the power of the metric
approach to shed light on the possible meaning of metrics which were previously void in
meaning in a non-relative sense. What’s more, this metric mapping provides information
that could have important implications for the interpretation of experimental studies using
CCT scores as the DV. That is, a mean difference (of a certain effect size) at the upper
range of the CCT metric could have very different interpretations than a mean difference
at the mid range (more on this in the Discussion section).

3.3.4.2.3

Risk Propensity Scale

Turning to the self-report measures, a logistic regression was used to determine the
mapping between scores from the risk-propensity measure and act of choosing the $10
gamble over the $4 safe option. The analysis revealed a meaningful positive relation
between RPS scores and probability of choosing the risky $10 gamble over the $4 sure
shot (Wald’s χ2 = 4.57, B = .35, OR = 1.42, p = .03). A similar analysis also revealed a
meaningful positive relation between RPS scores and the $6 lottery choice (Wald’s χ2 =
5.02, B = .45, OR = 1.56, p = .03). These mapping results provide preliminary empirical
evidence about the meaning of the metric of the RPS scale. For instance, with regard to
the $6 lottery, the metric mapping helps us gauge the meaning of RPS scores in a nonrelative sense by showing that an almost maximal score on the RPS (i.e., “8.5” out of a
maximum of “9”) corresponded to no more than a slightly higher than 50/50 chance of
choosing a $10 gamble over a $6 safe bet.

3.3.4.2.4

Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale

Given the multi-faceted nature of the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, a metric
analysis was performed on the most theoretically specific and relevant subscale of the
DOSPERT, that is, risk-taking in the financial domain. A logistic regression analysis
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revealed a meaningful positive relation between DOSPERT financial scores and
probability of choosing the risky $10 gamble over the safe $4 option (Wald’s χ2 = 9.42, B
= .69, OR = 1.99, p = .002) and also a meaningful positive relation between the financial
facet scores and probability of choosing the risky gamble over the $6 safe bet (Wald’s χ2
= 4.93, B = .47, OR = 1.60, p = .03).

16

This analysis revealed, for example, that a

maximal score on the financial DOSPERT (i.e., “7” out of “7”) corresponded to a slightly
higher than 50/50 chance (predicted probability = .58) of choosing a $10 gamble over a
$6 safe bet.
For further illustrative purposes, I executed a final metric analysis calibrating DOSPERT
scores onto mean number of pumps (on non-exploding trials) in the BART. A meaningful
metric mapping emerged between total DOSPERT scores and BART scores (r = .21, p =
.05), with a slightly stronger mapping between DOSPERT scores in the recreational
domain and BART scores (r = .27, p = .01). A regression analysis specified the particular
functional form of this relation, whereby a 1-unit increase on the DOSPERT recreational
scale (metric range = 1 to 7) corresponded to an increase of about 3 balloon pumps
averaged across trials in the BART (unstandardized regression coefficient: B = 3.29, p =
.01). Furthermore, a maximal DOSPERT recreational score of “7” corresponded to
inflating the balloons in the BART an average of 48 times.

3.3.5

Discussion

The primary goal of Study 3 was to demonstrate the calibration process for the metric of
two behavioral measures of risk-taking presumed to involve a state-like component.
Overall, the study generally achieved this goal, showing promising results in illustrating
the feasibility of calibrating behavioral measures of risk-taking to meaningful behavioral
fixed points, as to reduce the metric arbitrariness of the behavioral measures. In
summary, I found meaningful metric mappings between BART and CCT scores to the

16

Surprisingly, very similar patterns of results were also found for general DOSPERT scores, computed
across all domains (i.e., point bi-serial correlations between total DOSPERT scores and the $4 and $6
lottery choices of r = .36, p = .001 and r = .20, p = .05, respectively, compared to r = .33, p = .001 and r =
.24, p = .02, respectively for the financial DOSPERT scores).
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probability of choosing risky gambles in the lottery choices. For instance, the observed
mapping between an almost maximal score on the card task and a 50/50 chance of
choosing the $10 gamble over the $6 safe choice, demonstrated the ability of the metric
calibration approach to shed light on metric meaning. In addition, Study 3 successfully
demonstrated the calibration of the metric of two self-report measures of risk-taking. The
RPS, a general risk-propensity scale and the DOSPERT, a domain-specific risk-taking
measure, both yielded meaningful calibration results to the same lottery choice behavioral
reference points.
Study 3 findings have at least two important implications regarding the potential utility of
systematically calibrating the metrics of measures used in experimental studies. First, the
metric findings in Study 3 demonstrate the potential utility of non-arbitrary metrics to
allow for the extraction of more information from data patterns. In particular, the current
findings illustrate how using measures with calibrated metrics can enhance the
interpretation of experimental mean differences that emerge at different locations on the
scale of the DV measure. Second, the findings from Study 3 speak to the issue that nonarbitrary metrics may help us overcome some of the limitations of NHST. The basic idea
is that measures with a calibrated non-arbitrary metric could potentially help us gauge the
theoretical “noteworthiness” of an experimental effect, above and beyond the statistical
significance and effect size indices, by interpreting the effect with respect to relevant
behavioral reference points. In the Implications section of the General Discussion, I will
elaborate on concrete examples of these two benefits by applying my metric calibration
findings to actual experimental effects from the literature.
A final point worth mentioning with regard to implications of Study 3 findings is that
valuable information can also be gleaned about the metric meaning of BART and CCT
scores by using the same $4 lottery gamble choice as a common reference point for both
measures. For instance, using a .50 probability of choosing the risky gamble as a
common reference point, one can infer that a CCT score of about “20” is approximately
equivalent to a BART score of about “30” with respect to the underlying dimension of
risk-taking (see Figure 16 and Figure 17 [solid line]). This would also further suggest that
a CCT score of about “20” likely reflects a higher level of risk-taking than a BART score
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of about “20.” Future research should investigate the psychometric and scientific value of
this type of approach of calibrating the metric of different measures of the same construct
to a common reference point.

3.4

17

Other Analyses

To bolster the empirical substance of the current dissertation, I sought other empirical
datasets that could further demonstrate the feasibility of applying the proposed metric
calibration approach to constructs commonly examined in basic psychology. Toward this
end, I searched the literature for published datasets that contained the necessary
components to allow for a metric calibration analysis (i.e., independent assessment of test
scores and relevant behavior) and e-mailed authors requesting their data. I was able to
acquire one such dataset from Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004) and another from
Hong and Paunonen (2009). I present the results of my re-analyses of these datasets in
turn.

3.4.1

Trait Self-control

Tangney et al. (2004) investigated the benefits of self-control by examining the
psychological correlates of a new individual difference measure of the trait. In a sample
of 157 undergraduates, they found that higher scores on the new self-control measure
correlated with better adjustment, less binge eating and alcohol abuse, better relationship
and interpersonal skills, and higher grade point average (GPA). From a metrics
perspective, this study is a good candidate because GPA can be seen as a behavioral
reference point which has a fairly intuitive meaning to most psychologists. Hence, scores
from the self-control measure can be calibrated to GPA as a way to increase the meaning
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This approach can be contrasted to traditional approaches to test equating where, for instance, scores
from two measures of the same construct are equated using a simple linear regression prediction equation.
Given the different logic of the two approaches, as expected, applying this approach to the scores of my
two behavioral measures of risk-taking resulted in different equivalence mappings between the two
measures (e.g., BART score of “50” equivalent to a CCT score of about “24” using a traditional test
equation approach whereas the same BART score of “50” was equivalent to a CCT score of about “30”
using my common reference point approach). Importantly, such kind of traditional test equating cannot be
used to develop non-arbitrary metrics given scores are not linked to reference points external to the tests.
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of the metric of the self-control measure.

18

In their study, Tangney et al. (Study 1) had

undergraduate students complete the self-control measure in addition to a host of other
theoretically-relevant measures. Example items from their self-control scale were “I am
good at resisting temptation”, “I often interrupt people”(R), and “I sometimes drink or
use drugs to excess” (R), using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all and 5 = Very much).
They found a correlation of r = .39, p = .001 between self-control scores and GPA.

19

To probe the metric mapping between self-control scores and GPA, a regression analysis
was performed and revealed an unstandardized regression coefficient of B = .40 (β = r =
.39, p = .001). As can be seen in Figure 18, a 1-unit increase in self-control scores
corresponded to almost a .50 increase in GPA. For instance, a self-control score of “3”
(scale midpoint) corresponded to a GPA of about 2.9, a “4” to a GPA of about 3.3, and a
“5” to a GPA of about 3.7. What is potentially most illuminating about this metric
mapping is that according to the regression equation, a 4.0 GPA would correspond to a
hypothetical self-control score of “6.” Linking the self-control scores to external criteria
such as GPA, which have real-world meaning, therefore helps make apparent the
meaning and implications of a given self-control score and hence the metric becomes less
arbitrary. Through such linkages between self-control scores and GPA, we start getting a
rough sense of the approximate location of the scores of the measure on the underlying
dimension of self-control (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006b).

18

Although this strategy deviates from the main metric calibration strategies elaborated in the introduction,
such that scores from the self-control measure are linked to behavioral expressions of a different rather than
the same construct, this different approach is nonetheless consistent with theorizing by Blanton and Jaccard
(2006b), who stated that metric calibration can also be achieved by linking scores to theoretically-relevant
behaviors “so that one can better appreciate the real-world implications of obtaining one test score versus
another” (p. 63; see also Sechrest et al., 1996).
19

Unfortunately, GPA was self-reported in this study which is not ideal for a metric study. However, as
mentioned by Tangney et al., the self-control GPA relation was virtually unchanged when controlling for
social desirability using the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne &Marlowe, 1960), rpartial =
.32.
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Figure 18: Grade point average plotted against Tangney et al.’s (2004) trait selfcontrol scores.

3.4.2

Extraversion and Conscientiousness

Hong and Paunonen (2009) investigated and found reliable associations between various
personality facets and health-risk behaviors, which provides the necessary components to
further illustrate metric calibration for the constructs of extraversion and
conscientiousness. In a sample of 124 undergraduate students, Hong and Paunonen had
participants complete the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and a behavior report form
(BRF; Paunonen, 2003) that included various behaviors theoretically-relevant to different
personality facets. For my purposes, I focused on behaviors that seemed the most
interpretationally meaningful with respect to the available personality facets.
Consequently, I examined the behavior of attending social parties as a behavioral
reference point for the extraversion facet of Gregariousness and I also examined speeding
behavior as a reference point for the conscientiousness facet of Dutifulness. The
personality items were answered using a 5-point strongly disagree-strongly agree scale
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(Costa & McCrae, 1992) and each facet score was a sum score based on 8 items. The
behavior of attending social parties was assessed by the question “Estimate the average
number of parties per month that you attend.” For participant who had a driver’s license,
speeding behavior was assessed by the question “What is the fastest you have driven?”
measured in kilometers per hour.
Regression analyses revealed illuminating metric calibration patterns for both behaviors.
For the extraversion facet, the regression analysis revealed a robust positive relation
between Gregariousness facet scores and number of social parties attended per month, (B
= 2.01, β = r = .39, p = .0001). As is visually depicted in Figure 19 (panel A), a 1-unit
increase in Gregariousness scores corresponded to attending 2 more parties per month.
For instance, a Gregariousness score of “3” (scale midpoint) corresponded to attending
approximately 3 social parties whereas a Gregariousness maximal score of “5”
corresponded to attending about 7 social parties per month.

Figure 19: Number of parties per month given gregariousness facet scores (panel A)
and maximum driving speed given dutifulness facet scores (panel B).
For the conscientiousness facet, the regression analysis revealed a reliable negative
relation between Dutifulness facet scores and speeding behavior (B = -12.4, β = r = -.24,
p = .01). As shown in Figure 19 (panel B), a 1-unit increase in Dutifulness scores
corresponded to a maximum driving speed that was about 12 km/h slower. For example,
a Dutifulness score of “3” (scale midpoint) corresponded to a maximum driving speed of
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about 156 km/h whereas a Dutifulness maximal score of “5” corresponded to a maximum
driving speed of about 131 km/h. These metric linkages between lower-order personality
facet scores and external theoretically-relevant behaviors hence provide preliminary
information about the meaning of the metric of these personality inventories. To the
extent that personality theorists can agree on where certain behaviors locate an individual
on a relevant underlying personality dimension, then linking personality scores to those
behaviors can provide information about the meaning and implication of particular
personality scores.
Taken together, the metric mappings presented in these additional analyses provide more
empirical substance to strengthen my contention that the metric calibration approach is
feasible when applied to constructs commonly studied in basic psychological research.
Furthermore, these additional analyses will also provide more empirical examples to use
as illustrations to further demonstrate some of the proposed benefits and utility of the
metric calibration approach, which I will discuss further in the General Discussion.
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Chapter 4

4

General Discussion

In a world where the metrics of our instruments are meaningful, psychological research
could be done in importantly different ways, ranging from the way data are analyzed and
interpreted, to how psychological theories are tested, to how psychological findings are
catalogued. The overarching goal of the current dissertation is to make the case that it is
both useful and feasible to calibrate the metric of psychological instruments commonly
used in basic research, as to render their metrics non-arbitrary. In this section, I will first
review and summarize the findings from my empirical demonstrations that speak to the
feasibility of the metric calibration approach and then elaborate on the broader
implications of the metric approach with respect to the usefulness of non-arbitrary
metrics by reviewing several potential benefits they may one day provide.

4.1

Feasibility

Across seven distinct constructs assessed in five different samples (including two
samples graciously provided by other researchers), I demonstrated that it is empirically
possible to reduce the metric arbitrariness of instruments commonly used in basic
research. In these metric calibration studies, I illustrated how to apply a metric calibration
approach to a variety of psychological instruments, whether self-report or behavioral,
whether for predominantly trait-like (e.g., conscientiousness) or state-like (e.g., risktaking) constructs, and whether the construct is commonly studied in social psychology
(e.g., self-enhancement), cognitive psychology (e.g., risk-taking), or personality
psychology (e.g., extraversion). In summary, Study 1 showed a meaningful metric
calibration result for the metric of the instrument most commonly used to assess need for
cognition, an important individual difference variable in the research area of attitudes and
persuasion (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Scores from Cacioppo et al.’s
(1984) need for cognition measure were calibrated to the probability of choosing to
complete a cognitively effortful over a cognitively simpler task. Study 1 also found an
interesting metric mapping between scores of a practically useful self-report measure of
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task persistence (Steinberg et al., 2007) and actual persistence in an anagram persistence
task, whereby a non-linear cubic function explained three times more variance than a
linear metric mapping (which incidentally was replicated in another relevant dataset
shared by Ditre and Brandon, 2008). The “dipping shape” in the metric calibration
relation (see Figure 11), suggested that individuals indicating the maximal score on the
self-report measure may be over-reporting their typical task persistence (how the metric
approach can help in detecting measurement problems such as these will be elaborated
below).
Set in the context of the pan-cultural debate of self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2003),
Study 2 found theoretically interesting metric linkages (linear and cubic, see Figure 13)
between a trait rating measure of self-enhancement (which figures prominently in the
debate) and a specifically configured behavioral measure of self-enhancement. More
specifically, the metric mappings showed that trait rating scores above the scale midpoint
(typically interpreted as self-enhancement) corresponded to very little evidence of actual
self-enhancement behavior as assessed by over-claiming of knowledge in the OCT (see
Figure 13). This finding suggests that researchers should not interpret trait scores above
the scale midpoint as evidence for self-enhancement. Rather, metric calibration research
is required for making these kinds of claims whereby trait self-enhancement scores are
empirically connected to consensually agreed upon behaviors argued to reflect selfenhancement.
Study 3 extended the metric calibration approach to commonly used behavioral measures
of risk-taking and found meaningful metric mappings to risky gambles in binary lottery
choices involving the possibility of winning real money. For instance, the observed
mapping between an almost maximal score on the Columbia card task measure and a
50/50 chance of choosing the $10 gamble over the $6 safe choice was illuminating in
demonstrating how the metric approach can imbue meaning into scores and hence reduce
metric arbitrariness (see Figure 17). In addition, Study 3 successfully demonstrated the
calibration of the metric of two self-report measures of risk-taking (Risk Propensity Scale
and DOSPERT scale) to the same risky gamble choices.
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Finally, the feasibility of the metric approach was further demonstrated by re-analyzing
relevant datasets from samples shared by other researchers. Meaningful metric mappings
were found for instruments assessing extraversion, conscientiousness, and self-control.
Gregariousness facet scores were linked to number of social parties attended per month,
Dutifulness facet scores (conscientiousness) were connected to maximum driving speed,
and trait self-control scores were calibrated to GPA.
Taken together, these empirical demonstrations across several constructs and samples
provide concrete evidence that it is possible to apply the metric calibration approach (and
hence increase metric meaning) to constructs commonly studied in basic psychological
research. Though many challenges exist in the calibration process of psychological
instruments, the empirical illustrations reported herein should nonetheless reveal to
researchers that the metric calibration approach espoused in this dissertation is possible.
The next big question, then, is whether metric calibration is worth it? That is, what
concrete benefits do we gain from metric calibration and non-arbitrary metrics? I turn to
this next.

4.2

Implications

In this section, I review the implications of the metric calibration approach with respect
to utility following the structure and order used in the Introduction (see Table 1 for a
summary of the proposed benefits). Consequently, I will briefly elaborate on the potential
usefulness for each of the proposed benefits and further support my claims by drawing on
some of my empirical demonstrations or by providing additional re-analyses of yet other
shared datasets from the literature.

4.2.1

Help in the Interpretation of Data

In my first category of proposed benefits, I argue that non-arbitrary metrics would
facilitate the process of interpreting data in three main respects.

4.2.1.1

Enhance Interpretability of Statistical Effects

First, I contend that calibrated metrics would help in the interpretation of data by
enhancing the interpretability of statistical effects for statistical procedures commonly
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used in basic research. I will focus my attention on moderated multiple regression
(MMR), which has become the statistical procedure of choice in basic research to probe
interactions involving continuous predictors (rather than the sub-optimal approach of
using median splits; MacCallum et al., 2002). To demonstrate my point, I will re-analyze
a finding from the psychological literature involving need for cognition as a moderator
using calibrated NFC values found in Study 1, rather than the values of +/- 1 SD above
the sample specific mean used by convention. The psychological finding that I examined
is from a study by O’Hara, Walter, and Christopher (2009), who, in the context of
understanding the personality underpinnings of political behavior, found that NFC
moderated the relation between conscientiousness and political behavior.

20

Figure 20

(panel A) shows the main conscientiousness × NFC interaction from their study plotted at
+/- 1 SD (SD = .72) above the sample specific mean of “3.4” (predictors mean-centered
and product term created; Aiken & West, 1991).

Figure 20: Moderated multiple regression re-analysis of O’Hara et al. (2009) using
conventional +/-1 SD (panel A) or calibrated values (panel B).
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To find this dataset, I first combed the literature for relatively recent articles reporting data patterns
involving NFC as a moderator of some psychological effect. I found about 20 such articles and e-mailed
the corresponding authors requesting their datasets. Only two of such 20 requests resulted in the acquisition
of the relevant datasets (typically no reply or datasets unavailable). I report re-analyses from the O’Hara et
al. (2009) paper given that it best demonstrated the principles at hand.
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As can be seen, for those scoring 1 SD below the sample specific NFC mean, individuals
with higher conscientiousness scores exhibited higher levels of political interest, whereas
those scoring 1 SD above the sample specific NFC mean exhibited relatively high levels
of political interest regardless of their conscientiousness scores. With the calibrated NFC
metric in hand from Study 1 (for illustrative purposes), however, the interpretation of this
data pattern can be enhanced considerably. This can be achieved by analyzing the
conscientiousness × NFC interaction at calibrated NFC values, which have gained
meaning via empirical linkages to corresponding NFC behavior (i.e., completing
cognitively effortful task). For illustrative purposes, I re-analyzed O’Hara et al.’s
interaction pattern by centering the NFC scores around the NFC score associated with a
50/50 chance of choosing to complete the cognitively challenging task (mean = 3.8; see
Figure 10). Then, to plot and test simple slopes, I analyzed the relation between
conscientiousness and political interest at the calibrated NFC values associated with a
25% and 75% chance of completing the cognitively challenging task (i.e., NFC values of
“2.9” and “4.7”, respectively). The data pattern from this re-analysis is displayed in
Figure 20 (panel B). This illustration renders three major things apparent. First, it should
be evident that the interpretation of the MMR data pattern is enhanced given that the
interaction is analyzed using NFC values that have been grounded to actual NFC
behavior rather than arbitrary NFC values which have no meaning other than a relative
interpretation. That is, one gets a better sense of what the interaction might mean
psychologically because the relevant slopes can be interpreted with respect to the
probabilities of exhibiting a relevant behavior. In this particular case, that is, the relation
between conscientiousness and political interest is positive for the calibrated NFC value
of “2.9”, which corresponds to a 25% chance of exhibiting an NFC behavior, whereas the
relation is negative for the calibrated NFC value of “4.7”, which corresponds to a 75% of
exhibiting the NFC behavior.
The interpretation of the MMR data pattern is also enhanced because the interaction
analysis involving calibrated values, which are grounded to theoretically-relevant
behavior, may reveal different patterns of results which could have different, but
potentially important, theoretical implications. As is evident in Figure 20 (panel B), the
slope between conscientiousness and political interest is markedly more negative at the
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calibrated high NFC value (i.e., “4.7”) compared to the +1 SD NFC value (i.e., “4.1”).
Even though in this particular case, the different interaction pattern may not imply a
drastically different theoretical implication, it is quite possible that it could in a more
theoretically driven research situation. In research on implicit versus explicit attitudes, for
instance, a negative slope (rather than a flat slope) between implicit and explicit attitudes
is sometimes interpreted as over-correction of the implicit attitude on the explicit attitude
measure (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Hence, if the use of calibrated NFC values in such MMR
analyses consistently yielded negative implicit-explicit attitudes slopes at the calibrated
high NFC value (whereas the +1 SD above the mean value did not yield such negative
slopes), then this could have important theoretical implications regarding over-correction
processes underlying attitude judgments.
A final way calibrated values could enhance data interpretation in MMR analyses is by
overcoming sampling error issues inherent in the conventional MMR approach. The issue
involves the fact that the +/-1 SD approach is based on sample-specific values of the
mean and standard deviation. Thus, it is possible, due solely to sampling error, that an
interaction analysis yields a different pattern of results from previous research, which a
researcher incorrectly interprets in a theoretically substantive way (hence obfuscating the
accumulation of knowledge). For instance, returning to O’Hara et al.’s (2009) interaction
pattern (Figure 20, panel A), consider a follow-up extension study on the same topic, but
this time the mean of the NFC scores is “4.0” rather than “3.4”. In this situation, a
negative conscientiousness-political interest slope may be found and interpreted
theoretically even though the result would have been due solely to the NFC-aberrant
sample of individuals. If, on the other hand, it would be standard convention to use
consensually-agreed upon calibrated NFC values to analyze these types of MMR
analyses, this sampling error issue would be overcome, and hence the interpretation of
data would be enhanced.
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Strictly speaking, even a consensually-agreed upon convention of always using particular non-calibrated
scale scores when executing such MMR analyses could also overcome the sampling error issue (though
researchers would also need to agree to always use the same number of scale points). From a metric
calibration perspective, however, it is clear that striving toward consensually agreed upon calibrated metric
values is the most useful approach.
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4.2.1.2

Allow Extraction of More Information from Data Patterns

Another way non-arbitrary metrics could facilitate the interpretation of data is by
allowing the extraction of more information from data patterns. As alluded to in the
Discussion section for Study 3, the use of calibrated metrics in experimental studies could
allow more fine-grained interpretations of experimental effects that emerge at different
locations on the scale of the DV. That is, with non-arbitrary metrics, it becomes apparent
that an experimental effect in different ranges of the DV metric implies something
different psychologically and hence should be interpreted as such theoretically. For
example, referring back to Figure 17 (dotted line), it can be seen that an experimental
effect found at the upper range of the CCT metric (e.g., M = 29.0 vs. M = 26.0, d = .5)
would mean something quite different psychologically than an experimental effect of the
same size found at the mid range (e.g., M = 15 vs. M = 12, d = .5). This would be so
because a mean difference at the upper range of the CCT metric is associated with a
much larger difference in lottery choice behavior than the same mean difference in the
middle range (same logic as in Blanton & Jaccard, 2006b).
To make the proposed benefit more concrete, the calibrated CCT metric can be applied to
an actual (quasi-) experimental study of risk-taking in the literature, whereby Figner et al.
(2009, Experiment 3) found that teenagers turned over statistically significantly more
cards in the hot CCT than adults (M ~= 25 vs. M ~= 20, d = .65). If this study were
replicated, however, and one found an experimental effect of the same magnitude, but in
the middle or lower range of the CCT metric, it would be much more apparent (given the
calibrated CCT metric) that this experimental effect implies something different
psychologically and hence should be interpreted as such. Furthermore, even in the case
where the metric mapping for a certain metric is linear (e.g., calibrated trait rating metric
to OCT behavior, Study 2, Figure 13), it can be argued that using a calibrated metric
makes it much more apparent that an experimental effect has occurred at a different
location on the DV because one will naturally pay more attention to metric values if they
have some kind of meaning (rather than if the metric is arbitrary, which tends to
encourage just focusing on p-values and effect sizes). Hence, using calibrated non-
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arbitrary metrics could allow the extraction of more information from experimental data
patterns and thus facilitate how data are interpreted and catalogued.

4.2.1.3

Help Overcome Limitations of NHST

A final way calibrated metrics could aid with data interpretation is by potentially
overcoming some of the limitations of NHST. The basic idea is that measures with a
calibrated metric could help us gauge the theoretical “noteworthiness” of an experimental
effect, above and beyond the statistical significance and effect size indices, because the
experimental effect could be interpreted with respect to the relevant calibrated behavior.
To illustrate this concretely, I will apply my metric findings for the BART to an actual
experimental effect from the literature involving the BART as DV. For instance,
Benjamin and Robbins (2007) investigated the impact of framing effects on risk-taking in
the BART and found that a loss frame led to higher scores in the BART compared to a
gain frame (Mloss = 48.8 vs. Mgain = 42.3, p < .05, d = .57). The metric calibration results
of BART scores in the present Study 3 help to add meaning to this experimental effect
via its linkages to behavior in the risky lottery task (i.e., predicted probability of choosing
the $10 gamble over the $4 safe bet). That is, Benjamin and Robbins’ experimental effect
in the particular range of the BART metric (i.e., BART score of “49” and “42”)
corresponds to probabilities of .64 and .60 of choosing the risky $10 gamble (over the $4
safe bet), respectively (see Figure 16). Hence, one can interpret the increase in risk-taking
in the BART due to Benjamin and Robbins’ particular framing manipulation as roughly
equivalent to a 7% increase in the probability of choosing that particular risky gamble. As
illustrated in this example, non-arbitrary metrics information can be seen as providing
additional information to consider (over and above p-values, sample size, and effect
sizes) when faced with the difficult task of deciding on the “noteworthiness” of an
experimental result (Kirk, 1996). Hence, in this sense, using calibrated metrics could be
seen as helping us with data interpretation in the context of the limitations of NHST.

4.2.2

Facilitate Construct Validity Research

In my second category of proposed benefits, I argue that the metric calibration approach
could help with construct validity research in three main regards.
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4.2.2.1

Construct Illumination

Metric calibration could help construct validity research by shedding brighter (i.e., more
illuminating) light on the construct at hand. Consistent with more nuanced
conceptualizations of construct validity by past theorists (i.e., Cronbach & Meehl, 1955;
Messick, 1989), the process of linking test scores to theoretically-relevant and
meaningful behaviors can be seen as a more compelling form of evidence supporting the
construct validity of a psychological instrument (Messick, 1995). This is so because the
connection between test scores and theoretically-relevant behavior that results from
metric calibration reveals more illuminating construct validity evidence given that test
scores are linked directly to specifically-configured interpretable behaviors rather than
just another theoretically-related measure. Furthermore, and importantly, construct
validity evidence adduced by the metric calibration approach is more fine-grained
because it involves modeling particular response functions (linear or non-linear) between
test scores and behavior expressed in meaningful unstandardized regression coefficients
(or odds ratio in the case of a binary behavioral outcome) rather than the conventional
(and arguably impoverished) zero-order “validity” correlations. For example, the
Impulse-Control (conscientiousness) task persistence metric mapping found in Study 1
provides a useful demonstration of this point. As can be seen in Figure 12, every unit
increase in Impulse Control self-report scores corresponded to roughly a 25 second
increase in persistence on the near-impossible anagrams. This metric mapping translates
to about 1 minute and 12 seconds of persistence for individuals reporting Impulse Control
scores at the scale midpoint of “3” and about 1 minute and 37 seconds of persistence for
individuals reporting Impulse Control scores of “4”. Therefore, these kinds of mappings
between test scores and specific behaviors provide more illuminating and hence stronger
construct validity evidence for the psychological instrument at hand.

4.2.2.2

Help with Conceptual Challenges

Metric calibration could also help construct validity research by aiding with challenging
conceptual issues that often arise in the development of psychological instruments. In
particular, the process of metric calibration may help with conceptual challenges related
to construct definition and basic theorizing of the construct (Messick, 1989). One
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conceptual challenge that often arises, for example, is the issue of how broad a construct
should be defined. That is, finding the most optimal construct definition that is neither too
broad nor too narrow in scope (Gawronski et al., 2008). Some of these issues became
readily apparent when going through the metric calibration process for the construct of
conscientiousness in Study 1. For example, even though most researchers seem to accept
the construct definition of conscientiousness as the propensity of being painstaking and
careful in acting according to the dictates of one’s conscience (John & Srivastava, 1999),
conscientiousness in the literature is actually posited to have many different facets
including Self-Discipline, Carefulness, Thoroughness, Organization and Orderliness,
Deliberation, Industriousness, Conventionality, Reliability, Virtue, Dutifulness, and Need
for Achievement (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; Roberts et al., 2005). Given
that metric calibration requires researchers to focus on only a few diagnostic behavioral
manifestations of the construct, it has the potential to help with conceptual issues such as
whether a construct is too broad in scope.
In fact, I contend that a case can be made that conscientiousness is too broad in scope and
that conceptual clarity could be achieved by relegating most of those lower-order facets
of conscientiousness to their proper distinct constructs (e.g., relegate “need for
achievement” conscientiousness facet to actual “need for achievement” construct;
McClelland, 1951). Indeed, these types of conceptual challenges relate very closely to
what Jack Block termed the “jingle-jangle fallacy” (1995, 2000) whereby the same term
is used by different researchers to refer to different psychological entities and where
different terms are used by different researchers to refer to the same psychological entity.
In this respect, I contend that the metric calibration approach has the potential to help
researchers work through these difficult conceptual challenges.

4.2.2.3

Measurement Benchmark

A final way metric calibration studies could also help with construct validity research is
by providing a sort of measurement benchmark for detecting measurement problems
and/or to further improve psychological instruments. The logic underlying this idea stems
from the recently mentioned fact that the empirical metric linkages between test scores
and theoretically meaningful behaviors provide richer and arguably more diagnostic
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information than traditional convergent or criterion validity approaches. The non-linear
metric mapping between self-reported task persistence and persistence in the anagram
task provides a good example of this proposed benefit. As depicted in Figure 11 (dotted
line), a non-linear cubic function was found which explained almost three times more
variance than a linear function. This “dipping” pattern (which was subsequently
replicated in Ditre & Brandon’s, 2008 data) suggested that many individuals endorsing
the highest possible response on the self-report measure (“4” out of 4) exhibited some
kind of over-reporting bias given that these individuals showed less persistence in the
anagram task than those with a lower self-report persistence score (i.e., “3.5”). This
metric calibration finding demonstrates how the metric calibration approach may
facilitate the process of detecting measurement issues and also help in improving
measurement instruments. Indeed, a straightforward implication of the task persistence
self-report measure problem would be to examine whether a strong accuracy or honesty
instruction would eliminate the alleged over-reporting bias, as would be reflected if a
linear function would explain more or just as much variance as a cubic function.

4.2.3

22

Contribute to Theoretical Development

In my third category of proposed benefits, I argue that non-arbitrary metrics could
contribute to theoretical development more broadly, by aiding in theoretical debates
involving absolute claims, allowing for more precise theorizing in our scientific
language, and providing a platform for more quantitative testing of theories.

4.2.3.1

Aid in Theoretical Debates Involving Absolute Claims

First, I argue that metric calibration could contribute to theoretical development by
helping in theoretical debates that involve making absolute claims about psychological
phenomena. That is, the metric approach demonstrated in the current dissertation can
contribute in new ways to theoretical development in basic psychology by providing
methodological machinery for researchers to more directly tackle theoretical questions
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In fact, Ditre and Brandon (personal communication, February 10, 2010) showed great interest in my
finding and in wanting to execute such a follow-up construct validity study.
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that involve making claims of an absolute nature. Many interesting theoretical questions
are absolute in nature, for instance: “Is (implicit) self-esteem universally positive?”
(Yamaguchi et al., 2007), “Are young people narcissistic?” (Twenge, Konrath, Foster,
Campbell, & Bushman, 2008), and “Are most people unconscious racists?” (Blanton &
Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b). With arbitrary metrics, however, we cannot tackle these
important research questions directly and so researchers either tippy-toe around the
question in less effective indirect ways or avoid the questions altogether. The systematic
use of a metric calibration approach, however, could potentially open the door to more
directly tackling these important questions about human psychology.
Study 2 illustrated how the metric calibration approach could potentially be valuable in
contributing to theoretical debates involving absolute claims, by focusing on the pancultural debate of self-enhancement (Heine, 2005; Sedikides et al., 2003). The metric
mapping results for a trait rating measure of self-enhancement commonly used in the
debate showed that very little behavioral evidence of self-enhancement corresponded to
trait scores typically interpreted as self-enhancement. That is, a trait rating score of “5”
(on a 1 to 7-point scale) typically interpreted as self-enhancement (e.g., Gaertner et al.,
2008), corresponded to the over-claiming of only about 3 non-existent words.
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Of

course, this mapping should be interpreted with some caution given the small sample size
and lack of consensus on the OCT behavioral reference point. For the sake of illustration,
however, if one would put stock into this metric mapping, then a theoretical implication
for the pan-cultural debate could be that researchers should not use trait rating scores
tested against the scale midpoint to examine self-enhancement within or across cultures.
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This conclusion becomes even more pronounced if one uses the minimum value that is statistically
greater than the scale midpoint. In my sample, a trait rating score of “4.2” would be statistically
significantly greater than the scale midpoint of “4” (p < .05), but would only be associated with overclaiming of about one non-existent word. This was manifested in Gaertner et al. (2008), for example, where
a trait-rating mean of “3.7”, statistically greater than the scale midpoint of “3.5” (p < .05), was taken as
evidence of self-enhancement in a Taiwanese sample.
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4.2.3.2

Allow More Precise Theorizing via Enhanced Scientific
Language

Metric calibration could contribute to theoretical development in a second sense by
making our scientific language more precise, which in turn will increase the precision in
our theorizing. That is, calibrating the metric of psychological instruments empirically
substantiates claims about the standing of individuals on the underlying psychological
dimensions captured by those instruments. At present, theorizing containing references to
“high-X individuals” or “low-X individuals” doing certain things under certain conditions
are rampant in the literature (where X can be any construct). For example, “…high-SE
individuals possess self-doubts and insecurities…” (Jordan et al., 2003, p. 975). These
kinds of meter-reading claims are strictly unsubstantiated given that they are based on
scores with arbitrary metrics (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b), and hence impede
accurate theorizing and potentially interferes with theory development. With arbitrary
metrics, all that one can say is that individuals who “scored high (or low)” on a certain
instrument acted in certain ways. Only when scores are empirically calibrated to
behaviors consensually agreed-upon as reflecting high (or low) levels of the construct
does one’s theorizing involving expressions such as “high-X individuals” become
empirically substantiated.
For example, consider the preliminary metric calibration finding from Study 3 showing
that an almost maximal CCT score of “29” (out of “30”) corresponded to only a 50/50
chance of choosing a risky $10 gamble over $6 for certain (see Figure 17, dotted line). As
this example nicely demonstrates, it would be potentially misleading to assume that a
high score on this measure reflects a high level of risk-taking in an absolute sense. This
problem becomes even more apparent when one considers adopting this kind of meterreading strategy to different instruments of the same construct, for instance, Study 3’s
BART. It should be clear that a high score on the BART does not necessarily reflect the
same level of risk-taking than a high score on the CCT. This important issue, however, is
obfuscated when unsubstantiated expressions such as “high-X individuals” are made
based on measures with arbitrary metrics. The metric calibration approach could
overcome these problems and lead to more precise scientific language in describing
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psychological phenomena. Ultimately, this could facilitate more accurate theorizing
about human psychology and hence contribute to theoretical development more broadly.

4.2.3.3

Quantitative Testing of Psychological Theories

A final way metric calibration could potentially contribute to theoretical development is
by providing a platform for testing psychological theories in a more quantitative manner
rather than the strictly directional hypothesis testing approach typically used in
psychology (Meehl, 1978). In particular, using more meaningful calibrated metrics in
day-to-day research activities may eventually get researchers into the habit of paying
much more attention to the meaning of particular scores and metric meaning more
broadly. And in conjunction with the more nuanced interpretations of data patterns
calibrated metrics could allow, this different mentality may eventually lead to more finegrained integrated theoretical accounts of a research area which could facilitate the
process of testing psychological theories more quantitatively by developing hypotheses
involving particular point-value predictions. In physics, specific point-value predictions
involve comparing a theoretically predicted value xo (based on theoretical considerations
of the particular experimental or natural factors embedded in a situation) with the
observed mean x o, and determining whether the predicted value falls within the band of
probable error (due to random measurement error) of the empirically observed mean
(Meehl, 1967). Although it might be difficult to imagine that psychological theory will
ever be developed enough to be able to generate these types of point-value predictions, I
contend that the metric calibration approach may provide a developmental platform in
striving toward this general direction.

4.2.4

Facilitate the General Accumulation of Knowledge

The metric calibration approach may facilitate the general accumulation of knowledge
more broadly in three main respects. These are described below.

4.2.4.1

Valuable Information in its Own Right

The empirical findings that result from the metric calibration approach can be seen as
valuable information in its own right. That is, knowing what kinds of particular
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theoretically-relevant behaviors correspond to certain scores on a particular measure
provides, in itself, valuable knowledge about human psychology. For example, my reanalysis of Hong and Paunonen (2009) revealed a meaningful metric mapping between
gregariousness facet scores and number of social parties attended per month, such that a
maximal score of “5” corresponded to attending about 7 social parties per month. By
building a network of these kinds of metric mappings for various instruments assessing
diverse psychological constructs, valuable information could be systematically amassed
regarding our general knowledge of the psychological landscape.

4.2.4.2

Guiding Framework for Cataloguing the Magnitude of
Psychological Effects

The metric calibration approach could also help the general accumulation of knowledge
by providing a framework to help systematically catalogue the magnitude of
psychological effects, as strongly advocated by Jacob Cohen (1994). With arbitrary
metrics and effect size indices of limited meaning, however, storing up information about
the magnitude of experimental effects would likely be quite unproductive. With
calibrated metrics, on the other hand, this storing up of information could potentially be
much more useful because one could express the magnitude of a psychological effect
with respect to the calibrated (and consensually agreed-upon) behavioral reference points.
That is, one could express the magnitude of a particular manipulation on a set of DV
scores in terms of meaningfully interpretable behaviors. For example, pulling from my
previous re-interpretation of Benjamin and Robbins’ (2007) study involving a framing
manipulation on BART scores, one could catalogue the magnitude of the experimental
effect in terms of the increased probability of choosing the risky gamble. In this way, it is
hoped that we could perhaps finally heed to John Tukey’s (1969) plea for psychologists
to store up “amount[s], not just direction” (p. 86).

4.2.4.3

Facilitate Phenomenon-Based Research

A final way the metric calibration approach could contribute to the general accumulation
of knowledge is by facilitating phenomenon-based research (Asch, 1952/1987; Rozin,
2001). Adherents of the phenomenon-based research perspective argue that it is critical to
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identify and describe phenomena and invariances before engaging in more sophisticated
types of modeling and hypothesis testing. Viewed from this perspective, I contend that
the metric calibration approach could provide a useful general framework to engage in
this type of descriptive, phenomenon-driven research. In fact, basic metric calibration
studies, such as those executed in this dissertation, can be viewed as providing
descriptively-rich information about psychological phenomena, given that the goal of the
metric approach is to discover how the scores of a certain measure map onto meaningful
behaviors argued to reflect different levels of the underlying construct. View in this light,
metric calibration can be seen as having the potential to contribute more broadly to the
accumulation of psychological knowledge.

4.3

Relatedness to Other Past Measurement Approaches

The metric calibration approach espoused in this dissertation is broadly consistent with,
and can be seen as extending, other past measurement approaches, which are worth
mentioning for the sake of knowledge continuity. Importantly, however, notable
differences exist between these methods and the metric approach and ultimately only the
proposed metric calibration approach can render the units of measurement of
psychological instruments non-arbitrary.
For instance, Guttman’s (1950) scalogram approach involves finding a series of
behaviors such that all individuals exhibiting a set of cumulatively-ordered behaviors
belong to the same “level” of the underlying construct, whereas individuals exhibiting
those same behaviors and at least one additional behavior belong in the next higher
“level” of the construct. To achieve such Guttman scaling, the set of behaviors must be
ordered cumulatively such that exhibiting a set of such behaviors is assumed to reflect a
lower level of the construct than someone exhibiting that same set of behaviors in
addition to one other cumulatively-ordered behavior. Consider as an example the
Guttman scale developed to measure fear of battle in World War II soldiers (Stouffer,
1950). For this scale, individuals who did not experience “violent pounding of the heart”
during battle formed the lowest level of the construct, while those who did were part of
the next higher level of the construct. If a soldier also reported a “sinking feeling in the
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stomach” during battle as well as violent pounding of the heart, the solider belonged to
the next higher level of the construct, and so on.
The Guttman (1950) scalogram approach can be seen as similar to the metric calibration
approach in the sense that it focuses on the meaning of particular behaviors that are
assumed to reflect different levels of the underlying construct. An important difference,
however, between such approach and the metric calibration approach is that the
cumulatively-ordered behaviors are typically self-reported in the Guttman approach
whereas metric calibration emphasizes the objective manifestation of meaningfully
interpretable behaviors. A more important difference, however, lies in the fact that no
metrics or scores are calibrated in the Guttman approach because the behaviors are used
in and of themselves to reflect the different levels of the underlying construct whereas the
goal in metric calibration is to empirically connect particular scores to behaviors argued
to reflect different levels of the underlying construct.
Thurstone’s (1927) method of equal-appearing intervals is another measurement
approach that metric calibration is broadly consistent with. In such an approach,
individuals indicate their agreement or disagreement with attitudinal statements that have
been empirically judged to vary with respect to favorability toward the attitude object.
Measurement scores are then calculated by examining the items that individuals agreed
with and computing the average item favorability score for each of those endorsed items.
The Thurstone approach can be seen as similar to the metric calibration approach in the
broad sense that effort is put into creating endorsable statements that have been
empirically judged to reflect different levels of the underlying construct. Nonetheless,
and similar to the Guttman (1950) approach, the Thurstone approach is clearly different
from metric calibration because the endorsed statements (or more accurately the average
item favorability of the endorsed statements) are used in and of themselves to reflect
different levels of the underlying construct. Hence, it is unknown how resulting scores
map onto the underlying dimension because scores are based on subjective favorability
judgments from independent judges.
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The metric calibration approach can also be seen as an extension of “concept mapping,”
which is sometimes used in the item generation stage when developing self-report
instruments in the social sciences (Trochim, 1989). In this approach, concept mapping
refers to a “type of structured conceptualization” (p. 1) that facilitates the process of
conceptualizing the domain of a construct by using concept maps. From this perspective,
a group of experts of a certain construct would generate statements that describe
behaviors a person high in the construct would exhibit, distinct from behaviors a person
low in the construct would exhibit. Self-report items are then constructed based on those
statements. As can be seen, the concept mapping approach involves asking very similar
questions that a researcher from the metric calibration approach would ask, with regard to
behaviors reflective of high or low levels of the construct. The major difference, of
course, is that in the metric approach the relevant behaviors are used to calibrate test
scores rather than simply being used to generate self-report items.
Finally, the metric calibration approach espoused in this dissertation can also be seen as
an extension of two approaches used in the area of industrial/organizational psychology.
For instance, metric calibration can be viewed as an extension of the expectancy chart
approach sometimes used in the context of personnel selection (Lawshe & Bolda, 1958;
Lawshe, Bolda, Brune, & Auclair, 1958). In this approach, charts are constructed such
that the expected likelihoods of successful job performance of an individual are tabulated
for different ranges of predictor scores on some kind of assessment tool (e.g., a
personality measure). For instance, obtaining a score in the 50th percentile could
correspond to an expected probability of .2 of successful job performance whereas a
score in the 90th percentile could correspond to an expected probability of .6 of successful
job performance. Such approach is similar to the metric approach in the sense that an
empirical mapping is sought between particular test scores and the probability of
exhibiting a particular relevant behavior. The approaches are also similar in the sense that
similar types of statistical analyses are used to empirically connect test scores to behavior
(e.g., logistic regression). The two approaches differ in important ways, however, in that
only the metric calibration approach focuses on developing meaningful units of
measurement for different instruments of a construct. In this sense, the metric calibration
approach is significantly different from the expectancy chart approach given that only the
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metric calibration approach requires specifically choosing and configuring theoreticallyrelevant behaviors to serve as reference points that can be argued to reflect particular
locations on the underlying dimension of interest. Also, only in the metric calibration
approach is it relevant to select several distinct behaviors to reflect ordered reference
points. Finally, the metric calibration approach uniquely focuses on calibrating different
instruments to the same behavioral reference points as to discover what ranges of the
underlying dimension the different instruments are capturing.
Utility analysis is another approach in industrial/organizational psychology that could be
seen as a past research approach extended by the metric calibration approach. Originally
introduced by Brogden and Taylor (1950) and further developed by Cronbach and Gleser
(1965), utility analysis refers to a quantitative method that estimates the benefits in dollar
figures that would be gained by an organization if an intervention or selection procedure
designed to increase worker productivity was used. In a selection context, for instance, a
utility analysis approach would allow one to estimate how much money an organization
would gain if a person selected for a job had a particular score on a selection test
compared to another score (e.g., hiring a person with a score of “45” on a selection
measure could benefit the company $50,000 versus hiring a person with a score of “40”).
The utility analysis approach is similar to metric calibration in the sense that scores from
the selection measures are linked to external criteria that describe the implications of
receiving one score versus another. As with the expectancy chart approach, the two
approaches are also alike in that similar types of statistical analyses are used (e.g., linear
regression). The two approaches differ in important ways, however, in that the goal in
utility analysis is to specifically link selection scores to dollar figures to help managers
evaluate the financial impact of their decisions whereas the more general goal in the
metric calibration approach is to link the scores of different instruments to a common set
of behavioral reference points as to render the units of measurement of the different
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instruments meaningful and comparable. Hence, only in metric calibration is the focus on
developing meaningful units of measurements that researchers can collectively use.
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In summary, the metric calibration approach can be seen as broadly consistent with all of
these past measurement approaches. More specifically, the metric calibration approach
can be viewed as an extension and refinement of these past measurement approaches
rather than being viewed as a completely novel approach.

4.4

Limitations and Caveats

At the empirical level, the two most important limitations of the current dissertation are
related to the sample size of the present metric calibration studies and the need for
consensus in choosing appropriate behavioral reference points. In metric calibration
studies proper, large samples are required to ensure that the parameter estimates of the
metric mapping functions are accurate (i.e., stable) estimates of the relevant parameters
of the targeted population. This is critical because in metric calibration the ultimate goal
is to find meaningful empirical linkages between test scores and the probability or
frequency of theoretically-relevant behaviors. Hence, if the sample size is small and
parameter estimates of the metric function are contaminated with large amounts of
sampling error, then a metric mapping found in a particular sample may not be very
meaningful and hence useful. For instance, in the case of a binary behavioral reference
point, the log-odds coefficient and intercept upon which the metric mapping is calculated
may be too imprecise of a population estimate to put much stock in. Though what
constitutes a “large” sample may be difficult to pinpoint exactly, I would say sample
sizes in the range of 300 or more should be considered as a lower bound.
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Another approach in the I/O psychology area that relates to metric calibration broadly construed is the
Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System (ProMES; Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stuebing, &
Ekeberg, 1989), which seeks to develop integrative sets of utility functions for different aspects of
successful job performance (e.g., % of circuit boards completed) using a common organizational
effectiveness metric as outcome of the utility functions. This approach differs in important ways from
metric calibration, however, in that metric mappings are not established by empirically connecting test
scores to independently measured behavioral reference points but rather the utility functions between the
different aspects of job performance and organizational effectiveness are decided by discussion and
consensus (though the different aspects of job performance are measured).
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The second most important limitation at the empirical level is the need for some kind of
collective consensus in agreeing on behaviors that are most theoretically appropriate to
serve as behavioral reference points. Consequently, it is important to realize that my
empirical demonstrations are limited by the extent to which relevant experts agree with
my choice of behavioral reference points. I tried my best possible to choose behavioral
reference points that were theoretically derived and conceptually consistent with the most
commonly accepted working definition of each construct, including sometimes
contacting relevant experts and soliciting their opinions (e.g., in the case of choosing
lottery risk choices as behavioral reference points for risk-taking; T. Pleskac, personal
communication, June 15, 2010). Nonetheless, strictly speaking without some kind of
consensus on the appropriateness of the behavioral reference points, at best the empirical
demonstrations should be seen as simply that: illustrative empirical examples of the
metric calibration process assuming some kind of consensus exists.
At a more conceptual level, two limitations are worth briefly discussing here. First, the
metric approach may be limited in utility for broad personality constructs often studied in
personality psychology. That is, given the sometimes explicit goal in personality research
to assess and understand broad behavioral trends (typically assessed via self-report;
Paunonen, 2009), rather than more circumscribed and particularly meaningful behaviors,
it could seem that the metric calibration approach, which requires the selection of only a
few relevant behaviors to act as reference points, is of limited utility for the calibration of
instruments in the personality area. Though there may be a grain of salt in that position, I
contend that a possible alternative view on this issue is that the metric approach may
suggest that such modal measurement approach in personality is in itself limited. This
perspective would be consistent with pleas by certain theorists who have recently called
for much more direct behavioral observations in personality research (Back & Egloff,
2009; Furr, 2009; Mehl, 2009). Ultimately, these theorists argue that focusing more of
our attention on direct behavioral observations would bring us closer to the key mission
of psychology: “understanding the determinants and consequences of what people
actually do” (Back & Egloff, 2009, p. 405).
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The metric calibration approach could also be seen as limited in utility for instruments
assessing highly phenomenological constructs that tap into psychological states not
directly reflected in any observable behavior. For instance, instruments used to assess
phenomenological or “experiential” constructs such as consciousness or sensory color
perceptions may not be amenable to the metric calibration approach. That being said, I
would put forward that many constructs that appear at first glance to be too experiential
or subjective for metric calibration may, upon further consideration, actually be amenable
to metric calibration. For example, constructs such as personal values, inner motivations,
and transient feelings all could, upon deeper consideration, be argued to nonetheless have
correspondent behavioral manifestations that could be used as reference points to
calibrate the scores of such subjective and experiential measures (e.g., attending a pro-life
rally as a behavioral manifestation of holding anti-abortion values).
Another caveat worth mentioning is that in certain research situations, the metric issue
may be less relevant if researchers are more simply interested in the description of
behavior rather than using behavior as a proxy for an underlying latent construct. For
instance, in the psychological literature of addiction research, researchers may be
interested in assessing the number of daily cigarettes smoked after an intervention as a
completely descriptive measure of that specific behavior. In this very specific research
situation, metric calibration is not relevant because the metric (i.e., number of daily
cigarettes smoked) is meaningful given the strict descriptive nature of the assessment
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a). That being said, if the number of daily cigarettes is used as a
proxy to assess self-regulation, then the metric becomes arbitrary and metric calibration
becomes relevant if one wants to get a sense of where on the underlying dimension of
self-control the number of cigarettes metric falls. It seems safe to say that the vast
majority of psychological research falls in this latter category whereby behaviors are used
as a proxy to an underlying latent construct (Borsboom, 2005; Embretson, 2006).

4.5

Future Directions

In this section, I want to briefly elaborate on a few different future directions that I
believe constitute potentially fruitful avenues to explore to increase the feasibility and
ultimate utility of the metric calibration approach. First, future metric calibration research
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should seriously consider using more sophisticated methodology to assess richer
behaviors to serve as reference points. This could include, for example, using eyetracking technology to assess particular eye gaze behaviors that could serve as diagnostic
behavioral reference points to calibrate test scores of an instrument assessing a relevant
construct. For instance, in the context of calibrating test scores for a measure of goal
activation, one could use the percentage of time individuals’ gaze focus on goal-relevant
features of serially presented pictures. Eye-tracking methodology may turn out to be a
powerful general tool for metric calibration research because eye gaze behaviors may be
more diagnostic reflections of the construct at hand, given that early saccades have been
argued to be relatively unfiltered “up-stream” components of behavior (Guitton & Volle,
1987). Using an observational approach whereby independent judges code behavior
observed in carefully constructed laboratory situations could also be another fruitful
avenue to explore to provide richer behavioral reference points.
In addition, future research should also consider utilizing more sophisticated
methodology to assess ecologically valid behaviors that emerge in naturalistic settings to
serve as behavioral reference points. Though at first glance this future direction seems
methodologically prohibitive, recent technological developments have made possible the
assessment of human behaviors in vivo as they naturally occur in the lives of individuals
tracked over time. For instance, Mehl and colleagues (2001) have developed the
electronically activated recorder (EAR) as a naturalistic observation sampling method
that allows researchers to unobtrusively “observe” actual behavior as it unfolds in natural
environments. This is achieved by individuals wearing a pocket-sized audio-recorder that
captures snippets of ambient sounds in individuals’ momentary environments at random
intervals throughout the day, which can then be coded by independent judges. As an
example, in one study Mehl and colleagues coded the percentage of people’s waking
hours spent socializing, in the context of a cross-cultural study on whether Mexicans are
more or less sociable than Americans (Ramirez-Esparza, Mehl, Alvarez Bermudez, &
Pennebaker, 2009). From a metric calibration perspective, these ecologically valid
behavioral observations provide arguably the most meaningful and compelling behavioral
reference points for which to calibrate test scores.
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Another avenue to explore is the utility of my proposed experimental approach to metric
calibration inspired by the calibration of instruments in the physical sciences such as the
thermometer and hygrometer. The basic logic here is to experimentally manipulate the
construct at hand to extreme levels and look to identify any qualitatively distinct
behavioral manifestations of the construct that can serve as additional or better reference
points. This would potentially supplement the standard metric calibration approach in
important ways because it is possible that more diagnostic behavioral reference points
exist outside the range of naturally-occurring levels of the construct (akin to how the
calibration of thermometers to naturally-occurring levels of temperature could be seen as
limited, because the fixed points of boiling and freezing water do not necessarily arise
within naturally-varying temperature levels).
Finally, it is worth considering the application of more advanced psychometric
procedures as future avenues to supplant the extant metric calibration approach. One
angle to take in this vein is to explore the utility of a within-subjects approach to metric
calibration by employing psychometrically-inspired state-space models (e.g.,
Commandeur & Koopman, 2007). From this perspective, the construct at hand is
assessed using a repeated-measure design using both the to-be-calibrated measure and
relevant behavioral assessments. Then, individual-specific slopes and intercepts can be
estimated which can then be used to construct person-specific metric mappings to some
common behavioral reference point. This approach could be very powerful given that it
would allow for the consideration and comparison of metric calibration patterns at both
the intra- and inter-individual levels (which could turn out to be critically important).
A final psychometric future direction to consider is the application of item response
theory (IRT; Embretson & Reise, 2000; Lord, 1980) to provide a more sophisticated
modeling of relevant behavioral reference points. An important conceptual obstacle in the
metric calibration approach is that sometimes several different behaviors may be seen as
theoretically meaningful in serving as reference points and so the choice of behaviors
could turn out to be difficult for certain constructs. It may be possible, however, to use an
IRT approach to model a set of hierarchically-ordered behaviors (treated as “items”
varying in “item difficulty”), which could yield “behavior” characteristic curves, that
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would reveal the predicted probability of exhibiting each behavior as a function of a
person’s level on the underlying construct.

25

This could be seen, in a sense, as an IRT

approach applied to a Guttman-like behavioral scale. Ultimately, this approach could
provide a valuable tool allowing for a more fine-grained use of multiple behaviors to act
as distinct and ordered reference points to calibrate scores of psychological instruments.

4.6

Coda

In closing, given the advent of new technological developments in both methodological
assessment tools and psychometric advances, the future is bright for the metric
calibration approach to contribute in important ways to the betterment and advancement
of basic psychological research. I leave you with the hope that, in the spirit of John
Tukey, the metric calibration approach may one day finally allow psychological
researchers to care about their units of measurement. Ultimately, this would solidify the
cornerstone of measurement that so critically underlies empirical psychological research.
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I would like to thank Patrick Shrout for discussions that directly inspired this future direction research
idea (P. Shrout, SPSP 2011, January 28, 2011).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Conscientiousness items (MPQ and NEO-FFI) used in Study 1.
Conscientiousness facets (MPQ; Tellegen & Waller, 1994; NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae,
1992) (IPIP version of the MPQ and NEO-FFI facets; Goldberg et al., 2006)
HOW ACCURATELY CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF?
The next part of the experiment involves describing yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the
future. Describe yourself as you HONESTLY see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you
are, and roughly the same age.
So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept anonymous in absolute confidence.
You will be presented with a series of statements of behavioral descriptions. For each statement, indicate (using the
scale options) whether the statement is:
1
Very Inaccurate

2
Moderately
Inaccurate

3
Neither Accurate
Nor Inaccurate

4
Moderately Accurate

5
Very Accurate

as a description of you.
MPQ1. I like to plan ahead.
MPQ2. I make a mess of things.*
MPQ3. I am exacting in my work.
MPQ4. I pay attention to details.
MPQ5. I often make last-minute plans.*
MPQ6. I jump into things without thinking.*
MPQ7. I make plans and stick to them.
MPQ8. I like to act on a whim.*
MPQ9. I do things by the book.
MPQ10. I make rash decisions.*
NEO1. I get chores done right away.
NEO2. I find it difficult to get down to work.*
NEO3. I am always prepared.
NEO4. I waste my time.*
NEO5. I start tasks right away.
NEO6. I postpone decisions.*
NEO7. I get to work at once.
NEO8. I need a push to get started.*
NEO9. I carry out my plans.
NEO10. I avoid mistakes.
NEO11. I rush into things.*
NEO12. I choose my words with care.
NEO13. I do crazy things.*
NEO14. I stick to my chosen path.
NEO15. I act without thinking.*
NEO16. I have difficulty starting tasks.*
Note. Asterisks (*) denotes reverse-scored items.
Scoring:
MPQ Self-Control facet: MPQ1, MPQ2r, MPQ3, MPQ4, MPQ5r, MPQ6r, MPQ7, MPQ8r, MPQ9, MPQ10r
NEO-FFI Self-Discipline facet: NEO1, NEO2r, NEO3, NEO4r, NEO5, NEO6r, NEO7, NEO8r, NEO9, NEO16r
NEO-FFI Deliberation (IPIP cautiousness) facet: NEO10, NEO11r, NEO12, NEO13r, NEO14, NEO15r, MPQ5r,
MPQ6r, MPQ8r, MPQ10r
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Appendix B: Conscientiousness items (AB5C) used in Study 1.
Conscientiousness Impulse-Control facet (Goldberg’s Abridged Big Five Dimensional Circumplex
[AB5C]; Goldberg, 1999)
HOW DO SEE YOURSELF IN GENERAL?
In the next task, you will see a series of common human traits. Please use these traits to describe yourself as
accurately as possible. Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in
the future. Describe yourself as you are GENERALLY or TYPICALLY.
For each trait that you will see, please indicate whether that trait describes you using the following rating
scale:
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Somewhat
Disagree

3
Neither

4
Somewhat Agree

5
Strongly Agree

Gold1. Careful
Gold2. Careless *
Gold3. Cautious
Gold4. Conscientious
Gold5. Erratic *
Gold6. Impulsive *
Gold7. Particular
Gold8. Rash *
Gold9. Reckless *
Gold10. Ritualistic
Gold11. Systematic
Gold12. Uncautious *
Note. Asterisks (*) denotes reverse-scored items.
Scoring:
Goldberg Impulse-Control facet: Gold1, Gold2r, Gold3, Gold4, Gold5r, Gold6r, Gold7, Gold8r, Gold9r,
Gold10, Gold11, Gold12r
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Appendix C: NFC items used in Study 1.
Need for Cognition revised scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)
The next task involves answering questions that are designed to assess your thinking style. There are no
right or wrong answers.
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you, using
the following scale options:
1
Extremely
Uncharacteristic

2
Somewhat
Uncharacteristic

3
Uncertain

4
Somewhat
Characteristic

5
Extremely
Characteristic

NFC1. I prefer complex to simple problems.
NFC2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
NFC3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
NFC4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my
abilities.*
NFC5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth
about something.*
NFC6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.
NFC7. I only think as hard as I have to.*
NFC8. I prefer to think about small daily projects rather than long-term ones.*
NFC9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.*
NFC10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
NFC11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
NFC12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me much.*
NFC13. I prefer my life to be filled with problems that I must solve.
NFC14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
NFC15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important
but does not require much thought.
NFC16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort.*
NFC17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.*
NFC18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
Note. Asterisks (*) denotes reverse-scored items.
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Appendix D: Anagram persistence task (APT) materials used in Study 1.
Anagram Persistence Task Materials (APT; Brandon et al., 2003)
Anagram

Solution

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

BEACH
KYLIX
MALAE
YAQUI
TRAIN
INIAC
FULBE
PADUS
VOICE
WATER
FLING

BEAHC
KLYXI *
LMAAE *
QYUIA *
NTRAI
CINAI *
LBFUE *
DPSUA *
EOCVI
AEWTR
IFNLG

Note. Items with an asterisk (*) indicate the 6 critical near-impossible items used to compute the behavioral
index of task persistence.
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Appendix E: Words used in over-claiming technique (OCT) of Study 2.
Over-claiming Technique 150 (variant of Version 2005.1)
Paulhus, D.L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M.N., & Lysy, D.C. (2003). The over-claiming technique: Measuring
self-enhancement independent of ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 890-904.
PLEASE INDICATE FOR EACH ITEM WHETHER YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE ITEM
OR NOT, BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER.
0
Never heard
of it

1
Familiar
with it

EXAMPLES:
1.

If you’re asked about POLITICIANS and the item said “Bill Clinton”, you would probably circle ‘1’ to
indicate that you are familiar with him.

2.

If the category was FAMOUS ATHLETES and the item said “Fred Gruneberg”, you would probably
circle ‘0’ if you have never heard of him.

Historical Names and Events
1. Napoleon
2. Robespierre
3. El Puente*
4. My Lai
5. The Lusitania
6. Ronald Reagan
7. Prince Lorenzo*
8. The Luddites
9. Neville Chamberlain
10. Vichy Government
11. Queen Shattuck*
12. Bay of Pigs
13. Torquemada
14. Wounded Knee
15. Clara Barton

Fine Arts
16. Mozart
17. a cappella
18. Pullman paintings*
19. art deco
20. Paul Gauguin
21. Mona Lisa
22. La Neige Jaune*
23. Mario Lanza
24. Verdi
25. Vermeer
26. Jackson Howell*
27. Grand Pooh Bah
28. Botticelli
29. harpsichord
30. dramatis personae

Language.
31. subjunctive
32. hyperbole
33. alliteration
34. sentence stigma*
35. euphemism
36. double entendre
37. blank verse
38. pseudo-verb*
39. ampersand
40. myth
41. aphorism
42. shunt-word*
43. simile
44. acronym
45. synonym

Books and Poems
46. Antigone
47. Murphy's Last Ride*
48. Catcher in the Rye
49. The Bible
50. Hiawatha
51. Trapnell Meets Katz*
52. Mein Kampf
53. The Aeneid
54. Faustus
55. The Boy Who Cried Wolf
56. Pygmalion
57. Hickory Dickory Dock
58. The Divine Comedy
59. Windermere Wild*
60. The Raven
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Authors and Characters
61. Adonis
62. Mephistopheles
63. Shylock
64. Ancient Mariner
65. Doctor Fehr*
66. Venus
67. Romeo and Juliet
68. Bulldog Graziano*
69. Norman Mailer
70. Horatio Alger
71. Charlotte Bronte
72. Artemis
73. Lewis Carroll
74. Admiral Broughton*
75. Mrs. Malaprop

Social Science and Law
76. yellow journalism
77. angst
78. nationalism
79. megaphrenia*
80. acrophobia
81. pulse tax*
82. pork-barreling
83. prejudice
84. Christian Science
85. ombudsman
86. consumer apparatus*
87. superego
88. trust-busting
89. behaviorism
90. Oedipus complex

Physical Sciences
91. Manhattan Project
92. planets
93. nuclear fusion
94. cholarine*
95. atomic number
96. hydroponics
97. alloy
98. plate tectonics
99. photon
100. ultra-lipid*
101. centripetal force
102. plates of parallax*
103. nebula
104. particle accelerator
105. satellite

Life Sciences
106. mammal
107. adrenal gland
108. sciatica
109. insulin
110. meta-toxins*
111. intestine
112. bio-sexual*
113.meiosis
114. ribonucleic acid
115. electrocardiograph
116. amniotic sac
117. hemoglobin
118. retroplex*
119. antigen
120. recessive trait

Century Culture Names
121. Gail Brennan*
122. Jackie Robinson
123. Houdini
124. Ginger Rogers
125. Greta Garbo
126. Dale Carnegie
127. Scott Joplin
128. Rube Goldberg
129. George Gershwin
130. Mae West
131. Jesse Owens
132. Oliver Marjorie*
133. Louis Lapointe*
134. King Kong
135. P.T. Barnum

Philosophy
136. logistic heresy*
137.creationism
138. Goedel’s theorem
139. social constructionism
140. Platonic sense*
141. hermeneutics
142. esoteric deduction*
143. ghost in the machine
144. Hegel
145. Socrates
146. categorical imperative
147. free will
148. Ayn Rand
149. situational ethics
150. Principia Mathematica

Note. * Indicates items that are foils (i.e., non-existent items: 3, 7, 11, 18, 22, 26, 34, 38, 42, 47, 51, 59, 65,
68, 74, 79, 81, 86, 94, 100, 102, 110, 112, 118, 121, 132, 133, 136, 140, 142).
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Appendix F: Domain-specific risk-taking scale (DOSPERT) items used in Study 3.
Domain-specific risk-taking scale (DOSPERT; 30-item version, Blais & Weber, 2006)
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described
activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.
Provide a rating from using the following scale:
1
2
3
4
Extremely
Moderately
Somewhat
Not Sure
Unlikely
Unlikely
Unlikely

5
Somewhat
Likely

6
Moderately
Likely

1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S)
2. Going camping in the wilderness. (R)
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F)
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F)
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S)
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E)
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (S)
8. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F)
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E)
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E)
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F)
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (R)
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (F)
15. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S)
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. (E)
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F)
19. Taking a skydiving class. (R)
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.11 (S)
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S)
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R)
25. Piloting a small plane. (R)
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S)
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S)
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S)
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E)
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E)
Note. E = Ethical, F = Financial, H/S = Health/Safety, R = Recreational, and S = Social.

7
Extremely
Likely
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Appendix G: Ethics approval for Study1.
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Appendix H: Ethics approval for Study 2.
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Appendix I: Ethics approval for Study 3.
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